America must relax weapons controls
The emergence of the "China threat" has created a deluge of dire threat assessments. Now America's commercial export control agency, the Bureau of Industry and Security, has proposed dramatic new export restrictions that alarm US industry, concern our trading allies and befuddle the Chinese by failing to address the stated threat and leaving significant uncertainties in their wake.
Since the second world war, the US has led the evolution of a system of multilateral export controls that has worked well to stem transfers of militarily useful commercial commodities and technology to fractious or unstable nations. Multilateralism, via a body of like-minded allies known as the Wassenaar Arrangement, has been the key to success. In 1988, the US Congress banned unilateral national security export controls. Times have changed and policy clarity is urgently required.
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The first BIS China initiative - to control access to certain commercial technologies by individuals born in China but with other nationalities - was quietly withdrawn this spring after overwhelming criticism from the legal, academic and commercial communities and the expert BIS government-industry technical advisory committees.
The second proposed China rule, when initially floated last year, generated comparable adverse comment from those long active in the China marketplace and aware of its unforgiving competitive momentum - which, once lost, cannot be regained. When published this month, the proposal raised such concern that the BIS held an unprecedented meeting to clarify the rule with industry and academia, demonstrating clearly that it has yet to work out many details.
The net effect of the rule is to restrict unilaterally the "sale, re-export or transfer" of 47 commercial commodity categories if destined for potential military use in China. The affected items range from aircraft parts and machine tools to medical chemicals, from microprocessors to music equipment. BIS proposes tightening licence review standards to pre-1981 cold war standards of stringency, a breathtaking policy reversal. Those liable for violating the rule include the exporter, shipper, financial institutions, lawyers and virtually anyone who supports or facilitates the transaction. With no avenues to allow exporters to perform liability-reducing due diligence, and with higher penalties under the Patriot Act, fines for even minor infractions skyrocket, creating an exposure umbrella resembling a mushroom cloud.
Promised benefits are few. A new authorisation called "validated end user" has been offered, with merely the name changed from an idea flatly rejected as unworkable in the 1980s. The paperwork burden for Chinese companies to achieve this vaunted status and American companies to avail themselves of it are overwhelming, especially considering that both the Chinese ministry of commerce and BIS have insufficient staff to man the administrative oars. A benefit delayed is a benefit denied.
The rule presents countless drawbacks for China and America's other trading partners, which now are re-evaluating their relations with US suppliers to avoid being drawn into the expanded liability web and are purchasing elsewhere. Cynical manipulation of this liability bomb can fatally disadvantage US companies that have secured contracts or ventures in China. One brown envelope slipped to a US official alleging a Chinese company has military ties could derail a deal.
What threat is BIS and the White House seeking to address? Can the US prevent the Chinese military from modernising by restricting readily available commercial items? Hypocritically, BIS notes that the Chinese military is seeking parts and systems from the private sector: the US Congress mandated the US defence department to procure commercial off-the-shelf items more than two decades ago. Comparisons of defence spending to gross domestic product do not necessarily indicate a gathering storm of Chinese militarism.
BIS says that its China initiatives have been tailored to boost trade while enhancing security. The opposite may well be the case: lacking confidence in consistent US export policy, European and Asian firms are already "designing out" US parts and components from commercial products, defence and space systems while dusting off "blocking statutes" to bar extraterritorial impact of the proposed rule. Since China can freely procure the targeted goods and technology from Europe, Asia and Israel, where is the security or trade benefit for the US?
This BIS initiative lacks the assent of our allies and is therefore destructive to the Wassenaar control system. And China reminds us that the dangerous US trade imbalance will grow unless they are permitted to purchase high-value equipment - a sector where the US still holds a competitive advantage.
Congress, in all its legislation to control commercial exports since 1949, has insisted a balance be struck between robust trade and national security within a multilateral framework. The flawed China proposal skews the balance and is disruptive to trade relations. It is time to restore the balance with a sensible, multilateral policy which addresses a real threat.
The writer is a Washington-based international lawyer specialising in export controls to China
美国对华出口管制“害人害己”
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中国威胁论”的出现，催生了洪水般的悲观威胁评估。现在，美国的商业出口管理部门――商务部工业与安全局(Bureau of Industry and Security)，提议了全新的出口限制规定。这些规定并未应对所谓的威胁，而且留下大量不确定因素，因而让美国业界感到震惊，我们的贸易盟国感到忧虑，中国人感到迷惑。
自二战以来，美国领导了多边出口管制体系的发展，有效地阻止了具有军事用途的商业物资和技术转移到不友好或是不稳定的国家。一些志同道合的盟国订立了《瓦森纳协定》(Wassenaar Arrangement)。通过这个机制实施的多边主义，是成功的关键所在。1988年，美国国会禁止了单方面的国家安全出口管制。现在，时代已经改变，政策需要尽快透明化。
美国工业与安全局针对中国的首个提案，提出限制生于中国、但拥有它国国籍的个人获得某些商业技术。这项提案遭到法律、学术和商业团体以及工业与安全局政府―工业技术顾问专业委员会的强烈批评，在今年春天悄然撤销。
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针对中国的第二条规定在去年首次提出之时，招致了同样激烈的反对。反对者长期活跃在中国市场，了解中国势不可挡的竞争势头――一旦在中国市场失去业务发展的势头，就不可能再恢复。上个月公布之时，这项提议引起了如此大的关注，美国工业与安全局被迫召开了一次前所未有的公开会议，以便向业界和学术界澄清这项规定，这表明，规定的许多细节尚在制定之中。
这项规定的实际效果，是要单方面限制可能在华用于军事用途的47类商品的“销售、转出口或转运”。涉及的商品从飞机部件、机床到医用化学品，从微处理器到音乐设备，不一而足。美国工业与安全局提出，将许可证审验的严格程度，提高到1981年以前冷战时期的水平，这是惊人的政策逆转。可能要对违反规定负责的人包括出口商、托运人、金融机构、律师、以及几乎任何支持或促成交易的人。由于出口商无法通过尽职调查(due diligence)来减轻责任，加上美国《爱国者法》(Patriot Act)规定的处罚更加严厉，所以即使是轻微违规行为遭受的罚款也大幅提高，形成了笼罩在商人头上的蘑菇云。
许诺能带来的利益则几乎没有。名为“验证终端用户”(validated end user)的新授权体制，与20世纪80年代因不可行而被放弃的类似主意相比，只是换了一个名称。要想让中国企业取得这种所谓的身份，让美国企业从中受益，文书工作的负担难以承受，特别是考虑到中国商务部和美国工业与安全局都没有足够人手来开展行政管理。被拖延的利益就是得不到的利益。
此项规定为中国和美国的其它贸易伙伴带来了无数障碍，它们正重新评估与美国供应商的关系，以避免被拖入扩大了的责任网中，并开始从其它地方采购。恶意操纵这一责任炸弹，可能会令那些已在中国签订合同或建立企业的美国公司处于致命的不利地位。只要给某位美国官员写封信，指控某中国公司与军队有联系，就可能断送一笔交易。
美国工业与安全局和白宫希望化解的是什么威胁呢？美国通过限制容易得到的商用物资，就能阻止中国实现军事现代化吗？美国工业与安全局指出，中国军方从私营企业采购零部件和系统将带来威胁，这未免有些虚伪：20多年前，美国国会就授权国防部采购现成的商用物资。比较国防开支占国内生产总值(GDP)的比率，未必显示中国军国主义的崛起。
美国工业与安全局表示，其对华提案经过精心安排，旨在既促进贸易增长，又加强国家安全。更有可能出现的倒是相反的结果：由于对美国出口政策的连续性缺乏信心，欧亚企业已开始在商用产品、防务和航天系统的设计中，不采用美国的零部件，同时重新出台“对抗立法”，以抵制美国拟议之规定的域外效力。既然中国可从欧洲、亚洲和以色列自由采购美国要管制的商品和技术，美国能获得哪些安全或贸易利益？
美国工业与安全局的提案未能获得盟友的认同，因此将对瓦森纳管制体系造成破坏影响。而中国提醒我们，除非允许其购买美国具有竞争优势的高价值设备，否则美国贸易失衡的危险局面还会更严重。
在1949年以来制定的各项管制商业出口的立法中，美国国会始终坚持，应在多边框架内实现强劲贸易增长与国家安全之间的平衡。有问题的对华提案扭曲了这种平衡，并对贸易关系有破坏作用。现在是以针对真正威胁的明智的多边政策恢复这种平衡的时候了。
作者为驻华盛顿的国际律师，是对华出口管制方面的专家。
