America is pursuinga grand designin Asia
Asia's strong states will shape the future of international politics more than the weak states and terrorists of Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. But China's continuing authoritarian rise, like Thailand's descent into military dictatorship, suggests that the quality of democracy within Asian nations will be important in determining the course of the emerging Asian century.
Recognising this, the Bush administration - anticipating a future Chinese challenge to American primacy - is pursuing a grand design in Asia as ambitious as its campaign to transform the Middle East, and as bold in its use of military power and democraticvalues as strategic assets.
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Conventional wisdom holds that the US is a status quo power in Asia - and that a dissatisfied China seeks to undermine the US-centric regional order. But this assumption inverts both countries' roles in a period of dynamic change. China can rest content with the status quo: its rising wealth, power and influence naturally erode American preponderance. As one Chinese analyst put it: the US, not China, stands at a strategic crossroads as a consequence of China's rise.
That is why Washington - not Beijing - is pursuing the revolutionary design in Asia, cultivating new centres of power that will shape the emerging international order as much as China's ascent.
The centrepiece of President George W. Bush's Asia policy is encouraging Japan's normalisation as a great military power - a historic break from Japan's post-1945 tradition of pacifism. Similarly, Washington's intensifying partnership with New Delhi reflects America's determination to accelerate India's rise to world power - and India's aspirations for greatness. In India and Japan, the US is fuelling the strategic ascent of countries that intend to face China as equals.
The US is also cultivating the emerging regional powers of Indonesia and Vietnam. Like India and Japan, they share a historical wariness of Chinese power and an interest in countering Chinese influence in south-east Asia.
Lastly, the US is nurturing a strategic community of democracies in the shadow of Chinese autocracy. America and Japan have formalised trilateral defence co-ordination with both Australia and South Korea and are exploring a trilateral strategic dialogue with India. America wants Nato to develop military interoperability with leading Asian democracies.
America's Asian design is more interesting than a crude effort to contain China. Rather than a neo-conservative plot to prolong US dominance, Washington is actually diffusing its preponderant power by encouraging the rise of friendly Asian partners to help manage a future multipolar order.
America's strategy has costs. Japanese nationalism alarms neighbours such as South Korea, undermining Tokyo's leadership ambitions. Australia is torn between its US military ally and its Chinese trading partner. US-India nuclear co-operation risks a countervailing effort by China to strengthen Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Closer US ties with Hanoi may empower Vietnam's autocracy rather than encouraging its liberalisation. By fuelling Chinese insecurity, measures by America and its friends to hedge against a potential China threat may help bring it about.
China's sponsorship of authoritarian leaders in Burma and North Korea demonstrates the risks of democratic rollback in Thailand - and the strategic importance to the Asia-Pacific democracies, led by America, Japan and India, of standing up for democracy in their backyard. Together, these powers should launch a campaign for democratic reform and renewal across Asia - starting in Bangkok.
The US must encourage Japan to resolve the controversy over the Yasukuni shrine honouring Japanese war criminals, in a way that makes Japan a more attractive partner to its neighbours. A US-South Korean free-trade agreement would help restore frayed relations with Seoul. Washington should abandon its scepticism and embrace Asian regional organisations led by the Association of South East Asian Nations, which promote pluralism, enhance Japanese and Indian leadership and socialise China as a responsible neighbour.
These steps would reassure the many Asian governments that, unlike countries in some other parts of the world, want more American leadership in their unsettled region - not less.
The writer, a former adviser to John McCain, the US senator, is a fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the US and the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar at Oxford University
美国扶持日本印度制衡中国？
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构建未来国际政治格局的过程中，亚洲强国的影响将超过弱国以及阿富汗、伊拉克和黎巴嫩的恐怖分子。但就像泰国沦为军事专政国家一样，威权政体的中国持续崛起意味着，亚洲国家民主体制的质量，将成为决定“亚洲世纪”发展方向的重要因素。
预期中国未来将挑战美国领导地位的布什政府，由于认识到这一点，因此正在亚洲推行一套宏伟的设计。该设计就像其中东改造计划一样雄心勃勃，在运用军事实力和民主价值观作为战略资产方面也同样大胆。
传统观点认为，在亚洲，美国是代表现状的强国，而不满的中国寻求破坏以美国为中心的区域秩序。但是，该假设颠倒了这两个国家在这个动荡时代的角色。中国可以甘于现状：其日益增长的财富、实力和影响力，自然会削弱美国的优势。正如一位中国分析人士所言：作为中国崛起的后果之一，美国（而不是中国）站在战略十字路口上。
正是出于这个原因，华盛顿（而不是北京）正寻求在亚洲推行一项革命性的构想，扶植新的实力中心，使它们在新兴国际秩序的构建过程中，发挥与中国崛起同等重要的作用。
美国总统布什亚洲政策的核心是，鼓励日本成为一个“正常的”军事强国，历史性地告别日本1945年后的和平传统。同样，华盛顿与新德里日益紧密的合作关系，反映出美国决心推动印度加速成为世界强国――并迎合印度对“做大”的渴望。美国正在促成印度和日本两国战略地位的提升，而这两个国家有意与中国并驾齐驱。
美国同样在扶植印尼和越南等新兴地区强国。与印度和日本一样，这两个国家对中国实力有着历史的不安，在东南亚地区抗衡中国的影响力符合它们的利益。
最后，美国正在中国威权政体的阴影下培养一个战略民主团体。美日已经与澳大利亚和韩国正式签署了三方防务协作协议，并在寻求与印度展开三方战略对话。美国还想让北约与亚洲主要的民主国家发展军事协同能力。
与笨拙地企图遏制中国相比，美国对亚洲的这一设计要更有意思一些。美国政府不是在奉行旨在延续美国主宰地位的新保守主义战略，而是在分散其优势力量，鼓励亚洲友好伙伴的崛起，以协助管理未来的多极秩序。
美国的战略是有代价的。日本的民粹主义让韩国等邻国产生警觉，反而破坏了东京的领导雄心。澳大利亚夹在美国军事盟友与中国贸易伙伴之间左右为难。美国与印度的核合作，有可能招致中国采取报复行动，加强巴基斯坦的核威慑力。美国与越南政府更紧密的关系，也许会促进越南走向威权，而不是鼓励其自由化。由于增加了中国的不安全感，美国及其盟友为应对潜在中国威胁而采取的措施，可能反而会促使这种威胁成为现实。
中国对缅甸和朝鲜威权领导人的支持，既表明有泰国那样民主倒退的风险，也表明以美国、日本和印度为首的亚太民主国家在其后院捍卫民主的重要战略意义。这些国家应共同发起一场横跨整个亚洲的民主改革与复兴运动――从泰国开始。
美国必须鼓励日本解决因靖国神社(Yasukuni shrine)而引发的争议，使日本成为对邻国更具吸引力的伙伴。靖国神社供奉着日本的战犯。美韩自由贸易协议将有助于缓和两国的紧张关系。美国政府应放弃怀疑，接受提倡多边主义的东盟(ASEAN)领导的亚洲区域组织，增强日本和印度的领导地位，并与作为“负责任邻国”的中国保持接触。
这些措施会让许多亚洲政府放心。与世界其它某些地区的国家不同，亚洲有许多政府希望，美国能在这个不稳定的地区发挥更多（而不是更少）的领导作用。
作者曾任美国参议员约翰?麦凯恩(John McCain)的顾问，目前是美国的德国马歇尔基金会(German Marshall Fund)成员、牛津大学(Oxford University)富布莱特/牛津基金会学者。
