John Kay: A blessing in disguise?
The collapse of the stability and growth pact has left European fiscal policy in disarray. But this is not only a crisis for the European Union. Acrimonious debate in Brussels reflects hard choices at the national level. And not just in France and Germany. Gordon Brown, Britain's finance minister, is struggling to balance the books ahead of next week's pre-Budget statement. His US counterparts do not even try. The US has a growing federal deficit, plans for deep tax cuts and fiscal crisis in almost all 50 states.
Private-sector accountants have had a rough time recently but public-sector accountants have also been under pressure. France and Germany have at least been open in their breach of the EU's budgetary rules. Had it not been for smart footwork by the people who manage its public finances, Italy would have been arraigned too. And Mr Brown has kept Britain's public debt low by taking large amounts of public borrowing off-balance-sheet through the private finance initiative.
Only the US, home of Arthur Andersen, could have invented dynamic scoring. Since tax cuts are sure to promote growth, the deficits they seem to create are really revenue enhancements. Sounds familiar? This comes from the people who told you that the more money a dotcom was losing, the better were its prospects.
Around the world, monetary policy has gained credibility as fiscal policy has lost it. Inflation has been defeated but budgets are in crisis.
The difference is the level of political involvement. Politicians have willingly disengaged from the day-to-day management of monetary policy to set a framework within which central banks can perform that task. Central banks have used this autonomy to build authority and expertise. But politicians have engaged not just with the substance of fiscal policy but also with its presentation. US budget projections are based on fantastic assumptions, politically imposed.
A political fix that establishes more flexible parameters to replace the Maastricht criteria will not deal with this underlying problem. Fiscal policy needs a framework with moral authority, flexible when appropriate, rigid when necessary and independently monitored. Mechanisms of fiscal policy should enjoy the respect commanded by the Federal Reserve Board and the Bank of England's monetary policy committee.
The idea of a fiscal policy commission seems to have originated with Alan Blinder, the US economist*, and has recently been developed in Europe by CESifo, the economic research organisation**. Expertly staffed and politically independent, such a body could gradually establish the same legitimacy as agencies of monetary policing. Its primary task would be to define the level - not the structure - of taxation needed to finance expenditure decisions. It would consider whether public accounts did indeed reflect a true and fair view. And as it gained credit for its independence, securities markets would make it hard for governments to ignore what it said.
The EU's common currency requires both supranational and national supervision of fiscal policy. For the eurozone as a whole, a European fiscal policy commission should stand alongside the European Central Bank and perhaps operate under its auspices. Its brief would be to assess the consistency of national fiscal policies with the ECB's inflation targets.
But it will be effective only if supported by similar bodies in individual member states. Governments will never delegate responsibility for setting tax rates. But they could, and should, delegate responsibility for judging the overall tax level appropriate to planned expenditure. As with monetary agencies, the best fiscal agencies would impose competitive pressure on the weaker and enhance their skills.
The end of the stability pact will be a victory rather than a defeat if it leads to new ways of monitoring and controlling fiscal policy. Such mechanisms are needed in Brussels, Paris and Berlin. They are needed even more in New York and Washington.
稳定公约终结焉知非福
随着《欧洲稳定与增长公约》的崩溃，欧元区财政政策陷入了一片混乱。但这不仅是欧盟整体面临的危机。布鲁塞尔的唇枪舌战说明，欧盟各成员国也同样面临着艰难抉择。而且，财政问题不光出现在法国和德国。英国财政大臣戈登o布朗(Gordon Brown)正在竭力平衡收支，为下周发表预算前声明做准备。而他的美国同行却干脆放弃了努力。美国政府财政赤字不断上升，同时还计划大幅度减税，而全国50个州几乎个个都存在财政危机。
近来，私营部门的会计师日子已很难过，而公共部门的会计师也是备感压力。至少，法德两国对违背欧盟预算规定的行为并不遮掩。而意大利却全靠公共财政管理人士耍手腕，才免遭责难。另外，布朗先生利用私人融资方案(PFI)，把大笔公共借款挪至资产负债表外，从而使英国的公共债务维持在较低水平。
本来，只有安达信(Arthur Andersen)的总部美国才有可能发明出动态记账法。由于减税必能推动经济增长，那么，美国表面上创造的赤字其实就是税收的增加。这种说法听上去是不是很耳熟？那是从一些人的说法演变而来的，他们曾说，网站越亏钱前景越光明。
在全球各地，货币政策已经博得信赖，正如财政政策已经不可信一样。通货膨胀已经得到遏制，但财政预算却陷入危机。
Around the world, monetary policy has gained credibility as fiscal policy has lost it. Inflation has been defeated but budgets are in crisis.
差异在于政治干预程度不同。政治家设立政策框架，让央行在此框架下履行货币政策的日常管理职能，而自己却欣然抽身退出。央行利用这种自治权树立了权威、培养出专业技能。但是，政治家不仅对财政政策的具体内容横加干涉，对其表达方式也是指手画脚。美国预测的预算目标是建立在匪夷所思的、通过政治手段强加的假设之上。
可以设置更灵活的参数来取代《马斯特里赫特条约》(Maastricht)标准，但这样的政治机制无法解决上述根本问题。财政政策所需的框架必须具备道德权威，该灵活时就灵活，该严苛时就严苛，同时还要得到独立监控。财政政策机制，同美国联邦储备委员会或英国央行货币政策委员会一样，应该受到尊重。
成立一个财政政策委员会，这个主意似乎最先由美国经济学家艾伦o布林德(Alan Blinder)*提出，最近又由经济研究组织CESifo**在欧洲加以发展。该组织专家众多，政治独立，有望逐渐取得与各国货币监管机构同样的合法地位。这个委员会主要负责确定税收水平，而非税收结构，以满足支出决策的资金需要。此外它还须掂量：公共账目是否确实公正真实。如果该机构因保持独立而赢得公众信任，证券市场就将迫使政府重视它的观点。
由于欧盟采用单一货币，因此财政政策都应在国家和国家之上两个层面得到监督。为使欧元区成为一个整体，有必要成立一个欧洲财政政策委员会，与欧洲央行平行运作，或在欧洲央行管理下运作。它的主要任务将是，评估各国财政政策是否与欧洲央行的通胀目标保持一致。
但是，只有得到各成员国国内类似机构的支持，上述机构才能发挥作用。各国政府决不会将制定税率的重任委与他人，但可能、也应该委任他人来判断与计划支出相应的整体税收水平。正如货币政策机构一样，最好的财政政策机构也会对能力较弱的财政政策机构施加竞争压力，并改善它们的技能。
如果稳定公约的终结将带来新的财政政策监控方法，那么，它的终结将是一场胜利，而不是失败。这种机制布鲁塞尔、巴黎和柏林都需要，纽约和华盛顿甚至更需要。
