Penalties of a superstar strategy
Real Madrid overtook Manchester United last year as the world's biggest football club by revenues. And yet fans of the Spanish club are not celebrating.
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The business prowess of Florentino Pérez, construction magnate and president of Real Madrid, has not been matched by sporting success on the field. In fact, Real Madrid has failed to win a single title, at home or abroad, since 2003.
In November Real Madrid hit a new low with a 0-3 defeat by arch rivals Barcelona. An estimated 3bn viewers worldwide watched Real Madrid's humiliation. Barcelona's game was so dazzling that Real Madrid fans even gave a spontaneous standing ovation to Ronaldinho, Barcelona's toothy Brazilian striker.
Mr Pérez responded by sacking Wanderlei Luxemburgo, Real Madrid's fifth coach in as many years. Like his predecessors, Mr Luxemburgo had failed to motivate the constellation of superstars who play for Real Madrid.
Firing coaches, however, has not endeared Mr Pérez to Real Madrid fans or spared him from criticism.
"Real Madrid has no game plan," wrote Santiago Segurola, sports critic of El País, Spain's leading daily newspaper. "It is the product of a commercial idea that has relegated the actual sport to a secondary role. It spends enormous sums of money signing up stars, but they do not make a team. They are, rather, a disappointing mosaic, with some players in their twilight years, and others included solely for their commercial appeal."
For the first time, Real Madrid's dissatisfied fans are questioning their president's strategy. Underlying tensions between the club's commercial and sporting aims have burst into the open. During a recent live television interview, Mr Pérez was bombarded with angry text messages. "Florentino, we want a real team, not a dysfunctional collection of overpaid has-beens," one read.
Mr Pérez can hardly afford to ignore the feelings of his 84,441 members, who remain the owners of the club and have the power to vote him out of office.
But his tribulations also underscore a further problem that is not unique to the multimillion-dollar business of sport: how long can you pursue a successful commercial strategy if your product continues to flop?
When Mr Pérez was elected five years ago, he promised to restore the club's finances, bring in world-class talent and extend the club's brand around the world. Manchester United, a pioneer in the professionalisation of football management and a successful brand with 170m supporters worldwide, was to be Real Madrid's role model.
"We structured ourselves as a company and began to think of ourselves as content providers. This was an authentic revolution," says Carlos Martínez de Albornóz, Real Madrid's corporate managing director, recruited by Mr Pérez from Arcelor, the European steel company.
Shortly after taking over, Mr Pérez paid off Real Madrid's crippling debt burden by selling the club's training grounds, which occupied 120,000 sq m of prime real estate in northern Madrid. The sale netted �500m (￡344m) for the club.
Next, he went about assembling a team of galácticos - a galaxy of stars including Zinedine Zidane, Luis Figo, Ronaldo and David Beckham - not only to create an unbeatable side but to transform Real Madrid into a powerful international brand.
In July 2003, when Real Madrid introduced David Beckham, its newest player, the 11am press conference was timed to make the evening news broadcasts in Asia, where Beckham is particularly popular. The event had the world's second largest live television audience, after the funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales. That day, Real Madrid sold 8,000 Beckham T-shirts at �62 to �78 each. A month later, Real Madrid capitalised on Beckham's popularity with a 17-day club tour of Asia. The tour netted about �8m.
In many respects, Beckham's �35m transfer from Manchester United became the symbol of Real Madrid's transformation and growing global reach. It also marked the beginning of the club's sporting decline.
On paper, the numbers look unbeatable. Marketing revenues have become the club's biggest source of income, having trebled, to �117m, since Mr Pérez took charge. Income from sponsorship deals, the sale of image rights and advertising has grown six-fold. The club has launched a 24-hour satellite television channel and a website in three languages - Spanish, English and Japanese.
It has also entered into licensing agreements with content distributors in different countries, including Disney in the US, Platja in Japan and Citic in China, which will be responsible for developing the marketing channels for Real Madrid in their respective countries.
Total income, including ticket sales and television rights, came to �275m in the year to June 2005, ending Manchester United's eight-year run as football's highest earner.
According to Sports Markt, a German auditing agency, Real Madrid has also overtaken Manchester United as the club with the greatest number of followers, with an estimated 258m fans worldwide. "Think how far we can go with 258m customers," says a senior Real Madrid manager, who asked not to be named. "The value of a brand depends on its audience, and we have only just begun to exploit Real Madrid's marketing potential."
Strong revenues have allowed Real Madrid to spend an estimated �500m on transfers during Mr Pérez's tenure, which the club justifies on the grounds that "the best players pay for themselves".
The club does not disclose how much income each galáctico earns for Real Madrid. The return on investment for each player, says a senior manager, is not really measurable. He gives an example: five years ago, a VIP box cost �20,000 a year; today, Real Madrid charges �150,000 for the same box. "You cannot assign the increase to a single player," the manager says. "The fact is that companies are willing to pay for the privilege of seeing the best players in the world."
But when the world's best players fail to deliver the world's best football, the commercial strategy comes into conflict with the demands of club followers. Getting rid of under-performing players, for example, becomes a much more complicated decision if, like Beckham, they also happen to be in the vanguard of the club's expansion in Asia.
"Real Madrid has to satisfy two constituencies, and the interests of the two are not always aligned," says José Luís Nueno, a professor at the IESE business school in Barcelona and co-author of a case study about Real Madrid for Harvard Business School.
"The first constituency are the club's members, who have ownership rights over the club," he says. "They want goals and championship trophies. The second constituency is the club's larger fan base, including followers in the US, Japan and China. The second constituency follows individual players, not the club, and much of the merchandising is directed at them."
"But it is the first constituency which has the power to remove the president of Real Madrid," says Mr Nueno.
The fact that Mr Pérez was re-elected last year for another four-year term - despite a year without title wins - suggests that the tension between the business model and club results is sustainable, if not forever.
"The club's financial solvency is the precondition for building a world-class team," insists a senior manager. "There may be fallow periods in sporting terms, but it would be irresponsible to abandon the business model now.
"Unlike many clubs in Europe, which are owned by billionaires with deep pockets, we need to earn the money we invest in new players. We need to generate an operating profit of about �100m a year just to stay at the top of our game."
为豪华阵容罚点球
皇
家马德里(Real Madrid)去年超越曼联(Manchester United)，成为世界上收入最高的足球俱乐部。然而，这家西班牙俱乐部的球迷们却并没有为此而庆祝。
建筑业巨头、皇马主席弗罗伦蒂诺?佩雷斯(Florentino Pérez)在商业领域的非凡才华，没有体育赛事方面的成功与之相匹配。事实上，从2003年起，无论在国内还是国际赛场上，皇马都未能赢得一次冠军。
商业理念的产物
去年11月，皇马战绩创下新低，以0比3负于宿敌巴塞罗那队 (Barcelona)。估计全球有30亿电视观众目睹了皇马此番蒙羞。巴塞罗那队的表现令人眼花缭乱，连皇马球迷都忍不住起身，为巴塞罗那队的巴西前锋――大板牙罗纳尔迪尼奥 (Ronaldinho)喝彩。
佩雷斯对此的反应是：解雇了皇马5年来的的第5任教练范德莱?卢森伯格(Vanderlei Luxemburgo)。与他的前任们一样，卢森伯格也未能激发出皇马这一群超级巨星的积极性。
然而，炒掉教练没能使佩雷斯赢得皇马球迷的好感，也没令其免遭批评。
“皇马根本就没有比赛方案，”西班牙主要日报《国家报》(El País)的体育评论员圣地亚哥?塞古罗拉(Santiago Segurola)写道，“它是商业理念的产物，使真正的体育运动沦落到次要位置。该队在签约明星球员上投入巨资，但他们并不能成为一个球队。实际上，他们更像是拼凑而成、令人失望的大杂烩，一些球员正值全盛时期，而招入的另外一些球员却仅仅是因为他们在商业方面的号召力。”
心存不满的皇马球迷首次对该俱乐部主席的战略提出了质疑。该俱乐部中，商业和体育目标间的深层次紧张关系骤然公开化。在最近一次直播电视采访中，佩雷斯遭到了球迷门愤怒短信的炮轰。一条短信写道：“弗罗伦蒂诺：我们想要真正的球队，而不是花冤枉钱请来一群没用的过气球星。”
佩雷斯可承担不了无视其8.4441万名会员感受的后果，他们仍是俱乐部的所有者，有权通过投票把他赶下台。
不过，他的困境同时突显了另一个问题――一个并非数以百万美元计的体育产业所独有的问题：如果产品持续走下坡路，一项成功的商业策略又能坚持多久呢？
恢复俱乐部财力
5 年前佩雷斯当选时，曾承诺恢复俱乐部财力，引入世界级球员，并在全球范围内拓展俱乐部的品牌。曼联作为职业化足球管理方面的先行者，同时在全球范围内拥有1.7亿支持者的成功品牌，成为了皇马的行事榜样。
皇马公司常务董事卡洛斯?马丁内斯?德?阿尔沃诺斯(Carlos Martínez de Albornóz)表示：“我们像一家公司那样搭建组织结构，并开始将自己视为内容提供商。这是一场真正的革命。”他是佩雷斯从欧洲钢铁公司阿塞洛 (Arcelor)招募过来的。
接手皇马不久，佩雷斯售出该俱乐部的训练场地，还清了皇马濒临极限的债务。该训练场位于马德里北部的黄金地段，占地12万平米。此笔交易为俱乐部赚得 5亿欧元。
组建巨星队伍
接下来，他着手组建一支巨星队伍――包括齐内丁?齐达内(Zinedine Zidane)、路易斯?菲戈(Luis Figo)、罗纳尔多(Ronaldo)和大卫?贝克汉姆(David Beckham)在内的一系列大牌球星――不仅是为了创建一支无人能敌的球队，同时也是为了将皇马塑造成一个强大的国际品牌。
2003年7月，当皇马引进最新球员大卫?贝克汉姆时，该俱乐部选择上午11点召开新闻发布会，正是为了方便在亚洲各地晚间新闻中同步播出。贝克汉姆在亚洲格外受欢迎。此次直播吸引的电视观众数量位居全球直播节目第二，仅次于威尔士王妃戴安娜(Diana, Princess of Wales)的葬礼。当日，皇马卖出了8000件贝克汉姆T恤衫，每件价格为62欧元至78欧元。一个月之后，皇马借助贝克汉姆的人气，展开了历时17天的亚洲巡回赛。此次亚洲之旅进账800万欧元。
从许多方面而言，贝克汉姆以3500万欧元的价格从曼联转会皇马，成为该俱乐部转型及其全球影响力日益扩大的象征。但同时也标志着该俱乐部战绩滑坡的开始。
丰厚回报
从账面看，财务数据似乎无与伦比。自佩雷斯执掌皇马以来，该俱乐部的营销收入已经翻了三番，达到1.17亿欧元，成为该俱乐部最大的收入来源。来自赞助合同、肖像权销售和广告的收入已增长6倍。该俱乐部还开通了一个24小时卫星电视频道，以及一个提供西班牙语、英语和日语三种语言版本的网站。
皇马还与不同国家的内容发行商签署了特许权协议，其中包括美国的迪士尼(Disney)、日本的Platja及中国中信集团公司(Citic)。这些发行商将负责在其各自的国家里，为皇家马德里开拓市场营销渠道。
截至2005年6月份的一年，皇马包括球票销售和电视转播权在内的总收入达到了2.75亿欧元，从而结束了曼联8年来雄据足球俱乐部收入榜首的局面。
德国审计机构Sports Markt表示，皇马同时还超过曼联，成为球迷人数最多的俱乐部，估计其在全球范围内拥有2.58亿位球迷。“想想有了 2.58亿位顾客，我们能做出最大的成绩。”皇马一位不愿批露姓名的高级经理表示，“观众决定品牌的价值，而我们只不过刚刚开始发掘皇马的市场营销潜力。”
在佩雷斯任期内，强劲的收入使皇马能够在转会方面投入估计高达5亿欧元的资金，但该俱乐部立刻证明：“他们在最优秀球员上的投入，足以能够收回”。
该俱乐部没有透露每位“球星”给皇马带来多少收入。一位高级经理表示，每名球员的投资回报情况的确无法衡量。他举了这样一个例子：5年前，一个贵宾包厢的年费是2万欧元；而现在，皇马对同样包厢的收费标准为15万欧元。“你不能将这种增长归因于某一位球员，”这位经理表示。“事实是，各家公司都乐意为特别待遇掏腰包，享受观赏全球最优秀球员的比赛。”
商业战略与球迷需求的冲突
不过，当世界一流球星没能在比赛中上演一流表现时，商业战略就会与球迷们的需求发出冲突。举例来说，如果表现欠佳的球员刚好是俱乐部进军亚洲的开路先锋，比如说贝克汉姆，那么淘汰他们就成了一个复杂得多的决定。
巴塞罗那IESE商学院教授若泽?路易斯?努埃诺(José Luís Nueno) 表示：“皇家马德里必须要满足两大类选民的需要，而这两类选民的利益并不总是一致的。”努埃诺教授还是哈佛商学院(HBS)有关皇家马德里案例研究的作者之一。
“第一类选民是俱乐部会员，他们拥有俱乐部的所有权，”他表示，“他们要的是进球和夺杯。第二类选民是俱乐部基础更为广泛的球迷，其中包括美国、日本和中国的球迷。第二类选民关注的是单个球员，而不是俱乐部，他们是大多数销售计划的目标。”
努埃诺称：“不过，第一类选民才拥有罢免皇家马德里主席的权力。”
尽管一年来在赛事中颗粒无收，佩雷斯去年仍在选举中获得了又一个四年任期。这一事实表明，商业模式与俱乐部成绩之间的紧张关系仍能够维持，即便不会永远维持下去。
“该俱乐部的财务偿付能力是打造一支世界级球队的先决条件，”一位高级经理坚称，“用体育术语来说，可能有不在状态的时候，但目前放弃这种商业模式，是不负责任的。”
“与欧洲许多由腰缠万贯的亿万富翁所掌控的俱乐部不同，我们在新球员上的投资需要回报。我们每年需要创造1亿欧元左右的营业利润，只有这样，才能保持在竞争中的领先地位。”
