Taiwan's Trade Mirage
As did Ross Perot some years back, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian hears a giant sucking sound. Taiwan's economy -- long a manufacturing powerhouse and a reliable provider of well-paid jobs -- is losing competitiveness to the economic explosion of its larger neighbor, China. The Chen government resists Taiwan's integration with China's economy, preferring to expand economic ties with other countries. But it may be a pyrrhic effort, given that most companies don't want a deal struck with Taipei if it hinders their China strategy.
The crown jewel in the Chen government's strategy is Taipei's push for a free-trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, which it hopes will pave the way for similar accords with other countries wary of incurring Beijing's wrath. Taiwan authorities now confidently predict an FTA with Washington is only a matter of time, following U.S. Deputy Trade Representative Karan Bhatia's visit to the island last week. That's because Mr. Bhatia held talks on a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, generally considered a precursor to FTA negotiations.
But Mr. Bhatia, the highest ranking U.S. visitor to the island since President George W. Bush took office, also warned Mr. Chen that Washington wants to see Taiwan move faster to establish economic links with China, lift restrictions on trade and liberalize cross-Strait air and shipping links. These conditions, he said, would give American companies greater confidence in Taiwan as a link in the global supply chain. The unspoken corollary was that, without these conditions, American companies don't see much of a role for Taiwan in their long-term regional operations. While a U.S.-Taiwan FTA might make economic sense on its own merits, it will probably be a non starter if it is simply conceived as Taiwan's hedge against greater economic integration with China.
Even without such problems, putting in place an FTA with the U.S. is never easy. Taiwan faces concerns about whether it adequately protects intellectual-property rights, and will have to make major concessions on agricultural, services and pharmaceutical market access that will be domestically controversial. Then the agreement will have to be approved by a U.S. Congress that, rightly or wrongly, associates FTAs with job losses and disaffected constituents. Getting any FTA through Congress over the objections of labor and protectionist groups is a difficult task, and one that no U.S. administration will undertake without the support of business interests to lobby otherwise recalcitrant members of Congress.
While Taiwan could probably use its excellent ties on Capitol Hill to allay some of the concern in Congress, it can't overcome a lack of American business support. On its own, Taiwan is a nice little market. But without established channels to move goods, capital and people back and forth between Taiwan and what has become the major economic engine in Asia, it is hard for U.S. businesses to get too excited about an FTA with Taiwan. With bigger business interests in China these days, few U.S. companies perceive the benefits of an FTA that would not greatly further their regional business strategies, and might also have to be negotiated over the objections of the Chinese government.
Given its almost obsessive antipathy for President Chen, Beijing will do almost anything to stop him from achieving any new international "space" for Taiwan. Beijing is not above hauling in representatives of American multinationals and forcing them to choose between a U.S.-Taiwan FTA and their businesses in China. Few would choose the benefits of expanding trade with the 23 million people of Taiwan if it meant sacrificing their ambitions for a market of 1.3 billion. So U.S. business has yet to rally to support President Chen's vision of an FTA with the U.S.
The lack of American business support is compounded by a profound ambiguity within the Bush administration about President Chen. Although the Bush Administration came into office with the most pro-Taiwan credentials of any U.S. presidency in decades, President Chen has squandered that through a series of announcements on Taiwan's political status that have taken the administration by surprise. Most recently, the White House was caught off guard by his February decision to disband the National Unification Council, a body set up by Taiwan in 1990 to promote eventual reunification with China. Such actions have raised questions in Washington about President Chen's appreciation of U.S. interests in the region.
Although President Chen has given assurances that he is not pursuing a policy of de jure independence for Taiwan, the Bush administration is skeptical of his motives in pursuing policies that effectively further separate Taiwan from the mainland. With its attention taken up with multiple threats on other fronts, from the Middle East to North Korea, the Bush administration is nervous about political adventurism in Taipei. "Taiwan independence," said Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in recent Congressional testimony, "means war" -- and President Bush has enough of that already.
For all these reasons, it's unlikely the Bush administration will pursue an FTA with Taiwan unless the island shows more willingness to expand cross-Strait ties. So President Chen faces an uncomfortable dilemma. He wants closer economic ties with the U.S. as a means to pull free of the China vortex. But Washington won't sign on unless he allows the vortex to draw Taiwan deeper into integration. Given this state of affairs, we aren't likely to see FTA negotiations between Taiwan and the U.S. anytime soon. And the roar of that sucking sound is likely to keep President Chen awake for some time to come.
Mr. Freeman, assistant U.S. trade representative for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan from 2002-05, is the managing director of the China Alliance of Independent Law Firms, based in Washington, D.C.
陈水扁的“对美自由贸易”美梦
十多年前，反对建立北美自由贸易协定的罗斯?佩罗(Ross Perot)提醒人们，当心（协定导致）美国就业机会流向墨西哥的“巨大的吮吸声”。佩罗的预言后来并未应验。不过，今天，台湾总统陈水扁却听到了这样的声音：面对中国大陆爆炸式的经济增长，长期以来一直是全球制造业中心之一并提供了大量优厚工作机会的台湾正在逐渐失去它的竞争优势。
陈水扁政府拒绝与大陆实现经济一体化，而宁愿扩大与其他国家的经济联系。但这样作恐怕代价太大甚至得不偿失，因为如果与台湾的业务往来会影响在大陆的战略，那么大多数公司会宁愿不跟台湾来往。
在陈水扁政府的战略规划里，他最倾心的是推动与美国建立自由贸易协定。他希望，与美国达成协议能为台湾与其他不愿招惹北京政府不快的国家达成类似协议铺平道路。在美国贸易副代表卡兰?巴蒂亚(Karan Bhatia)上周访问台湾之后，台湾政府满怀信心地预言，与美国达成协议只是时间问题。台湾之所以这么自信，是因为巴蒂亚在台期间与陈水扁举行了有关建立贸易和投资框架协议(Trade and Investment Framework Agreement)的会谈，这样一个协议被普遍视为是自由贸易协议谈判的前奏。
不过，作为布什总统就任以来级别最高的访台美国官员的巴蒂亚同时也警告陈水扁说，华盛顿希望台湾在与中国大陆建立经贸联系、取消贸易限制、实现三通方面能有更多进展。巴蒂亚说，做到这些将使美国企业对台湾作为全球供应链中的一环有更大信心。
巴蒂亚的言外之意是，如果做不到这些，美国企业不会认为台湾在他们的长期地区性发展战略中有多大作用。虽然自由贸易协定本身对美、台经济或许不乏有益之处，但如果它被人们视为是台湾为避免与大陆经济加速一体化而采取的防范措施的话，那么它对美国和台湾的经济或许只会起到抑制作用。
即使没有上面这些问题，达成自由贸易协定也决不是一件容易的事。台湾目前对知识产权的保护程度是外界担心的一个问题，另外，为达成协议，它还不得不在农业、服务业和医药市场准入方面作出重大让步，而这种做法在台湾岛内势必会引发极大争议。
另外，协议还需得到美国国会的批准，而这个国会不论有无道理总要把事情与国内就业机会减少及选民的不满联系起来。要让自由贸易协定战胜劳工组织和保护主义团体的反对获得通过也是一件非常困难的事，如果没有商业利益团体出面游说持反对意见的国会议员，那么没有任何一届美国政府愿意担起这样一桩苦差事。
虽然台湾可能会动用其在国会的铁关系安抚一些议员的担忧，但它没法解决缺乏美国商界支持的问题。台湾市场本身虽然很不错，但毕竟太小。如果不能在台湾与已经成为亚洲主要经济增长动力的中国大陆之间建立商品、资本和人员流动的渠道，那么，美国商界对与台湾的自由贸易协定很难有太大兴趣。
美国企业在华商业利益正日益上升，没有人认为对台自由贸易协定对他们能有什么好处，这个协议既不能明显推进他们在该地区的业务战略，或许还会因为中国政府的反对而需要反复讨价还价。
鉴于北京政府对陈水扁与生俱来的仇视，它势必会不遗余力地阻止陈水扁在国际舞台上获得更大空间。招来美国跨国公司的代表、逼他们在对台自由贸易协定与在华业务机会之间作出选择，这样的做法对北京来说应该是很正常的。
如果为与人口仅2,300万的台湾扩大贸易就要牺牲在一个有13亿人口的大市场上的远大前程，相信没人会作出这样的选择。所以，现在没有美国企业支持陈水扁为自由贸易协定描绘的前景。
除了缺少商界的支持之外，布什政府对陈水扁的态度也非常暧昧。布什上台后任命的美国在台协会主席是几十年来历届政府中最亲美的。可惜的是陈水扁未能充分利用这样的机会与布什政府加深感情，相反，陈水扁抛出的一系列有关台湾政治地位的声明搞得白宫屡屡大跌眼镜。
最近的一次是在今年2月，陈水扁计划废除“国统会”的决定让白宫措手不及。“国统会”是台湾1990年成立的一个旨在推动海峡两岸最终实现统一的团体。这样的做法难免让华盛顿担心陈水扁对美国在该地区的利益有怎样的认识。
虽然陈水扁已保证不会在法理上寻求台独，但布什政府仍对其追求实际导致台湾与大陆进一步分离的政策的动机感到怀疑。布什政府眼下需要应付的事很多，从中东到朝鲜，许多问题在威胁著它，因此，台北在政治上的冒险主义动向让它非常不安。美国副国务卿佐立克(Robert Zoellick)最近在一次国会听证会上说，台湾独立就意味著战争。对于这一点，布什总统已有了足够多的体会。
综合上述各种因素可以得出结论：除非台湾在扩大两岸交流上表现出更大的意愿，否则，布什政府不大可能与它达成自由贸易协议。如此看来，陈水扁面临著这非常尴尬的处境。他希望拉近与美国的经贸联系，以便从中国大陆这个吸引力巨大的旋涡中脱身。但华盛顿不会签署协议，除非陈水扁愿意让这旋涡加速台湾的一体化。鉴于这样一种事态，可以预计台湾和美国不会很快开启有关自由贸易协定的谈判。也许，那“巨大的吮吸声”能让陈水扁总统清醒一段时间
