Sticking to Stocks in a Low-Return World
IT SAYS PLENTY ABOUT THE MARKET'S current imperturbable state that investors are okay with the idea that manufacturers continue to purge payrolls amid stagnant output, so long as Wall Street's agenda-setters can focus on signs of better times to come.
Despite the investment community's embrace of the Bush administration's market-friendly tax policies, Wall Street keeps singing the Clintonian refrain, "Don't stop thinking about tomorrow."
In a truncated week made less consequential by the departure of many vacationers, the market absorbed some poor-to-middling economic news and pushed higher on persistent buying by investors who see few good options besides stocks.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average gained 81 points, just under 1%, to reach 9070, while the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index rose a similar percentage, adding 9 to settle at 985. The Nasdaq extended its performance lead over the rest of the market, rising 38 points, or 2.3%, to hit 1663, helped by a 3% gain in Microsoft, its largest component.
Even before Thursday's job report showed the economy shed 30,000 jobs in June, and the unemployment rate climbed to 6.4% from 6.1%, the Institute for Supply Management Tuesday indicated that manufacturing activity contracted slightly last month.
But peeling away the bitter outer layers to get to the sweet stuff inside, analysts began stressing the positive trend in new orders and prices paid in the ISM data. And the fact that the number of hours worked remained steady, while the ranks of temporary workers rose, blunted the impact of the higher-than-expected unemployment rate, suggesting a stabilizing labor market.
Sure, 56,000 manufacturing positions were eliminated in June, but investors have been willing to overlook the smokestack sector as a fairly small and secularly shrinking part of the economy.
On cue, the ISM's nonmanufacturing index arrived later Thursday to show more strength than forecasters predicted in the services sector. Also fresh in mind was the Wall Street Journal's midyear economists survey, in which the same group that predicted the economy would grow twice as fast as it likely did in the first half forecast 3.5% real growth in the back half.
Without drawing too many conclusions from a lightly traded week, it was clear that investors' interest in buying stocks outlasted the end of the second quarter. Market-wide, investors seem to be concluding -- helped, no doubt, by their brokers -- that greater equity exposure is warranted in a low-return world.
The plausible argument that stocks are fairly expensive at 19 times 2003 forecast earnings (earnings that may or may not materialize as hoped) isn't likely to gain much traction when nearly everything looks at least as expensive. Ten-year Treasury yields below 3.7% look pricey to many, never mind money-market funds with negative inflation-adjusted yields. And everyone has a story about the crazy price just paid for some ramshackle house on his or her block.
As the analysts at BCA Research point out, investors are comparing five-year Treasuries at 2.49% and General Electric shares with a dividend yield of 2.66%-and-growing, and they're opting for the latter. Of course, plenty more investors are simply swapping cash for pure equity risk without such sober consideration, as the sizzling (and virtually yield-less) Nasdaq indicates.
Brokerage firms -- with great incentive to flush client money out of the money- market funds that are now unprofitable for both parties -- will no doubt take the opportunity of half-year account statements to keep this rotation in motion.
Without suggesting that was the motive, Merrill Lynch last week did its part by upgrading Microsoft to a "Buy" Tuesday -- the same day it began pounding the table for clients to buy Wal-Mart. When 14,000 brokers simultaneously start working the phones to sell two of the four biggest companies in the market, it can be effective. The thin market was receptive to the ideas, with each stock rising better than 2% on the day and helping to drive a 100-point advance in the Dow.
This is the sort of thing that can go on until investors are sated, buyers tire or some particularly unsettling corporate or economic shock approaches.
True, the S&P 500 so far has had trouble staying above the 1000 mark. And the indexes have looked more vulnerable to a retreat in recent weeks. As one hedge fund manager put it, "Next week is for grown-ups, when the rubber hits the road" as earnings season starts.
That's always a risk to a market floating on great expectations. But last week earnings warnings from the likes of Baxter International (again) and Seibel Systems led to stock declines ranging from slim to none.
As long as investors remain in the mood to give the economy the benefit of the doubt and look ever forward, the market easily could levitate until it becomes literally too late for the second-half numbers to turn out as projected.
WHEN DAIRY PRODUCER DEAN FOODS last week agreed to buy Horizon Organic, a maker of natural milk products, all the intuitive questions rang across Wall Street.
Is Dean Foods paying too much at $24 a share in cash, or 57 times expected 2003 earnings, for the 87% of Horizon it doesn't already own? Or, as some litigious Horizon shareholders contend, is Dean paying far too little? Will the organic cows be able to get along with other, hormone-enhanced cows? And, finally, would another company some day change its name to Holy Cow Industries to make proper use of Horizon's ticker symbol, HCOW?
In the estimation of the market, the financial questions can be answered in Dean's favor. Dean shares rose 2.18 to 32.78 on the week, to a new 52-week high, implying that investors feel the deal is a pretty good one for both companies involved. Horizon shares jumped 4.76 to 23.69, snuggling up close to the offer price.
The purchase price, certainly expensive at first look, can be justified by the 20% annual earnings growth rate now enjoyed by Horizon, say the Dean enthusiasts. Dean, the result of the earlier merger of the old Dean with Suiza Foods, says the deal will prove accretive to its earnings in the first full year after it closes late this year. Dean is forecast to earn $2.10 a share this year, up 16% from $1.81 in 2002, and earnings in 2004 are projected to grow another 11% to $2.33.
The fast-growing character of the organic foods industry enhances the appeal of this category, and the transaction fits nicely with Dean's strategy of shifting its business toward branded foods and away from commodity milk products. One investor in Dean says that any time the company can exploit its distribution network by finding additional products to place on its trucks, the profit impact is quite positive.
Another reason the market likes the $216 million deal (Dean will also assume $40 million of Horizon debt): It suggests Dean won't do a much bigger, riskier acquisition, a concern of some investors. The rating agencies maintained their favorable stance toward Dean after the news broke.
That makes Dean one of the relative few stocks clicking to new highs that has a fairly predictable earnings course, a strong bottom-line trend and a reasonable valuation of less than 16-times 2003 earnings. That valuation looks even more reasonable than it did a few months ago, given the broad market's recent run to a multiple of 19.
BOOKSTORES HAVE WHOLE SHELVES supporting the biographies of Warren Buffett. He is quoted almost as often as Ben Franklin. His company, Berkshire Hathaway, famously sports the highest share price on the New York Stock Exchange. Thousands of pilgrims make a weekend out of the Berkshire annual meeting -- in Omaha, no less.
Given all this, is it possible that Berkshire Hathaway could plausibly be called under-appreciated by Wall Street?
Oak Value Capital Management, a large and longtime shareholder of Berkshire, is indeed calling the stock unheralded, misunderstood and undervalued.
The investment team at Oak, a Durham, N.C., asset manager, has almost 11% of its client accounts in Berkshire shares, and underscores its devotion to Buffett's company by producing periodic reports on it. In its latest one, Oak contrasts the Berkshire of today with that of late 1998 to suggest that a far stronger Berkshire is available now at the same price it was fetching four and a half years ago.
Berkshire shares have risen less than 4% since the end of 1998, from 70,000 to a recent 72,600. That's a pretty good showing considering the S&P 500's 19% drop over that period. But the Oak folks contend that the near flat line of Berkshire shares belies a fortification of an already powerful financial machine.
For starters, Oak objects to the popular description of Berkshire as a holding company or conglomerate, insisting that it is a business based on reaping low-cost cash from dominant insurance businesses and redeploying it in higher-return assets. This activity is diminishing Berkshire's reliance on its big pubic stakes in Coca-Cola, Gillette and such, while raising its exposure to wholly owned companies and the growing reinsurance business.
Since the end of 1998, the "float" generated by the insurance operations -- this is the cash overseen and invested by Berkshire in excess of payouts on policies -- has grown by almost $20 billion. At the end of the first quarter, the float totaled $42.5 billion, real money even to a company with a $111 billion market value. This cash mountain has been accumulating at lower and lower cost, as measured by the insurance underwriting profit or loss.
Of course, the terrorist-related losses caused by the Sept. 11 attacks cost Berkshire some $2.2 billion, and Buffett has been critical of himself and colleagues for sloppiness in overseeing those risks. But after the fact, the turmoil in the reinsurance business has made Berkshire a much stronger competitor. It's the only reinsurer left with a triple-A credit rating and can be a price setter more than its peers can.
Other points made by Oak: From 1999 through 2002 Berkshire booked after-tax earnings of $10 billion, increased the cash and investments on the balance sheet by $6.2 billion, collected $6.9 billion in realized equity investment gains and paid $11.5 billion for operating companies.
And Oak calculates that Berkshire's return on investment for those operating companies has ranged from 9.4% for its stake in Mid-American Energy to 16% for the five home construction-related companies it has acquired. Notably, last year Berkshire had $3.3 billion in pretax profits from its noninsurance operating businesses, up from just $800 million in 1998. The company is far less a securities portfolio subject to Wall Street's whims than it used to be.
All well and good, a skeptic might respond. But there are decent explanations for why Berkshire shares have stagnated in recent years. Its annual increases in book value have dramatically lagged the company's 22% long-term average, world events have underscored the catastrophe risk of large insurers, concerns about Buffett's yet-to-be-chosen successor grow yearly and -- just maybe -- the stock was overvalued in 1998.
The Oak managers do address the succession question, saying they believe Buffett's death or incapacitation would cause a shock-driven drop in the share price, but a temporary one. The board's added focus on designating a successor or successors is a comfort, while the managers of the individual businesses would, of course, remain.
For their part, the Oak team thinks that institutional investors don't take the time to understand Berkshire and feel free to ignore it because it isn't part of their performance benchmarks, leading to a lower valuation than is deserved.
By their numbers, Berkshire could soon be trading at a price/earnings ratio equal to that of the S&P 500 based on 2003 or 2004 profit potential. That would be an extraordinary price for a company with Berkshire's financial heft and track record.
THE OTHER SIDE OF BUFFETT'S capital-allocation acumen is that the people selling what he's buying are frequently getting a sub-par price. Certainly, that's the way the shareholders of Clayton Homes have felt since the founding Clayton family agreed to sell the company to Berkshire in April for $12.50 a share.
As described here a few weeks ago, some investors were protesting that this is a lowball price, agreed to in a management panic, and one that fails to account for the rapidly improved outlook for the manufactured housing industry. At the time, Clayton shares had just begun trading above the $12.50 cash bid price, a sign that the market believed the deal could be struck down. The stock has remained above the bid since, and recently was at 12.84.
Last week, two more Clayton shareholders declared they would vote against the deal when shareholders meet on July 16. Third Avenue Management and Cliffwood Partners vowed to vote "No," joining Orbis Investment Management. Together, these investors own less than 7% of the shares. The Clayton family has pledged to vote its 30% stake for the deal, leaving a tough challenge for dissenters to win.
As noted here before, it's hard to believe an investor would vote for the deal to receive $12.50 when the stock could be sold for more than that in the market. The complicating factor, though, is that many speculators have acquired shares since the record date of June 2, so they effectively will have their shares voted by those who sold them the stock.
Michael Winer of Third Avenue Management says his firm owns Clayton shares at an average cost of around 10, so it would make a profit on the transaction. But still, he says the price is too low, effectively valuing the company based on cyclically depressed earnings.
Orbis has pointed out that a recent sale of manufactured-home park operator Chateau Communities would imply a value of $4 to $5 a share for the comparable unit of Clayton -- more than double the value placed on it by Clayton's investment bankers. Winer says he has spoken with both chief executive Kevin Clayton and Buffett himself, who stress the continued difficult industry conditions. Winer figures a renegotiation of terms is unlikely, and believes that Buffett would simply walk away if the deal gets voted down.
That would deprive Berkshire shareholders of one advantageous investment. But based on the surging values of other manufactured-housing stocks, it could make winners of those investors who have been paying more than $12.50 for the stock every day.
IN LAST WEEK'S COLUMN, The American Association of Individual Investor survey was reported to have shown 89% bullish responses. In fact, it was the ratio of bulls to those investors expressing a bullish or bearish opinion that came to 89%. When the "neutral" responses are included, the bullish percentage came to 71.4%, with 8.6% bears and 20% neutral. The 71.4% figure was the highest bullish reading since early 2000. The 89% bulls as a proportion of those expressing a market view was the highest such measure since September 2000.
吓不倒的投资者
只要华尔街人士依旧关注经济好转的种种迹象,投资者就能欣然接受制造业因产量低迷而继续裁员的观点。这也基本解释了造成股市目前波澜不惊现状的原因。
尽管投资业对布什政府有利股市的减税政策大表欢迎,但华尔街仍是念念不忘克林顿时代的警句:"人无远虑,必有近忧"。
上周适逢美国独立日周年纪念,许多市场人士离场度假,交投时间缩短,因此无法合理判断大盘走势的内在原因。市场已消化了部分利空至中性的消息,股指因投资者不断买入股票而走高。目前,投资者缺乏除股票以外更好的投资选择。
道琼斯工业股票平均价格指数全周上涨81点,至9070点,涨幅不足1%;标准普尔500指数上涨9点,至985点,涨幅与上一周持平;那斯达克综合指数受其最大成份股微软公司(Microsoft)股价上涨3%推动,涨38点,至1663点,涨幅2.3%。
上周四就业报告公布前,美国供应管理学会(Institute for Supply Management, 简称ISM)即在周二指出,6月份的制造活动呈现小幅萎缩。报告显示,6月份的失业人数为3万人,失业率从5月份的6.1%攀升至6.4%。
但是排除令人不快的表明数据而关注令人欣慰的内在因素,分析师们开始强调ISM公布的6月份人新订单指数和价格指数出现回升势头。事实是,工作时数保持不变,而临时雇员人数增加,这纾缓了高于预期的失业率带来的冲击,表明就业市场仍较为稳定。 的确,制造业6月份的失业人数达到5.6万人,但投资者一直因制造业占经济总产值比重相对较小并且该比值长期以来呈下降趋势而有意忽略制造业。
上周四晚些时候公布的ISM非制造业指数显示,服务业的表现强于预期。另外,《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal)年中对经济学家所作的最新调查显示,经济学家们预计下半年经济的增长速度将达到3.5%,是上半年预期经济增速的两倍。
虽然从全周清淡的交投无法得出过多的结论,但显然投资者在第二季度结束后,仍有意增持股票。整个市场中,投资者似乎认为,在投资品种收益率普遍较低的情况下,投资股票的收益相对有所保证。 虽然有人认为目前股价本益比已达到相对较高的19倍,但在几乎所有投资品种价格也都处于较高水平之际,这种看似矛盾的论点可能不会引起投资者的注意。10年期国债收益率现已低于3.7%,对许多投资者而言,这个价位已经偏高,更不用说货币市场上基金的实际收益率已因通货膨胀调整而变为负值。
正如BCA Research的分析师们所指出的,投资者对投资品种的收益率有所比较:例如,5年期国债的收益率为2.49%,而通用电气(General Electric Co.)的股息回报率为2.66%,且有增长趋势,因此他们倾向于选择后者。当然,更多的投资者只是简单地将手头现金换成股票,而并未经过如此冷静的考虑,这从那斯达克综合指数的一路走高中可以反映出来。
由于现在货币市场的基金品种对投资者和经纪行而言已都无利可图,所以经纪行有足够的动因将客户资金从货币市场撤出。毫无疑问,经纪行一定会利用各个公司披露中期业绩的机会把资金转向股市。
受这种动力推动,美林(Merrill Lynch)于上周二将微软的股票评级上调至买进,该公司还在同一天鼓励客户买进沃尔玛(Wal-Mart)股票。上周二1.4万名经纪人还同时开始通过电话向其客户推介微软和沃尔玛这两只市值位居前4名的股票,经纪人的努力可能会产生效果。交投清淡的股市认同了经纪人的观点,上述两家公司股价上周二涨幅均超过2%,并推动道琼斯指数上扬100点。
在投资者产生厌烦情绪、或某些特别令人不安的公司消息或经济报告来临之前,这类行为仍将持续一阵子。
的确标准普尔500指数突破1000点遭遇困难,而且该指数未来数周下调的几率更大。但正如一位对冲基金经理所言,随著收益公布季节的开始,股市下周还将一路上扬。
过高的预期总会伴生相应的风险。但是百特(Baxter International Inc., BAX)和Seibel Systems等公司上周发表的收益预警对大盘的影响却微乎其微。
只要投资者仍对现状举棋不定并对未来有所期望,大盘就会轻松上扬,直至最终数据证明下半年经济的真实状况。
奶制品生产商DEAN FOODS上周同意收购天然鲜奶生产商Horizon Organic股权时,华尔街随即产生了一连串本能的疑问。
Dean Foods为收购其未持有的Horizon 87%股权的出价是否过高?(要知道,每股24美元的现金收购价可是Horizon 2003年每股收益预期的57倍。)还是如Horizon某些股东所言,Dean的出价过低?那些喂养有机饲料的牛能否与喂养激素添加剂的牛和平共处?最后一个问题是,是否会有另外一家公司起名为Holy Cow Industries,以便更好地利用Horizon现在的股票代码HCOW。
市场预期方面,Dean股价的飙升已回答了所有问题。当周该股上涨2.18美元,至32.78美元,创下52周新高。这表明投资者认为,上述收购将使双方受益。Horizon股价也上涨4.76美元,升至23.69美元,接近Dean的收购出价。
支持Dean此次收购的人表示,乍一看,Dean的收购出价的确偏高,但考虑到Horizon目前每年20%的利润增幅,该价格处于合理水平。Dean则称,在今年晚些时候完成对Horizon的收购后,预计公司利润明年就将因此受益。
Dean目前预计其2003财政年度的每股收益为2.10美元,较2002财政年度的1.81美元增长16%。公司预计2004财政年度的每股收益可望较2003财年增长11%至2.33美元。
有机食品业快速增长的特点已增加了此类公司对投资者的吸引力,收购Horizon亦符合Dean将其主营业务从牛奶转向知名品牌的食品。Dean的一位投资者称,该公司能在任何时候通过寻找更多的产品来拓展其分销网络,这对公司收益将产生正面影响。
市场看好这项总额2.16亿美元交易的另一个原因是(Dean还将承担Horizon约4,000万美元的债务),这表明Dean不会从事规模更大、风险更高的收购活动。收购消息公布后,评级公司维持了对Dean的有利评级。
这使Dean成为少数创下新高的个股之一,这些个股收益前景明确、利润呈现强劲增长趋势,且与2003财政年度收益预期相比本益比不足16倍。鉴于大盘本益比最近已经升至19倍,Dean的股价较其数月更为合理。
美国各家书店都有整架的沃伦?巴菲特(Warren Buffet)传记。他的言论像本杰明?富兰克林(Ben Franklin)一样被频频引用。他名下的Berkshire Hathaway公司在纽约证交所的高额股价众所周知。前不久的一个周末,数千人蜂拥至公司总部所在地奥马哈参加年度股东大会。
凡此种种,难道华尔街还会认为Berkshire Hathaway是一家被低估的公司吗?
但确有这种情况,长期持有Berkshire股票的大股东Oak价值型资产管理公司就认为,投资者对该公司的股票了解不够,并且低估了它的价值。
这家位于新罕布什尔杜汉姆的投资公司将旗下管理的客户资金中的11%投资于Berkshire,而且它对这部分投资非常重视,定期发表有关该公司的投资报告。在最新一期报告中,Oak将Berkshire目前的表现与1998年末的情况作了对比,并称,这只与当年股价基本处在同一水平的股票有望进一步走强。
Berkshire股价自1998年底以来上升了不足4%,从70,000美元上升到72,600美元。
不过,考虑到同期标准普尔500指数下跌了19%,Berkshire的上述表现已相当不错。Oak的人士还认为,近期Berkshire股价接近水平线的走势掩盖了这家财大气粗的金融公司的实力。
对于初次接触Berkshire的人士,Oak不喜欢像一般人那样,将它简单地称为一家控股公司或者大财团,Oak执意将它形容为一家依托其占主导地位的保险业务、以低成本获取现金,并将现金投资于高回报资产的公司。这些经营活动加大了Berkshire对其全资公司和日益增长的再保险业务的投入,同时,也使其得以降低对它在可口可乐(Coca-Cola)、吉列(Gillette)等公司持有的大量公共股份的依赖性。
自1998年底以来,Berkshire保险业务产生的流动资金增加了将近200亿美元。今年第一季度末,这家市值为1,110亿美元的公司拿到的流动资金总额就达到了425亿美元。而从其保险承保业务的损益情况看,如此的巨额资金产生的成本却相当的低。
不过,"911"恐怖事件使Berkshire遭受了22亿美元的相关损失,巴菲特因此一直对他本人和他的属下在预见这方面的风险上有失审慎而多有责备。但在发生恐怖事件后,再保险业务蒸蒸日上,Berkshire的竞争实力也因此大大增强。它是唯一一家信贷评级为AAA的再保险公司,而且,在定价方面,它比同行公司有更高的权威。
Oak还指出,1999年至2002年,Berkshire共实现税前利润100亿美元,资产负债表上的现金和投资增长了62亿美元,兑现的股权投资利得达69亿美元,对经营性公司的投资为115亿美元。
其中,在Mid-American Energy的投资回报率为9.4%,在它收购的5家与住宅建筑有关的企业中的投资回报率为16%。
更值得一提的是,Berkshire去年非保险业务的税前利润达33亿美元,而1998年时仅为8亿美元。现在,Berkshire再也不是一家受华尔街股市的风吹草动所左右的股权投资公司了。
怀疑论者可能会说,这当然好,但是为什么Berkshire的股价近几年还是增长寥寥呢?对于这个问题的回答还是很充分的:该公司近年帐面价值的平均年增长率远低于其22%的长期平均增长率,一些全球性重大事件凸显了大型保险公司面临的巨大风险,外界对巴菲特尚未选定接班人的担心日甚一日-另外还有一个可能的因素是,该股1998年时的股价被高估了。
Oak的经理人也谈到了接班人问题。他们认为,巴菲特如果去世或丧失工作能力将导致Berkshire的股价因受到突然的打击而下挫,但这种下挫也将是暂时的。该公司董事会最近在甄选接班人的工作上投入了更多精力,这一点应令人感到欣慰,而该公司各项业务的管理人员将维持不动。
Oak的人士认为,机构投资者大多数都没有花时间来加深对Berkshire的理解,并且很容易忽视它,因为衡量他们工作表现的标准里并没有这方面的要求,这种情况导致Berkshire的股价比它应有的水平要低。
尽管上周新公布的失业率数字有所上升,但上周四的半天交易结束后,道琼斯指数仍上涨了81点。投资者对微软(Microsoft)的追捧推高了大盘。
预计Berkshire的本益比不久将达到标普500指数成份股公司根据2003、2004年收益预期计算的预期本益比水平。以Berkshire的财务实力和过往记录,这意味著其股价将达到一个相当可观的价位。
巴菲特分配资金的聪明之处还在于,投资者在抛出他所买入的股票时,往往只能获得低于市场价格的成交价。在克莱顿(Clayton)家族4月份同意以每股12.50的价格把Clayton Homes出售给Berkshire之后,Clayton Homes的股东就一直有这样的感觉。
正如几周前本文曾谈及的,部分投资者反对称,公司管理层匆忙达成的这一收购价格过于偏低,未能充分反映出组合屋行业前景迅速改善的事实。当时Clayton股价刚开始上升超过每股12.50美元的现金收购价位,表明市场相信此项收购将以失败告终。Clayton股价此后一直保持在这一价位之上,最新股价为12.84美元。
上周,又有两名Clayton股东表示,在7月16日举行的股东大会上将投票反对这项收购。Third Avenue Management和Cliffwood Partners加入了Orbis Investment Management的行列,宣称要对收购投反对票。这些股东总共拥有的股份数低于总数的7%。但占30%股权的Clayton家族已决定同意这项收购,因此反对方要想获胜可谓困难重重。
正如此前讨论过的,很难相信Clayton的投资者会接受每股12.50的收购价,因为该股如果在股市上交易将能卖出更好的价钱。然而,问题的复杂性在于,许多投机者是在6月2日登记日之后买入Clayton股票的,因此Clayton的命运实际上掌握在当时卖出股票的那些人手里。
Third Avenue Management的迈克尔?怀纳(Michael Winer)称,他的公司是以平均每股约10美元的价格买入Clayton股票的,因此能从这项收购中获益。但是,他仍然表示,收购价的确过低,它实际上是根据公司盈利周期的低点制定的。
Orbis指出,从最近组合屋营地运营商Chateau Communities的出售实例可以看出,Clayton相应部门的价格应为每股4美元至5美元,是Clayton的投资银行确定的价格的2倍多。怀纳称,他已经与Clayton首席执行长凯文?克莱顿(Kevin Clayton)及巴菲特本人都进行了会谈。怀纳认为,不太可能就收购条款重开谈判,他相信,如果收购被否决,巴菲特不过将一走了之。
而Berkshire的股东将因此失去一个上佳的投资机会,但随著其他组合屋运营商股价的不断上扬,那些以高于每股12.50美元的价格买入Clayton股票的投资者将成为赢家。