The hard argument for China's soft landing
The world has at last embraced the Chinese growth miracle. But in doing so it may be missing an important reality check. Two problems have recently emerged in the Chinese economy: a credit bubble and inflation. The good news is that China is already coping with these issues. The bad news is that the world may be unprepared for the impact of a Chinese slowdown.
The recent excesses of the credit cycle are staggering. In the 12 months to November 2003 the outstanding volume of China's total bank loans rose by 20 per cent, nearly double the average gains of 12 per cent over the 1997-2002 period. The acceleration has been concentrated in the four state banks that provide funding for China's vast network of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Unfortunately, with excess lending flowing into this shaky segment of the Chinese economy there is growing risk of a new wave of non- performing bank loans. There is also mounting evidence of a property bubble in pockets of the relatively wealthy coastal region, especially Shanghai.
Meanwhile, there has been a notable shift in the inflation dynamic: after 15 months of deflation, China moved back into positive inflation territory in early 2003. And inflation has begun to accelerate, hitting an annual 3 per cent in November - the sharpest rise in nearly seven years.
Has the Chinese economy overheated? Not yet. But it certainly could if the authorities did nothing. For that reason, China's central bank took action to stem the potential excesses of credit-induced inflation, raising reserve requirements on bank deposits to 7 per cent from 6 per cent in late September.
The medicine appears to be working. Bank loan growth averaged just Rmb82bn (�7.7bn) in October and November, down sharply from average monthly gains of Rmb275bn in the first three quarters of the year.
The turn in China's credit cycle could have important implications for other Asian economies, for which Chinese imports have become an important source of external demand. Last year, China accounted for about 70 per cent of Japan's total export growth, for South Korea nearly 40 per cent and for Taiwan an astonishing 90 per cent. Nor is Asia alone in this. Chinese demand accounted for US and German export growth as well. Needless to say, as China slows, such trade linkages will spread the impact quickly.
There is good reason that the world is not prepared for the coming Chinese slowdown. In the rush to embrace miracle growth, there is little appreciation of what is most important to China: the overarching imperative to stay the course of reforms without disturbing social stability. Critical to this process is the unrelenting restructuring of the SOE network, resulting in the annual elimination of some 7m - 9m state-funded jobs. China's reforms are all about creating a market-based alternative to its antiquated SOE sector and sustaining a vigorous growth climate capable of re-employing most of the displaced workers.
China cannot afford a "growth accident" that might destabilise this process. The bigger its economy and the further it goes down the reform road, the more severe the consequences of any such accident. To the extent that recent credit and inflation developments raise the risk of a hard landing, Chinese authorities have a great incentive to try to engineer a soft landing.
If history is a guide, the western consensus will probably veer from one extreme to another in assessing China's economic prospects. The debate over China's currency peg could be pivotal in this regard. Alan Greenspan, US Federal Reserve chairman, recently stressed the risk of recession that would arise from defending a currency regime by creating excessive domestic liquidity.
Mr Greenspan's view adds to the growing chorus in the west urging China to revalue the renminbi. The arguments in most cases are thinly veiled efforts to get China to temper pressures elsewhere in the world. In particular, Japan and Europe, among the world's wealthiest regions, remain reluctant to reform even as they demand a currency adjustment from a poor nation that is aggressively reforming.
Yet China is dealing with its growth excesses on its own terms - not on terms politically expedient in the west. Fortunately, the Chinese have not fallen behind the curve in tackling these concerns. Unfortunately, the rest of the world is misreading China once again.
The writer is chief economist at Morgan Stanley
中国经济软着陆的硬道理
世界终于承认了中国的经济增长奇迹。但正因如此，人们可能走向另一个极端，而忽略了重要的负面现实。近期，中国经济出现了两大问题：一是信贷泡沫，二是通货膨胀。从好的方面说，中国已经在处理这些问题。从不好的方面说，世界可能会对中国经济的减缓措手不及。
当前信贷周期内，近期的过度借贷令人惊讶。截至2003年11月的十二个月内，中国的未清偿银行贷款总额上升了20%，高出1997年至2002年期间12%的平均增幅几乎一倍。四大国有银行须对此负主要责任；这些银行为中国庞大的国企网络提供资金。不幸的是，随着过多贷款流入国企这个最不健全的经济板块，爆发新一轮不良银行贷款危机的风险越来越大。此外，在相对富裕的沿海地区，特别是在上海，房地产泡沫日益明显。
与此同时，中国的通涨态势也已经发生了值得注意的变化：在经历了15个月的通缩之后，中国经济在2003年初恢复正数通涨。近来通胀速度更开始加快，2003年11月的年通胀率达到3%，为将近七年来的最大升幅。
中国经济是否已经过热？答案是"还没有"。但假如宏观调控部门坐视不理，过热是完全可能的。正因如此，中国央行已采取行动，制止信贷泡沫引发通涨，进而导致过度的势头。9月下旬，央行将银行存款的准备金要求由原来的6%提高至7%。
这贴药看来正在奏效。2003年10月和11月，银行贷款平均每月仅增长820亿人民币，大大低于2003年前三个季度2,750亿人民币的月平均增幅。
中国信贷周期的转折，有可能给亚洲其他经济体带来重大影响。对于这些经济体而言，中国的进口已成为重要的外来需求来源。去年，中国为日本总出口增长贡献了大约70%；至于韩国，则接近40%；而台湾的总出口增长中，竟有高达90%是输往中国大陆的。这种情况还不仅限于亚洲。美国和德国的总出口增长中，也有相当大一部分是来自中国的需求。无庸讳言，随着中国经济减缓，其所产生的冲击将经由这些经贸纽带快速传递。
不难理解世界为什么对中国经济即将减缓缺乏准备。在赞叹奇迹般增长之余，外界对于中国的"重中之重"其实了解甚少：对于中国政府而言，压倒一切的任务，是在不影响社会稳定的前提下深化改革。而改革进程的关键，是坚定不移地对国企架构进行重组，每年裁减约700至900万个国企岗位。中国的各项改革，归根结底是要为落伍的国企打开一条符合市场规律的出路，同时保持强劲的经济增长势头，以期让多数下岗工人再就业。
由此可见，中国经受不起有可能破坏改革进程稳定的"成长意外"。经济规模越大，改革越深入，这种意外造成的后果就越严重。近期的信贷泡沫和通涨走势，增加了经济"硬着陆"的风险，因此，中国政府有足够的原动力想要实现"软着陆"式的经济减缓。
假如历史可以为鉴，那么西方关于中国经济前景的普遍共识，很可能又会从一个极端跳到另一个极端。围绕中国汇率"盯住"政策的辩论，可能成为这方面的关键。美联储主席格林斯潘最近强调说，制造过量的国内流动资金来维护固定的汇率机制，会增加经济衰退的风险。
格林斯潘先生的观点，应和了西方国家不断要求人民币升值的合唱。他们的论点大多是一些既自私又拙劣的藉口，目的是让中国为他们缓解压力。尤其是日本和欧洲这两个世界上最富有的经济区，一方面自己不愿投身改革，另一方面要求一个正在积极推进改革的穷国调整汇率。
然而，中国正按照自己的方式解决发展过程中出现的过度问题，不急于迎合西方政客的眼前需要。幸运的是，中国人处理问题的步伐并不落后。不幸的是，世界又一次误读了中国。
本文作者是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)首席经济学家
