A Basket Case
Singapore may be tiny, but its influence isn't. Last year, China and Malaysia copied the city-state's exchange rate regime by announcing a move toward currency-basket regimes. A number of other Asian countries have also expressed interest in the idea. The irony is, Singapore's "currency basket" never was as simple as the pundits thought. And its system may not be as easily transferable, either.
First, some history. Singapore's central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), established the city-state's exchange-rate regime back in 1981. Since then, Singapore's bankers have let the Singapore dollar's value "float" within a certain band against an undisclosed basket of currencies -- primarily those of the country's major trading partners. Simple analysis suggests that the Singapore dollar is most significantly influenced by moves in the U.S. dollar, though there are some signs of a slight decline in the greenback's weight after 1998.
Singapore's set-up has advantages. By keeping the make-up of the basket secret, the MAS can fine-tune the exchange rate. It's also a way of ensuring greater flexibility in the face of external shocks. Nothing's set in stone, however: The MAS "periodically" reviews the policy to "ensure that it remains consistent with the underlying fundamentals of the economy."
The policy worked on several levels. Up until the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the MAS deliberately let the Singapore dollar gradually appreciate. This upward crawl kept inflation under check. The so-called "strong Singapore dollar policy" also forced local industry to constantly become more efficient, because as the currency's value rose, Singaporean exports became less price competitive.
The basket proved useful in tougher times, too. After the 1997-98 financial crisis, the Singapore economy lost some of its buoyancy and was faced with a declining export demand. So, the MAS stopped the policy of gradual appreciation of the Singapore dollar, giving its exporters a break in the short term. As business picked up again, the MAS switched once again to a gradual upward crawl while still letting the dollar float in a very narrow band around its basket.
To gauge Singapore's success, just compare it to Hong Kong, where business cycles have been largely similar. Singapore has experienced lower and less volatile inflation. This is principally due to the MAS's strong and pro-active exchange rate response to inflation concerns, unlike Hong Kong, which is bound by its U.S. dollar-based currency board arrangement.
Sound easy? Don't be fooled. When central banks adopt a Singapore-style exchange-rate arrangement, they usually envision a largely mechanical regime, where the central bank tries to keep the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate more or less within a predetermined band. But that's not how it works, in practice -- as China and Malaysia are probably learning.
According to our research, as well as others' work, Singapore's monetary policy is used for strategic purposes. Namely, the exchange rate is adjusted to stabilize inflation and economic growth, as well as dampen what the central bank considers excessive exchange-rate volatility. The MAS itself effectively says as much, in its Monetary Policy Statement which has been released on a semiannual basis since February 2001. That document plays a role in economic management, too -- by increasing transparency, it is helping promote foreign-exchange market stability.
There appears, too, to be an inconsistency in the way the MAS manages the Singapore dollar. Specifically, the MAS has generally let the exchange rate appreciate to counter any signs of inflationary and overheating pressures. However, it's much more circumspect about using the exchange rate to stimulate the economy during downturns. Why? Because of concerns that the depreciation would create domestic inflation. In other words, there's a definite "fear of inflation."
Many other small and open economies in Asia may also experience this "fear." But they won't have the other set of supply-side tools that Singapore has to manage its economy. In the tiny city-state, the central bank can fine-tune the economy by tinkering with the pension system's payouts, cutting wages and salaries, and changing land and corporate tax rates. Since the Singapore government generally cuts these costs -- sometimes quite drastically -- during a downturn, the MAS isn't forced to depreciate the Singapore dollar to maintain the city-state's short-term competitiveness.
Singapore's economy has a lot of advantages beyond its exchange rate. It's a productive place, with a fiscally prudent government. But the factors behind its success are quite unique to the city-state. This should give policy makers in other countries reason to pause before attempting to a replicate the Singapore exchange- rate system in its entirety
也论一篮子货币
虽然新加坡地小人少，但是它的影响却不小。去年中国和马来西亚模仿这个城市国家的汇率制度，宣布采用一篮子货币政策。很多其他亚洲国家对这一政策也表示出了兴趣。但具有讽刺意味的是，新加坡的“货币篮子政策”决非学者们想像的那么简单。它的汇率机制也并不那么容易被其他国家移植。
先讲点历史。新加坡央行──新加坡金管局(Monetary Authority of Singapore, MAS)早在1981年就建立了这套汇率制度。从那时起，央行确定了一篮子货币，并在这个框架下允许新加坡元在一定范围内“浮动”。新加坡金管局没有向外界公布一篮子货币的具体构成──基本上是主要贸易伙伴国的货币。简单分析表明，新元受美元变动影响最大，不过有迹象显示1998年以后美元的重要性有所下降。
新加坡汇率机制结构有自己的优势。因为一篮子货币的组成对外保密，新加坡金管局就能够微幅调整新元汇率。同时，这也是一种保证新加坡应对外部冲击时享有较大灵活性的有效方法。尽管汇率体制中有很多未知因素，但是新加坡金管局会“定期”回顾其政策，“以保证政策与经济基本原则相一致。”
新加坡的汇率政策在不同层面发挥作用。在1997-98年亚洲金融危机之前，金管局一直有意使新元逐步升值，使国内通货膨胀处于可控状态。同时，这种所谓的“强势新元政策”也迫使当地的产业不断提高效率，因为新元升值会削弱新加坡出口商品的价格竞争力。
这种一篮子货币政策在陷入困境的时候同样有效。在1997-98年亚洲金融危机后，新加坡的经济活力减退，出口商品需求下降。新加坡金管局暂停了新元逐步升值的货币政策，使出口商获得了一丝暂时之机。当出口行业情况好转时，新加坡金管局再次启用逐步升值政策，继续允许新元在一篮子货币框架下小幅浮动。
只要将新加坡与拥有相似经济周期的香港进行比较，我们就可以看到它的成功之处。新加坡的通货膨胀率较低，也更加稳定。这主要得益于新加坡金管局在应对通货膨胀时所采用的积极、有力的汇率政策。而香港却受限于以美元为基础的联系汇率制度。
听起来很容易吧？千万别被表象欺骗。当央行采取新加坡式的汇率政策时，他们构想的往往是一套大体上机械性运作的汇率体系，央行在这套机制内努力将贸易加权名义汇率控制在预先设定的范围内。但这并不是新加坡汇率机制的运作方式──中国和马来西亚或许正在了解这一点。
根据我们的研究以及其他人的调查，新加坡的货币政策是服务于战略目的的。也就是说，汇率调整是用来稳定通货膨胀，促进经济发展，抑制央行认为过于活跃的汇率波动的。新加坡金管局在半年一次的货币政策声明中有效、充分地说明了这一点。这份2001年2月开始发布的文件通过提高政策透明度在经济管理中发挥著作用，也有助于促进外汇市场的稳定。
不过，新加坡金管局管理新元的方式中似乎也有些不一致的地方。具体来讲，为了应对通货膨胀或经济过热带来的压力，金管局通常会让新元升值。然而，在经济低迷期需要利用汇率来刺激经济发展时，他们却谨慎得多。为什么？答案是：担心贬值会造成国内通货膨胀。换句话说，他们患有明显的“通货膨胀恐惧症”。
亚洲很多其他小规模开放型经济体或许也有类似的“恐惧症”。但是他们不像新加坡那样拥有管理经济的另一套供应面的工具。在这个小小的城市国家中，央行可以调整养老金支出金额、削减薪酬以及改变土地及公司税率来调节经济。新加坡政府往往会在经济低迷期降低了这些成本，有时力度很大，这样金管局就无需以新元贬值来维持国家的短期竞争力了。
除了汇率体制外，新加坡经济还有很多优势。经济生产率高，并奉行谨慎的财政政策。但其成功的背后是城市国家所独有的一些特色。这应该给其他国家的政策制定者足够的理由，在全盘抄袭新加坡汇率机制前三思。
