FEER(7/10) China Kicks Off Long-expected Reform Of The Media
THE ANNOUNCEMENT on the June 20 evening news was brief. Even on the front pages of official newspapers the next day, it was only a sentence. The Communist Party's Publicity Department (the former Propaganda Department), the State Press and Publications Administration, and the Post Office were barring all newspapers and periodicals, except scientific publications, from taking any subscriptions for 2004 until the end of September. It said the move was part of an effort to stop publications from engaging in coercion to secure subscriptions.
The significance of this move could easily be missed. Scholars and media executives say, however, that it is the first concrete step in a long-anticipated shake-up of the media in China. The immediate target: thousands of small party- and government department-affiliated publications that, by flaunting their official links, force people to buy subscriptions and take out pricey advertisements. A typical publication doing so is a newspaper run by the local tax, commercial or police bureau. Subscribe or advertise and, by implication at least, you are protected against a tax audit, losing your business licence, or worse.
The party's next step, scholars and media executives say, is a plan, which could be approved by the Publicity Department this month, requiring most party and government publications to cut their links with their official parents before subscriptions can resume. They will then be left to swim, or more likely sink, in the marketplace. This mirrors earlier campaigns to force official departments and the military to give up running businesses, on the grounds that such enterprises consumed official resources and fed corruption. Their official backing also gave them an unfair edge against competitors. The crucial difference this time is that the party aims to retain its control over the publications' content even after they are forced into the market. Exactly how this continued editorial hold will be achieved is unclear.
Equally surprisingly, some scholars say the official reform plan, which was originally drawn up by the State Press and Publications Administration, also provides for minority foreign and domestic private investment -- perhaps up to a 40% stake -- in previously closed parts of the sensitive media industry.
"This kind of regulation will come out very soon," predicts Yu Guoming, a high-profile media scholar who saw an early draft of the plan and believes it will survive vetting by the Publicity Department largely intact. Referring to the investment provisions, Yu, the vice-dean of the Renmin University School of Journalism in Beijing, says that for Chinese media groups to succeed as companies, as the government wants, "they have to have capital from all sorts of sources. Just relying on the state channel [of investment] isn't enough, I'm afraid."
Even as they contemplate tapping new, even foreign, capital, the authorities have made it clear they have no intention of allowing nonstate investors into the editorial operations of major media companies. The corporate model being promoted by China's propaganda tsars is one in which media companies spin off their nonsensitive operations into subsidiaries that could be opened to outside investment. Editorial control, meanwhile, is retained by their corporate parents, which are meant to stay 100% state-controlled.
But some observers say allowing nonstate investment in any part of the operations of news organizations will inevitably have an impact on content. Du Gangjian, a professor at China's elite training academy for state officials, the National School of Administration, suggests that distributors, because of their proximity to advertisers and subscribers, can easily slide into a role in which they would begin influencing editorial decisions -- by noting, for example, that certain kinds of content are good for advertising, while others aren't.
Renmin University's Yu also sees a more market-oriented media as having real implications for content. In China, he explains, only the market has the power to "bargain with the government on the question of control of the media."
The reforms are part of a campaign by a new generation of party managers to improve the economic performance of the media while retaining control over content, experts say. Officials speak openly of their hunger for China to have media conglomerates capable of taking on the world's media giants. They are impatient with a media landscape cluttered with publications that one senior official described on an October television show as "low level" and "redundant." China currently has 70 media groups, 38 of them newspaper groups, and none remotely able to compete with the global behemoths that China wants to emulate, such as AOL Time Warner and Germany's Bertelsmann. Indeed, the head of China's State Press and Publications Administration, Shi Zongyuan, noted in a book last year that sales revenue for Bertelsmann in the 1999-2000 financial year exceeded sales revenue for the entire Chinese press and publishing industry the year before.
The scale of China's ambitions helps to explain longstanding foreign investor interest in its media industry. For ideological reasons, Chinese officials have been wary of allowing in foreign capital. But Yu says that they are starting to recognize the need for infusions of foreign capital and management know-how to power a rapid expansion of media groups so that the country can hold its own internationally. The editor of one mid-sized official newspaper says he, for one, has no ideological objections to foreign investment. It could bankroll an increase in circulation, he says, and put the paper on a firmer financial footing.
To be sure, the State Press and Publications Administration blueprint on reform now being considered by the Publicity Department wasn't widely disseminated. Senior editors at three leading publications say they haven't been told about its foreign investment provisions, and are sceptical the party would allow that in a sector it is intent on continuing to control.
Media groups, of course, could also raise money by listing on domestic stock markets. Propaganda officials in the past have blown hot and cold on that idea. An article in March in the Beijing-based Business Post reported that six newspaper groups had prepared proposals for listing on China's domestic A-share market, but most for now had put the plans aside.
Until recently, foreign investment in China's media was banned. Foreign companies had to make do with cooperative agreements under which Chinese partners used their titles and content, usually in return for a portion of advertising revenue. Newsstands are full of foreign titles from such arrangements, including Chinese-language editions of Madame Figaro, Marie Claire , Cosmopolitan and National Geographic Traveler.
In December, China for the first time allowed foreign equity investment in a part of the print media -- retail newspaper, magazine, and book distribution. The State Press and Publications Administration began accepting applications for such investments on May 1. The official China Daily newspaper reported in April that more than 60 overseas companies had opened offices in China with the aim of applying. According to its commitments to the World Trade Organization, China is scheduled to start allowing foreign capital into the wholesale distribution business from December 2004. The deeper significance of the changes in the investment rules now being mooted is that they could also permit foreign investment in other aspects of print-media operations.
The picture for domestic private investment in the media is more complicated. Although regulations officially restrict investment to state media companies, a number of state, private, and even listed companies hold stakes in Chinese publications.
If broader foreign investment is allowed, a key precondition for official approval will almost certainly be the Chinese firm's successful separation of its ideologically sensitive editorial activities -- which will remain off-limits to foreign or domestic private investment -- from the rest of its business.
A Publicity Department vice-minister, Li Congjun, spoke about the need for such a division in October in a TV discussion programme, a rare public forum where propaganda officials talked about media reform. Chinese media companies, Li said, needed to be managed as companies and to be mindful of their "ideological characteristics" and "obligations to guide correct opinion." Indeed, State Administration of Radio Film and Television Minister Xu Guangchun listed on the programme four things that would never change: the media's role as the party's "throat and tongue," party management of the media and media personnel, and the media's role in "guiding correct opinion."
To manage the tension between party-controlled content and the market, Li said that media companies should "separate propaganda business from operations." He gave the Shandong Dazhong Newspaper Group as an example. From 2001, it created seven subsidiaries, each handling a different aspect of the business, such as advertising, distribution and printing. It kept editorial activities in the parent company, and created an investment-management company to control its assets. Foreign investment would presumably be allowed only in subsidiary companies.
The aim of the party's move to end coerced subscriptions and force official papers to operate according to market rules is similarly to improve the financial fundamentals of the media industry. One major goal is to cut the numbers of publications. China has more than 2,000 newspapers and nearly 9,000 periodicals. The National School of Administration's Du estimates that half the newspapers are in financial trouble. They drain funds from the party and government, and from victims of coerced subscriptions and advertising. Du estimates the average village government spends more than 1,000 renminbi ($120) a year on forced subscriptions -- up to three years' income for a farmer in some parts of China.
To relieve burdens at all levels, Renmin University's Yu and others say the party wants to retain just one affiliated newspaper group per province and city. The Beijing-backed Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao said on June 24 that "in principle" all district- and county-level party and government papers will be eliminated.
It's unclear exactly how party and government departments will divest themselves of publications. Some scholars suggest that the government may have to drop its requirement that all publications have official sponsors. This could open the way for publications to be openly run by nonstate players. Du sees a more "pluralistic" market as inevitable. "The ruling party cannot prevent the emergence of non-'throat-and-tongue' media," he says.
A POPULIST STYLE FOR PARTY, NOT PUBLIC, INFORMATION
Communist Party propaganda officials have little time for anyone who suggests China would be better off with a free media. In the party's book, the central role of the media is to "guide correct opinion" -- most importantly, "correct opinion" about all the benefits of Communist Party rule.
Now, as always, publications and individual editors and reporters who stray too far from party reporting guidelines face disciplinary action. Since a new party leadership took office last November, the party has closed one paper -- Xin Bao in the Worker's Daily Group -- and suspended another, the 21st Century World Herald. It has removed editors at top papers, and may well have had a role in the failure of hard-hitting financial magazine Caijing to get its June 20 issue onto newsstands. (Eager to play down the controversy, the magazine is blaming unspecified "technical problems.")
Most notoriously, in the early months of the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the party ordered a blackout on reporting on the virus, in the name of preventing panic. The blackout only fuelled greater panic, and contributed to the disease's spread. The party ultimately backtracked, and allowed a period of unusually open coverage.
The image-conscious new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao would prefer that no one dwell on such heavy-handed tactics. They would like to be known instead for a handful of more populist media initiatives. Chinese journalists all cite, for example, Hu's instruction that news outlets should cut back dramatically on their coverage of leaders' activities. They say that he issued the order on his first day on the job as Communist Party general secretary, after watching the endless, typically stultifying coverage of his accession on the television news.
The TV news still runs reports of leaders addressing rows of bored cadres and shaking hands with visiting foreign dignitaries, but the stories are now shorter. Hu reportedly told the media to use the time and space freed up by his order to report on "things that people really care about." He even warned the secretaries of fellow leaders to stop calling news organizations demanding coverage, a grateful top editor at a party paper says.
Among his more substantial initiatives, Hu is credited with giving the go-ahead for news organizations to report when the full Politburo has met, and what subjects it discussed. Such information was previously secret. In addition, Chinese television broadcast live tense press conferences at the height of the SARS crisis.
Yet Du Gangjian, a professor at the National School of Administration in Beijing, says that he hopes for more. The propaganda authorities, he says, still tend to feel that "information is the monopoly of the government." Du says that work is continuing on a public information law started under Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin. But for now, propaganda officials "have no sense of the right to know, or of what public information is," he says.
中国媒体改革终于启程
6月20日晚间新闻播送了一条简短的通知。虽然这条消息第二天登上了各大官方报纸的头版位置，但它也仍然只是短短的一句话：中共中央宣传部(Publicity Department)、新闻出版总署(State Press and Publications Administration)和国家邮政总局(Post Office)发出通知，禁止报纸期刊的出版单位在9月份以前征订2004年的报纸和期刊，只有科技类出版物不在此列。据称此举旨在制止为保证发行量而推行的各种强制性摊派征订手段。
这项政策的重要性很容易被人们忽略，但学者以及媒体管理人员认为，这标志著中国媒体行业期待已久的改革终于迈出坚实的第一步。
这项政策首当其冲的对象就是党和政府机构上千份小型的关联出版物，它们以政府关系为后台迫使人们订阅或者购买其昂贵的广告版面。最典型的出版物就是税务局、工商局和警察局出版的报刊。它向订户和广告商发出的最低程度的暗示就是：只要订阅或打广告，你不会受到税务审查、吊销工商执照或更大的的危险。
专家和媒体管理人士们认为，下一步尚在计划中的行动就是要求大多数党和政府的出版物切断与官方主管单位的联系，然后才能够恢复发行征订工作。这项计划有望于本月内获得宣传部的批准。然后，这些出版机构就会被推入市场经济的浪潮中，他们的命运更有可能就是渐渐沉没。这与早些时候政府和军队机构被禁止从事商业活动如出一辙，最根本的原因就是他们耗费了大量官方资源，并滋生腐败。此外，官方背景也赋予它们不公平的竞争优势。而这一次的关键不同点在于，即使它们被推入市场，共产党仍然要控制这些出版物的内容。如何实现对内容的控制目前尚不得而知。
同样令人吃惊的是，据一些专家学者透露，由新闻出版总署率先起草的改革计划也允许外资和国内私人资本入股新闻出版行业，并且在这个此前严格限制且极为敏感的媒体领域，最高持股比例可达40%。
据见到过这份计划草案的媒体领域知名学者喻国明说，这些放松管制的条例很快就会出笼。他相信中宣部在审议通过这项计划时基本不会加以改动。喻国明在提及持股条款时表示，中国的媒体集团要想像政府期望的那样以公司运作的方式取得成功，就必须吸收各种渠道的资金。只依靠政府投资渠道恐怕还不够。 虽然政府在考虑利用包括外资在内的新资源，但政府也明确表示，不允许非国有的投资者涉足大型媒体公司的编辑业务。中国媒体监管机构鼓励发展的企业运作方式是这样一种形式，即媒体公司将各类非敏感性业务分拆成多家子公司，并向外部资本开放；而将编辑业务的控制权保留在母公司手中，也就意味著仍然由国家全资控制。 但一些观察家认为，允许非国有投资进入新闻机构中的任何业务部门最终都将影响到内容。国家行政学院(National School of Administration)的杜钢建教授表示，分销部门由于最贴近广告商和订户，很容易就可以担当起影响刊物内容决策的角色。它们甚至无需为此费心，例如只要说某些内容对刊登广告有利，而另外一些不行即可。
人民大学的喻国明也认为，媒体行业越以市场为导向，其内容就越容易受影响。他解释说，在中国有能力就媒体内容控制问题向政府提出质疑的唯一力量就是市场了。
专家们认为，这些改革是新一代党的领导人改善媒体行业经济效益，同时控制媒体内容的部份举措。
政府官员公开表示，迫切希望中国的大型媒体集团能够与全球媒体行业的巨头们一起并驾齐驱。他们对中国媒体行业的现状感到难以接受。在去年10月份的一次电视节目上，一位政府高级官员曾用"低层次"和"泛滥"来形容中国目前的新闻出版行业。中国目前拥有70多家媒体集团，其中的38家都是报纸集团，但任何一家都远远没有实力能够与全球性的媒体集团如美国在线时代华纳(AOL Time Warner)和德国的贝塔斯曼(Bertelsmann)等展开竞争。实际上，新闻出版总署署长石宗源就在去年的一本书中表示，贝塔斯曼1999-2000财政年度的销售收入就超过了中国整个新闻出版行业上一年的收入总和。
中国政府的宏伟目标有助于解释外资对中国媒体行业的兴趣长盛不衰的原因。出于意识形态因素的考虑，中国政府对外资进入一直倍加谨慎。但喻国明认为，政府官员已经认识到中国要拥有自己的全球性媒体公司，就必须要引入外资并学习先进的管理经验，来加速媒体集团的扩张。一家中型的官方报纸主编以自身为例，他说对外资就没有意识形态方面的思想障碍。他说，引入外资会使报纸发行量激增，并改善报纸的财务状况。
诚然，由新闻出版总署起草、宣传部门正在审议的改革计划现在还没有广为人知。三家领先出版物的资深编辑表示，他们还没有得到外资可入股其刊物比例的消息，而且对于这个共产党有意要继续控制的领域能否允许外资进入也心存怀疑。 当然，媒体集团也可以通过国内股票市场来筹集资金，但宣传部门对此一直没有定论。北京《财经时报》(Business Post)曾于3月份刊登一篇文章，称6家报业集团已经做好在国内发行A股的准备，但多数计划现在已被搁置。
直到最近，外资都被禁止进入中国的媒体行业。外国公司不得不与国内伙伴签署合作协议，由国内的合作伙伴使用他们的名称和内容，并以广告收入为酬。通过这类协议，报刊亭已经布满了外国媒体的标志，包括中文版的Madame
Figaro、Marie Claire、Cosmopolitan和 National Geographic Traveler。
去年12月，中国首次允许外资进入部份出版物分销领域，包括零售报纸、杂志和书籍的分销。从今年5月1日开始，新闻出版总署开始受理这类投资申请。官方《中国日报》(China Daily)在4月份报导说，已经有60多家外国媒体公司在中国成立了办事处，准备提交申请。根据中国加入世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization)的承诺，中国定于2004年12月开始允许外资进入出版物批发业务领域。目前正在审议的投资条例的更深层含义是，即外资也将获准进入印刷媒体的其他业务领域。 国内私人资本涉足出版业的情况更加复杂。虽然政府条例严禁私人资本进入国有媒体公司，但仍然有一些国有或私人资本，甚至上市公司都持有一些中文出版物的股份。
如果外商投资领域被放宽，那么获得政府批准的一个关键前提条件几乎可以肯定，就是中国媒体公司能够将意识形态方面颇为敏感的内容编辑业务和其他业务成功地分割开来。内容编辑仍将严禁外资或国内私人资本进入。
中宣部副部长李从军在去年10月份的一次电视谈话节目中就谈到了进行分拆的必要性。这种有宣传部官员参加、讨论媒体改革的公开论坛实属少见。他说，中国的媒体公司需要按照企业模式展开经营，并要时刻留意保留其意识形态方面的特性，并肩负起正确舆论导向的义务。实际上，国家广播电影电视总局(State Administration of Radio Film and Television)局长徐光春就在同一个节目中列明了几项永远不会更改的标准，即：媒体的角色是"党的喉舌"，党管理媒体及媒体机构人事，以及媒体依然要承担正确舆论导向的责任。
为了缓和党控制的媒体内容和市场需求之间的紧张关系，李从军表示媒体公司应当把宣传业务和其他业务区分开来。他援引山东大众新闻报业集团(Shandong Dazhong Newspaper Group)为例。该集团于2001年设立了7家子公司，分别经营不同的业务范围，例如广告、分销和印刷等。编辑业务仍保留在母公司手中，同时还成立了一家投资管理公司来负责管理集团资产。外资当然只能投资于这些子公司。
制止强制性订阅以及迫使官方报纸按照市场规则运营，这些措施与改善媒体行业财务状况的举措相类似。主要目标之一就是减少出版物的数量。中国有2,000多份报纸，近9,000种期刊。国家行政学院的杜钢建教授估计，大约一半的报纸都处于财务困境之中。它们消耗了党和政府的大量资金，也从被迫强制订阅的订户及广告商那里谋得收入。每个乡村政府每年平均支出人民币1,000多元（合120美元）应付强制征订，这个数额是中国部份地区一位农民三年的收入总和。
人民大学的喻国明和其他人士认为，为减轻各级负担，共产党希望在每个省市只保留一份附属报纸。有北京背景的香港报纸《大公报》在6月24日称，原则上讲，所有与区、县级党和政府关联的报纸都会被取消。
但是党和政府将采取什么样的具体措施来切断与这些出版机构之间的关系目前还不清楚。一些学者建议，政府可以取消每份出版物都必须有官方主办单位的要求。
这将为非国有资本公开经营出版业务打开一扇大门。杜钢建教授认为，一个更加多元化的市场是不可避免的。他说，执政党无法阻止非"喉舌"媒体的出现。
