The answer to Asia's rise is not to retreat from the world
How can the world's rich countries compete with the rising Asian powers? Not only do the latter possess vast reservoirs of cheap and hard-working labour, but they are rapidly upgrading their exports. Soon, it is alleged, the Asian giants will undercut every producer located in rich countries. Yet local self-sufficiency will save us. Thus goes the argument of two prophets of "localisation".* But it is nonsense.
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The world is indeed suffering a huge supply shock, just as it did prior to the first world war. Then the shock was an increase in the effective supply of land, as the railway and steamship brought the "new world" into the global economy. This time, it is an expansion in the effective labour supply, which has tripled over the past two decades, according to Richard Freeman of Harvard University (see charts). In an integrated world economy, suggests Helmut Reisen of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, equilibrium real wages in high-income countries should fall by about 15 per cent.**
We do not live in such a world. This is obviously true for labour, where tight controls on migration fragment the global market: thus, a study for the US bureau of labour statistics concludes that average labour costs per hour in Chinese manufacturing were just $0.60 in 2002, against $24 in Germany (see charts). Yet Germany is still the world's largest exporter of manufactures.
What is the impact of Asia's entry into a world with such highly segmented pools of labour?
One point is evident: the reason for the Asians to export is to increase their consumption, at least in the long run. If the Chinese, for example, could produce everything more cheaply at home, their exporters would find that the euros they earned would be worthless. True, the Chinese government could buy the unwanted currency. But what would be the point of accumulating ever vaster currency reserves if there were nothing worth buying with them?
A slightly more sophisticated view would be that the Chinese do want to earn foreign currency, but to buy oil and other natural resources. But why should they expect Saudis to accept euros in payment? The answer is that oil producers continue to buy things from rich countries that cannot be supplied more cheaply by the Chinese.
If China were indeed to replace all exports from high-income countries in world markets, the latter would be driven to self-sufficiency automatically. No policy would be needed. But protection against imports from China would shift domestic resources towards where China and India are already competitive and away from where they are least so. Damaging one's most competitive activities to nurture one's least competitive ones would be mad.
The view that the Asians will simply end up more competitive in everything is absurd. What, then, is the true impact of the labour supply shock? The short answer is that it generates a fall in the world relative prices of labour-intensive goods and services against those more intensive in now scarcer resources of capital (both human and physical) and land.
This has two consequences: shifts in the terms of trade, namely, changes in the relative prices of imports and exports of Asia's partner countries; and changes in the distribution of income within the latter, as prices of labour, capital and land adjust.
China's terms of trade have deteriorated markedly since it opened up. Estimates suggest that prices of its exports have fallen by about 25 per cent relative to those of its imports. In this way, China's exports make the rest of the world better off.
That China has made the rest of the world better off, as a whole, does not mean it has made every single country better off. The more similar is a country's comparative advantage to China's the more likely it is to be a loser (and vice versa). In practice, the winners are likely to be producers of industrial raw materials, particularly fuel. For the high-income countries, Asia's impact is mixed: it lowers the price of the goods and services they import from developing countries (which makes them better off), but raises the price of imported commodities (which makes them worse off). In recent years, the latter effect has outweighed the former for the US and Germany. The UK has gained, however, largely because it is self-sufficient in energy (see charts).
Now suppose China's entry indeed made a country worse off, by raising the prices of its imports relative to those of its exports. Mexico seems to be an example. Would Mexico be better off if it protected its producers against imports from China? The answer is: no. The loss is imposed by what has happened to prices in world markets. Taxing imports will not reverse that loss, unless Mexico had monopoly power in world trade. Normally, protection will inflict an additional cost upon the economy. Crying over spilt milk is foolish.
For high-income countries, the bigger the gain from falling world prices of labour-intensive imports, the larger the shift in the internal distribution of income against unskilled labour. Thus the benefit also creates the challenge.
Fortunately, it should be a manageable one. The forces pushing for global wage equalisation through trade are quite weak. Nevertheless, the end result is likely to be employment of unskilled labour almost exclusively in the production of non-tradeable goods and services. But provided controls are maintained on immigration of unskilled labour, that need be no disaster. Other measures are also worth considering. Among them are lowering taxes on low-wage incomes; subsidies to the wages of unskilled workers; and support for education and training.
The world is indeed going through a huge supply shock. But for the high-income countries, the best advice is: relax. The internal redistribution of income caused by trade is likely to be modest. Above all, deliberately shifting their structure of production in the direction of Asia's comparative advantage, through protection, would be mad. Let us rejoice in trade's ability to help people escape misery, take the benefits and facilitate necessary adjustments instead.
* Caroline Lucas and Colin Hines, Europe's Hi-Tech Future: The Last Colonial Delusion, December 2005,
www.carolinelucasmep.org.uk/publications/; ** China and India's Implications for the World Economy,
www.oecd.org/reisenMartin Wolf discusses global issues with influential economists.
富国如何应对中印崛起？
世
界的富国如何才能与崛起的亚洲大国竞争呢？后者不仅拥有大量廉价而勤劳的劳动力，而且还在迅速升级它们的出口。据称，亚洲大国很快就会抢去富国中每个制造商的生意。然而，本土的自给将会拯救我们。两个 “本土化”预言家的论点如是说。*但这是胡说八道。
世界正如一战前那样，的确在遭受一场巨大的供应冲击。当时的冲击是，随着铁路和轮船将“新世界”带入全球化经济，土地的有效供应量增加。这一次则是有效劳动力供应的增加，据哈佛大学的理查德?弗里曼(Richard Freeman)表示，过去20年有效劳动力供应已增至原来的3倍(见图表)。经合组织(OECD)的赫尔穆特?赖森(Helmut Reisen)指出，在一体化的世界经济中，高收入国家的均衡实际工资应该下降约15%。 **
我们并非生活在这样的世界里。这对劳动力而言显然是事实，因为对移民的严格控制割裂了全球市场：因此，一份为美国劳工统计局(US bureau of labour statistics)所做的研究断言，2002年中国制造业平均劳动力成本每小时仅为0.60美元，而德国为24美元 (见图表)。但德国仍然是全球最大的制造品出口国。
亚洲进入一个劳动力市场分化如此严重的世界会带来什么影响呢？
有一点很清楚：亚洲人出口的原因是为了增加他们的消费，至少长期而言是这个目的。例如，如果中国人可以在本国以更低的成本生产所有东西，他们的出口商就会发现，他们所赚的欧元毫无价值。没错，中国政府可以买下这些没有用的外汇，但假如没有东西值得用这些钱来买，积累越来越多的外汇储备有什么用呢？
一个稍微成熟一点的观点是，中国人确实想赚外汇，但是用来买石油和其它自然资源。不过，他们怎么知道沙特人会接受用欧元付款呢？答案就是，产油国仍然要从富裕国家购买中国无法廉价供应的东西。
假如中国确实在世界市场上取代了高收入国家的所有出口，后者将被迫自动地走向自给。不需要任何政策。但为抵制来自中国的进口而采取的保护行动，会把国内资源转移到中印已经具有竞争力的领域，却脱离了中印最没竞争力的领域。破坏最有竞争力的活动而去培育最没竞争力的活动，这是非常愚蠢的。
亚洲人最终肯定会在所有事情上都更有竞争力的观点是荒谬的。那么，劳动力供应冲击的真正影响是什么呢？简短的回答是，它会造成劳动密集型商品和服务的世界相对价格下降，而目前更稀缺的资本(人力资本和实物资本)和土地资源价格则相对上涨。
这有两个后果：贸易条件的改变，也就是亚洲伙伴国家进出口相对价格的改变；以及随着劳动力、资本和土地价格的调整，亚洲伙伴国内部收入分配的改变。
自中国开放以来，其贸易条件显著恶化。估计数据显示，该国的出口价格相对进口价格已下跌了约25%。这样，中国的出口让世界其它国家更富裕了。
中国使世界其它国家的状况总体得到了改善，但并不意味着它使每个国家的状况都得到了改善。一个国家与中国的比较优势越相似，就越有可能遭受损失（反之亦然）。实际上，赢家很可能是工业原材料、尤其是燃料生产国。对高收入国家来说，亚洲的影响是好坏都有：这使它们从发展中国家进口的商品和服务价格降低（使它们的状况改善），但使大宗商品的进口价格提高（使它们的状况恶化）。最近几年，对美国和德国来说，后者的影响较前者更大。但英国得到了好处，主要是由于它的能源可以自足（见图表）。
现在，假设中国加入世界经济体系使得一个国家进口产品相对出口产品的价格上升，确实使一国经济状况恶化，结果会怎么样呢？墨西哥似乎是个例证。如果墨西哥通过抵制从中国的进口保护本国生产商，它的状况是否会改善呢？答案是否定的。世界市场价格的变化将把损失强加给它。除非墨西哥在世界贸易中有垄断力量，对进口征税不会挽回损失。正常情况下，保护会给经济造成额外的成本。牛奶打翻了，干哭很愚蠢。
对高收入国家来说，从劳动密集型进口的世界价格下降中获益越大，不利于国内非熟练工人的内部收入分配转移就越大。因此好处也一样带来了挑战。
幸运的是，这应是个可以应付的问题。通过贸易推动全球工资均等化的力量是相当微弱的。不过，最终结果很可能是，非熟练工人的就业几乎全都集中在生产不可贸易产品和服务的部门。但倘若维持对非熟练工人移民控制，灾难不会发生。其它手段也值得考虑。其中包括降低低工资收入者的税收、对非熟练工人实行工资补贴，以及扶持教育和培训。
世界确实在经历巨大的供应冲击。但对高收入国家来说，最好的建议是：悠着点吧。贸易引起的国内收入再分配很可能有限。最重要的是，高收入国家通过保护措施，蓄意转换生产结构，使之朝亚洲具有比较优势的领域发展，这样做是疯狂行为。贸易能够帮助人们摆脱贫困、从中受益并促进必要的调整，让我们为之欢呼吧。
* 卡罗琳?卢卡斯(Caroline Lucas)与科林?海因斯(Colin Hines)，《欧洲的高技术未来：最后的殖民幻想》(Europe’s Hi-Tech Future: The Last Colonial Delusion)， 2005年12月，
www.carolinelucasmep.org.uk/publications/; ** 《中印对世界经济的影响》 China and India’s Implications for the World Economy,
www.oecd.org/reisen
