Do not believe everything you hear about global imbalances
Should we stop worrying and learn to love global imbalances? Investors certainly seem to believe this. Even though the US current account deficit reached 7 per cent of gross domestic product in the last quarter of 2005, the real exchange rate has stabilised. But the best time to worry about such trends is when everybody has ceased to do so. Now is such a time.
Why should we remain concerned about global imbalances? The answer is that they are undesirable, cannot continue indefinitely and the longer they last, the bigger and more painful the adjustment will be. Worse still, as recent US congressional threats to China over its "exchange rate manipulation" demonstrate, much damage can be done along the way to the world economy and international relations.
Yet if we are to understand the dangers, we need first to recognise what is happening. Many people in the rest of the world - and not a few inside the US - agree that it is the latter's fault. If only, critics argue, the US government had a smaller fiscal deficit and US households were less profligate, the current account deficits would disappear. These people are right: if the US had an economic depression, the trade deficit would certainly dwindle.
Yet this cure would be vastly more painful than the disease. Indeed, the globe's present economic configuration is not the disease but the result of the cure. However, this particular cure brings painful side-effects and cannot be taken indefinitely.
As Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, noted in a recent lecture on India: "There is one striking fact about the global economy that belies a predominantly American explanation for the pattern of global capital flows: real interest rates globally are low, not high."* The rest of the world's surplus savings are "crowding in" the high US current account deficits and domestic spending; it is not deficient US saving that is "crowding out" domestic spending elsewhere.
A superpower's place may always be in the wrong. But, as Charles Dumas and Diana Choyleva of London-based Lombard Street Research explain in a thought-provoking analysis, on lines also argued by Cambridge's Wynne Godley, the driving force behind the global imbalances is Asia's structural savings surplus, with China playing an increasingly significant role.** The US cannot safely diminish its excess spending if others do not diminish their excess saving at the same time.
If one accepts the propositions that the US domestic spending and current account deficits are a desirable response to the excess of desired savings over investment in the rest of the world, why should we worry? The answer is clear: even if better than the immediate alternatives, the growing imbalances are worse than the best ones.
First, the imbalances are the results of bad policies in the capital exporting countries. The global accumulation of $2,340bn (￡1,340bn) in additional foreign currency reserves since the beginning of 2000 was the result of decisions to intervene in currency markets. At a global level the opportunity cost of reserves held by the 10 largest holders is now about 2 per cent of GDP, argues Mr Summers.
China's reserves alone are now $600 for every man, woman and child - and rising. Cannot a government rightly concerned about persistent mass poverty do something more intelligent with this money than lend it to the US, at very low interest rates, only to have the latter both complain and ultimately, in all likelihood, depreciate its currency and so partially default on its liabilities?
Second, the scale of US foreign borrowing has, it is true, allowed George W. Bush, US president, to offer guns and butter. But the adverse impact on sectors producing tradable goods and services has also exacerbated protectionist sentiments. When the economy next slows down, the expression of these sentiments could become both deafening and dangerous.
Third, strange things are happening to the US economy. When the foreign sector is running a huge financial surplus, the domestic sectors must, in aggregate, run huge deficits (excesses of expenditure over income). Since the bursting of the equity bubble, the corporate sector has moved into surplus. The government and, above all the household sector, are in huge deficit. In 1982, the household sector ran a surplus of 5.5 per cent of GDP. Now it runs an unprecedented deficit of close to 7 per cent of GDP. As a result, household indebtedness and debt service are both soaring (see charts).
Finally, the counterpart of the huge capital inflow is not increased investment, but increased consumption and falling national savings. Gross savings are about14 per cent of GDP and net savings just 1 per cent. Investment is also tilted towards real estate and the non-traded sector, which will not pay the foreign debts.
Last but not least, the finance of the inflow has increasingly taken the form of short-term lending, including large-scale official lending.
Yes, there are economists who argue that the huge US current account deficits are a mirage or, if not that, indefinitely sustainable. Professor Willem Buiter of the London School of Economics, dealt with the former argument in the FT's economists' forum.*** The latter is, I believe, mistaken unless one assumes almost limitless generosity on the part of the capital exporters.
Over the past 15 years, US imports at constant prices grew at a trend rate of 8.3 per cent a year, while exports grew at 5.1 per cent. Today, as a result, imports are 60 per cent bigger than exports. It would take a substantial turnround in these relative rates of growth for the current account deficit merely to stabilise as a share of GDP, let alone fall. Yet, if these trends were to continue, the current account deficit and net liability position would, even with no increase in the cost of funds to the US, reach 17 per cent and 100 per cent of GDP, respectively, by 2016.
What is undesirable ought to change. What is unsustainable will change. What is dangerous must change. Yet, if the world is to avoid a serious recession, adjustment must start in the surplus countries. The fate of the world economy does not lie predominantly in US hands. It is comforting for many - both American and non-American - to disbelieve this. It is true, all the same.
*Reflections on Global Account Imbalances and Emerging Markets Reserve Accumulation, March 24 2006,
www.president.harvard.edu/speeches**The Bill from the China Shop: How Asia's Savings Glut Threatens the World Economy (Profile Books, 2006)
全球失衡这个“慢性病”
我们应停止担心并学会热爱全球失衡吗？投资者似乎确实相信这点。尽管美国的经常账户赤字2005年最后一季度达到了国内生产总值(GDP)的7%，实际汇率却稳定了下来。但担心这些趋势的最佳时机，是当人人都停止担心的时候。现在正是这个时候。
我们为什么仍应担心全球失衡呢？答案就是，全球失衡不受欢迎，不能无限期地持续，并且它持续时间越长，调整就会越大越痛苦。更糟糕的是，正如近期美国国会就中国“操纵汇率”问题进行的威胁所示，它还会对世界经济和国际关系造成很大损害。
但如果我们想知道这些危险，首先需要认清当前的情况。世界其它国家的许多人，以及美国国内许多人都一致认为，这是美国的错。批评人士称，只要美国政府缩小财政赤字，美国家庭不那么恣意挥霍，经常账户赤字就会消失。这些人说得对：假如美国出现经济萧条，那么贸易逆差肯定会减少。
然而，这种疗法会比疾病还要痛苦得多。事实上，全球如今的经济状况并非疾病，而是疗法造成的后果。不过，这种特殊疗法带来了痛苦的副作用，这是无法无限期忍耐下去的。
正如美国前财政部长劳伦斯?萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)在近期有关印度的演讲中指出：“对于全球资本流动的模式，美国有一个占主导地位的解释，而全球经济中的一个惊人事实却证明了该解释的错误，即全球的实际利率处在低水平，而非高水平。”*是世界其它国家的过剩储蓄正“挤入”美国的高额经常账赤字和国内支出，而非美国储蓄不足在“挤出”其它地方的国内消费。
超级大国可能总是有过错。但是，正如总部位于伦敦的朗伯德街研究(Lombard Street Research)的查尔斯?杜马斯(Charles Dumas)和黛安娜?乔伊列娃(Diana Choyleva)在一份发人深思的分析中所解释的(剑桥的韦恩?戈德利(Wynne Godley)也持相近观点)，全球失衡背后的驱动力是亚洲的结构性储蓄过剩，而中国在其中扮演了日益重要的角色。**假如其它国家不在美国减少过渡消费的同时减少过度储蓄，那么美国的这一做法就存在危险。
假如有人接受以下主张，即面对世界其它国家渴望的储蓄过剩超过投资，美国国内消费和经常账户赤字是可取的回应措施，那么我们为何要担心呢？答案很明显：不断增大的失衡即便比眼下所能采用的其它替代选择好，也不是最好的选择。
首先，失衡是资本输出国家的糟糕政策造成的。2000年年初以来，全球各国新增的外汇储备累计达2.34万亿美元(合1.34万亿英镑)，这是干预外汇市场的决定造成的结果。萨默斯先生指出，从全球来看，10个最大外汇储备国持有这些储备的机会成本，目前约为GDP的2%。
单是中国的储备目前就达人均600美元，而且还在上升。一个有正当理由担心持续大范围贫困的政府，就不能不把钱借给美国，而用更聪明的方法利用这些钱吗？借给美国的钱利率很低，还会被美国埋怨，最终美国十有八九还会将美元贬值，从而部分赖掉其债务。
其次，美国的国外借债规模，确实已让美国总统布什(George W. Bush)得以同时发展军事和经济。但对生产可贸易商品和服务行业的不利影响，也加剧了贸易保护主义情绪。当经济下一次放缓时，这些情绪的表达可能会变得震耳欲聋且危险。
第三，美国经济正在发生着一些奇怪的事情。当对外部门出现巨大盈余时，国内部门总体必须是巨额赤字(支出超过收入的超额部分)。自股票泡沫破灭以来，公司部门已变成了盈余。政府部门，最重要的是家庭部门，已出现巨额赤字。1982年，家庭部门的盈余占GDP的5.5%。现在，该部门赤字规模空前，接近GDP的7%。结果，家庭负债和偿债都在迅速增加(见图表)。
最后，与巨额资本流入相对应的不是投资增加，而是消费增加和国民储蓄不断下降。总储蓄约占GDP的14%，净储蓄则仅占1%。投资也在向房地产和非贸易部门倾斜，这些部门将不会偿还外债。
此外还有很重要的一点，流入资金的融资日益采用短期贷款形式，包括大规模官方贷款。
是的，确实有经济学家认为，巨大的美国经常账户赤字是一种幻像，即便不是幻像，那也是可无限期持续下去的。伦敦政经学院(London School of Economics)教授威廉?比特(Willem Buiter)在《金融时报》经济学家论坛***上探讨了前一个论点。我认为，后面一点是错误的，除非假设资金输出国的慷慨几乎是无限的。
过去15年里，按固定价格计算，美国的进口以每年8.3%的趋势增长率增长，而出口以5.1%的速度增长。结果造成今天进口比出口规模大60%。仅仅是为了把经常账户赤字占GDP的比例稳定下来，就需要实质性地扭转这两个相关增长率的走势，更不用说让这个比例下降了。而如果上述趋势继续下去，那么到2016年，就算美国利用资金的成本不上升，经常账户赤字和净负债规模也将分别达到GDP的17%和100%。
令人讨厌的情况应该改变。不可持续的情况将会改变。带来危险的情况必须改变。然而，如果世界想避免一次严重衰退，那么调整必须从盈余国开始。世界经济的命运主要不在美国手里。这是符合事实的，尽管不相信这一点令人感觉良好(对许多美国人和非美国人来说都是如此)。
*《反思全球账户不平衡和新兴市场储备积累》(Reflections on Global Account Imbalances and Emerging Markets Reserve Accumulation)，2006年3月24日，
www.president.harvard.edu/speeches</P> **《来自中国商店的账单：亚洲储蓄过剩是怎样威胁世界经济的》(The Bill from the China Shop: How Asia’s Savings Glut Threatens the World Economy ，Profile Books出版社，2006年)
