The coming age of the self-interested superpower
With the world's second largest economy in purchasing power parity and the resource base to modernise its military, China is well on the road to becoming the first new superpower of the 21st century.
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Rising China is not simply going to be a remake of Japan - which never made it to superpower status - because Beijing, unlike Tokyo, is a strategic free agent. In the geopolitical marketplace, it has become mandatory to anticipate China's emergence during the next 10 to 20 years in much the same way as share prices will reflect the forecast performance of a company. But these forecasts are complicated by uncertainty regarding China's posture vis-a-vis the US; as partner, competitor or adversary. In many ways, China is less the equivalent of Wilhelminian Germany on the eve of the first world war, fated to collide with the status quo powers in its quest of a "place in the sun", than of the Germany of Bismarck in the 1870s and 1880s. It is a power erupting on to a crowded global scene but with no predetermined outcome as to the nature of its relations and alliances.
China, by virtue of the explosive growth of its economic appetites and production, disrupts this global scene. At the same time, it is presenting itself as a status quo power. Today's China, unlike the US with its militant promotion of regime change in non-democratic states, has no value system to sell and no messianic mission to fulfil. This is becoming its great strength as it moves towards superpower status. It is not only the Zimbabwes, the Myanmars and the Sudans of the world that will flock to China's self-interest-driven, value-free foreign policy, but also those states that are seeking a counter-weight to America's assertion of its own democratic mission. Jacques Chirac, the French president, may be misguided in his vision of a multipolar world in which China would somehow deal with France as an equal. But as China's economic and political leverage grows, it is not only the French who will rise to the bait of a Bismarckian China obstructing the Bonapartist instincts of the US.
However, China's value-free foreign policy has significant limits. In the long run, it will inevitably create tensions with a US - and, indeed, a European Union - that sees values as an integral component of international relations. This would come on top of the more traditional causes of friction between China and the US, such as the fate of Taiwan and the nature of the strategic order in east Asia. Yet, for China, the relationship with the US remains by far the most important one to get right.
In the shorter term, the policies flowing from China's value-blind positioning provide no clear sense of direction regarding world challenges such as global warming or, most acutely today, nuclear proliferation. China may be tempted to seize the opportunity of securing first call on Iran's energy resources, thus preventing a unified stance in the United Nations Security Council and precipitating the breakdown of the international non-proliferation regime. Conversely, China might decide that the spread of nuclear weapons - perhaps to Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan - would run counter to its interests and that it should therefore work with the US, Europe and Russia in nudging Iran away from the nuclear threshold.
America will have to learn to balance its long-standing regional interests in east Asia with China's ability to help or hinder at the global level, notably on the Iranian question. Washington, at some stage, will have to decide what is more important: dealing with the Iranian account (which may entail satisfying China on other issues) or constraining China in east Asia (even if this means losing China's support on Iran in the Security Council).
Europe, in a way, has the opposite problem. The EU thinks of China in global terms but neglects the regional dimension of the US-Chinese relationship in east Asia. The Europeans are essentially passive beneficiaries of the strategic stability created by America's military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Compromises with China, including horse-trading on the EU arms embargo, should not be contemplated by the Europeans without due consideration of America's strategic role in east Asia. Any miscalculation would have dire long-term consequences for US-European relations. However, the corresponding strategic dialogue between the US and the EU for dealing with such problems hardly exists.
One hopes that in the capitals of China, the US and Europe, the full implications of the new trade-offs are not only understood but acted on.
The writer is special adviser at the Fondation pour la Recheche Stratégique, Paris
中国：超级大国之路并非坦途
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购买力平价计算，中国是世界第二大经济体，再加上拥有军事现代化所需的资源基础，中国已稳步走上了成为21世纪第一个崭新超级大国之路。
崛起的中国将不只是日本的简单翻版(日本从未成功获得超级大国地位)，因为中国政府与日本政府不同，中国政府在战略上是自由行动主体。在地缘政治领域，中国将在未来10至20年崛起。我们必须预见到这一点，就像股价会反映一家公司的预期业绩那样。但由于中国对美国采取何种姿态还不确定――合作伙伴、竞争对手还是敌人，这些预期也由此变得复杂。在许多方面，与其说中国与一战前夕威廉时代的德国相同，还不如说与19世纪70和80年代俾斯麦（Bismarck）时代的德国一样。威廉时代的德国追求“阳光下的土地”（place in the sun，威廉二世语），注定要与维持现状的强国发生冲突。中国是一股突然喷发的力量，将登上拥挤不堪的全球舞台，但有关它与其它国家的关系和结盟，其性质所产生的结果无法预先确定。
中国凭借其经济胃口和生产的爆炸式增长，打破了这种全球格局。同时，它又把自己说成是维持现状的强国（status quo power）。如今的中国与美国不同，中国没有价值观体系可推销，也没有救世主般的使命要履行，美国则会用军事手段促使非民主国家政权更替。这成为中国向超级大国地位迈进过程中的巨大优势。在这个世界上，不仅津巴布韦、缅甸和苏丹等国家会追随中国自利驱动且价值无涉（value-free）的外交政策，那些寻求抗衡美国散播自身民主使命的国家也会这么做。法国总统雅克?希拉克(Jacques Chirac)设想的多极世界可能是错误的，他设想中国基本上会与法国平起平坐。但随着中国经济和政治势力的增长，中国势必会阻挠美国波拿巴主义式（Bonapartist，指拿破仑?波拿巴通过武力推销其价值观）的扩张本能，而吞下俾斯麦式中国抛下的诱饵的将不仅仅是法国人。
然而，中国价值无涉的外交政策有极大的局限性。长期来看，它将不可避免地造成与美国（事实上还有欧盟）这样的国家关系紧张，因为这样的国家视价值观为国际关系中不可分割的部分。在传统原因之外，这将成为造成中美摩擦的又一原因，传统原因比如台湾问题和东亚战略秩序的性质等。然而，对中国而言，保持健康的中美关系仍是最为重要的。
短期来看，中国无视价值观的立场所产生的政策，并未给世界所面临的挑战指明方向，例如全球气候变暖，或如今最尖锐的核扩散问题。一方面，中国或许很想抓住机会，成为第一个锁定伊朗能源资源的国家，从而阻止联合国安理会内部形成统一立场，并导致国际核不扩散体制的瓦解。另一方面，中国可能认为，核武器的扩散(或许向日本、韩国甚至台湾扩散)，会有悖其利益，因此应当与美国、欧洲和俄罗斯合作，将伊朗推离核门槛。
美国在东亚有着长期存在的地区利益，中国则在全球范围拥有促进或妨碍这一利益的能力，特别是在伊朗问题上，美国将不得不学会平衡这两者。在某个阶段，美国政府将不得不决定以下哪一个更重要：处理伊朗问题(这可能需要在其它问题上满足中国)，还是在东亚抑制中国(即使这意味着在伊朗问题上失去中国在安理会的支持)。
欧洲在某种意义上则有相反的问题。欧盟从全球角度考虑中国，但忽视了美中在东亚的关系这一地区因素。美国在亚太地区的军事存在造就了战略稳定，而欧洲人基本上是这一稳定局面的被动受益者。欧洲人在思考与中国达成的妥协时(包括在欧盟武器禁运上的讨价还价)，应该适当考虑美国在东亚的战略角色。任何计算失误都可能给欧美关系带来可怕的长期后果。但在这类问题的处理上，美国与欧盟之间几乎不存在相应的战略对话。
人们希望，中国、美国和欧洲各国政府不仅能全面理解新的利弊得失的意义，更能对其采取行动。
作者系巴黎战略研究基金会(Fondation pour la Recheche Stratégique)特别顾问
