The hard truth behind China's soft landing
Investors, economists and policy-
makers are not sure whether the US economy is slowing down or speeding up. What hope then is there for those analysing China, who have less and much less accurate information on which to base their thoughts? Given China's disproportionate contribution to world growth over the past few years, however, the second issue matters almost as much as the first.
Most official statistics released over the past two weeks point towards the soft landing desired by the Chinese authorities. Growth in industrial production dipped to 15.5 per cent in the year to July, down from an overheated 23 per cent at the start of 2004, marking its fifth monthly decline. Expansion in money supply and producer prices has also slowed.
On that basis, Chinese gross domestic product growth should moderate from more than 9 per cent this year to 78 per cent in 2005 still rapid enough to absorb surplus labour and maintain social stability while generating less over-investment and thus fewer future bad loans.
But there are enough data to contradict this benign scenario to keep Beijing (and the rest of us) on tenterhooks. Fixed asset investment, which accounts for nearly half of GDP, accelerated sharply in July, growing by more than 30 per cent. Electricity consumption is still growing at 16 per cent and retail sales by 13 per cent. Consumer price inflation has breached the central bank's 5 per cent danger level. That largely reflects one-off gains in food prices, but there are worrying signs of upward pressure on wages.
Evidently, this spring's administrative measures a polite term for bureaucratic bullying by the centre to cool the economy, though initially successful, are starting to lose their effectiveness. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of local officials ignoring or reversing Beijing's dictums when it comes to building new factories and housing.
A proper market economy and China despite its protestations is less than half-way there would simply tighten monetary policy to rein in growth. But on the mainland, where lending is politically-directed rather than rational, that does not work. Indeed, higher rates would hit the central government hardest of all both by raising the cost of its own debt and by triggering more non-performing loans at the state-owned banks.
The only alternative is further enforcement, and perhaps a fresh set, of those administrative measures. Indeed, premier Wen Jiabao exhorted provincial governors this month to continue to implement Beijing's “macroeconomic controls”. The trouble is, that this type of policy-making is likely to overshoot: once local bureaucrats and bank managers have had the slowdown message beaten into them, Mr Wen cannot credibly order a quick reversal.
As a result, the economy, once it starts slowing, might go right on doing so particularly in targeted sectors such as steel, cars, aluminium and cement. Certainly, profits in those industries will be badly hit. We may never see it in the official GDP numbers, but there is still a distinct possibility that China is going to suffer a hard landing.
Manila mathsThe Philippines is one of Asia's most prolific and least responsible sovereign borrowers, with public-sector debt amounting to nearly $100bn or more than 120 per cent of GDP. Since almost half of this is denominated in foreign currency, an attack of fiscal rectitude in Manila would be newsworthy for international bondholders as well
as domestic ones.
And there are indeed signs that president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo reinvigorated by May's election victory and with a bigger parliamentary majority is pushing to consolidate government finances. Vowing to wipe out the budget deficit by the end of the decade, her administration has rapidly prepared a package of petrol and value-added tax increases to raise revenues by 2 per cent of GDP in 2005.
Moreover, Napocor, the state-owned power company, is applying for a 20 per cent increase in tariffs. Since Napocor's massive losses and a decline in the tax take over the past few years are the main reasons behind the country's public sector deficit, currently running at of 56 per cent of GDP a year, this is encouraging.
The snag is that politicians rarely vote for higher taxes, and in the Philippines party loyalty and coalitions tend to be weaker than in most places, while passing legislation is slow. Napocor's electricity price increase should be easier to implement since it has to be approved by the regulator, not parliament. But even that is not a foregone conclusion: in 2002, despite rising costs, the government forced Napocor to cut power rates to curry favour with voters.
Without a significant reduction in the annual deficit, however UBS reckons the magic number is 3 per cent of GDP the country's debt burden will continue to rise. By 2010 it could reach an unsustainable 175 per cent of GDP. Unfortunately, despite her rebirth as a fiscal conservative, Ms Arroyo's track record does not inspire: during her first term, the country's budget deficit actually widened.
中国软着陆的真相
投资人、经济学家和政策制定者拿不准，美国经济是在减速还是在加速。那么，对于那些分析中国的人来说，他们的想法所基于的信息更少、更不准确，他们还能指望什么呢？在过去几年中，中国为世界经济增长做出了巨大的贡献。考虑到这一点，第二个问题几乎和第一个问题一样重要。
在过去两周内发布的官方统计数据中，多数都是指向中国政府渴望的软着陆。截至7月的一年中，工业产值增长率出现第五次单月下跌，降至15.5%，低于2004年年初过热的23%。货币供应扩张和生产物价上升也已放缓。
据此，到2005年，中国国内生产总值(GDP)增长率应从今年的逾9%降至7.8%，这个增长率依然足以吸收剩余劳动力并维持社会稳定，同时降低过度投资，并因此减少未来的坏账。
但也有足够数据来反驳这种良性的前景，令中国政府（以及我们其他人）坐立不安。占GDP近一半的固定资产投资在7月份大幅增长，增长率超过30%。7月份电力消耗依然以16%的速度增长，而零售额增长13%。消费物价通货膨胀率已超出央行5%的警戒线水平。这基本上反映出食品价格的一次性上涨，但有令人担忧的迹象表明，工资正承受上涨压力。
显然，今年春天的行政措施尽管最初很成功，但现在已开始失效。“行政措施”是中央为给经济降温，而采取的官方强制手段的委婉说法。还有大量零星证据表明，地方政府官员在忽视或违抗中央政府的命令，继续建设新的工厂和住宅。
一个真正的市场经济体只要紧缩货币政策就能抑制增长，但中国连一半还没达到，尽管中国自己不承认。但在中国大陆，信贷更多由政治、而非理性来引导，因此上述做法不起作用。实际上，提高利率会严重打击中央政府，因为这将增加政府自身的债务成本，同时引发国有银行出现更多不良贷款。
唯一的选择就是进一步执行（而且或许是重新制定）那些行政措施。事实上，温家宝总理本月告诫省级官员，要继续实施中央的“宏观调控”措施。麻烦之处在于，此类决策很可能过头：一旦地方官员和银行经理头脑中灌进了经济减速的信息，温先生就不可能令人信服地下令使局面迅速逆转。
结果，一旦经济开始放缓，就有可能一发不可收，尤其在钢铁、汽车、铝和水泥等调控目标行业。毫无疑问，这些行业的利润将受严重打击。我们或许再也不能从官方的GDP数字中看到它们，但中国经历硬着陆的可能性依然很明显。
给马尼拉算笔账
菲律宾是亚洲借贷最多、最不负责任的主权借贷者，共有近1000亿美元的公共部门债务，超过其GDP的120%。由于其中近一半以外汇计价，因此对国际、国内债券持有者来说，若菲律宾政府突然表现出财政上的正直，将具有新闻价值。
事实上，种种迹象表明，总统格洛丽亚?马卡帕加尔?阿罗约(Gloria Macapagal Arroyo)在5月份竞选获胜后重新振作起来，而议会中更大多数成员强烈要求巩固政府的财政状况。阿罗约政府发誓要在2010年前消除预算赤字，已快速准备好一套增加汽油税和增值税的方案，从而在2005年增收达GDP的2%。
另外，国有电力公司国家电力公司(Napocor)正申请将电费上调20%。这是令人鼓舞的，因为该国公共部门之所以出现赤字，主要原因在于，国家电力公司的大规模亏损和过去几年退税降低，目前每年的公共部门赤字都达到GDP的56%。
障碍在于，政治家很少支持增税，而且相比其它多数国家，菲律宾的党派忠诚度与联合力量往往较弱，同时法案通过非常缓慢。国家电力公司的电价增长可能较易执行，因为这必须由监管机构而非议会批准。但即使是这个问题也无法预知结果：2002年，尽管成本不断上升，但政府为讨好选民，迫使国家电力公司降价。
如果每年的赤字得不到大幅削减，那么菲律宾的债务负担将继续增强，尽管瑞士银行(UBS)作了一个不可思议的估计，称该国的赤字为GDP的3%。到2010年，该国赤字将达GDP的175%，那将是无法支撑的。不幸的是，尽管阿罗约再生为一个财政保守主义者，但她的历史纪录并不鼓舞人心：在她的第一个任期内，菲律宾的预算赤字事实上有所扩大。
