The underrated dangers of the dollar's orderly decline
The dollar is falling. That is no surprise. The surprise is only how it is falling. Current account deficits and deflationary pressure are being shifted from the US towards other high-income countries. Among the most endangered is an already feeble eurozone.
Since the beginning of 2002, the Federal Reserve's broad trade-weighted index has fallen by about 12 per cent (see chart). As far as John Snow, the US Treasury secretary, is concerned, the decline has been "orderly". But what looks orderly to the US looks less so elsewhere.
Since the end of January 2002, the dollar has lost 31 per cent of its value against the Australian dollar, 30 per cent against the euro, 19 per cent against the yen and sterling and 18 per cent against the Canadian dollar. Yet against the most important of emerging market currencies, China's renminbi, the dollar has moved not at all. The Hong Kong dollar and Malaysian ringgit are also fixed. But even the Indian rupee, Korean won, Taiwanese and Singaporean dollars and Russian rouble have barely moved.
What is going on? "Intervention" is the answer. The world has returned to the Bretton Woods era, which ended in 1971, with the move to generalised floating. But it has done so only partially. Peter Garber of Deutsche Bank has put forward an elegant account of the new global monetary system at a forum organised by the International Monetary Fund.*
In the old Bretton Woods era, there were just two groups of countries: the US and the rest. The US, as the core country, adjusted to the policies of everybody else until, in 1971, it ceased abruptly to do so. Today, however, the world economy is divided into three parts: the US is the first; in Mr Garber's terminology, the "capital-account zone" is the second; and "the trade account zone" is the third. Countries in the capital-account zone target domestic monetary stability, while letting private capital flows set exchange rates. Countries in the trade-account zone fix exchange rates, while trying to sterilise the domestic monetary consequences.
The objective of countries in the trade-account zone is growth. In Mr Garber's words: "The fundamental global imbalance is not in the exchange rate. The fundamental global imbalance is the enormous excess supply of labour in Asia now waiting to enter the modern global economy. The exchange rate is only the valve that controls that rate of entry." In order to maximise growth, Asian mercantilists lend the US the money with which to purchase their surging exports. When they demand repayment, the US will devalue and so partially default. The Asian strategy is to grow by giving.
Consider the implications of this tripartite division of the world economy. The US has a growing current account deficit, which has now reached 5 per cent of gross domestic product. As these deficits have piled up, the country has become a huge net debtor. At the end of last year, net liabilities were 25 per cent of GDP (see chart). The structure of the external sector, together with the political imperative of full employment, or what economists call "internal balance", is driving these deficits. At recent dollar exchange rates, internal balance has been possible only in combination with a huge external imbalance.
The growing external deficit appears to be structural: since 1990, US exports of goods and services have been growing at 5.7 per cent a year, in constant prices, while imports have been growing at 8.8 per cent. To avoid a continuing deterioration, one alternative is for the US to grow more slowly than the rest of the world. But Mark Cliffe of ING argues that it would need an 11 per cent fall in US GDP, relative to trend, to reduce the current account deficit to 2 per cent of GDP. It should go without saying that the US would not tolerate such a slump. There are two possible escapes from the recessionary trap: depreciation of the real exchange rate and faster growth in the rest of the world. But, according to Mr Cliffe, it would take a 36 per cent increase in the rest of the world's GDP, a 34 per cent decline in the trade-weighted dollar, or some mixture of the two, to reduce the current account deficit to 2 per cent of GDP.
So vast an increase in the rest of the world's relative GDP is infeasible. But depreciation is also at least partially blocked by the Asian mercantilists. In 2002 and the first half of 2003, foreign official purchases have financed a quarter of the US current account deficit. Between the beginning of 2002 and September 2003, Asian foreign currency reserves rose by $546bn. But the pressure on the US currency remains downward. It has been displaced, from the Asian mercantilists on to countries in the capital-account zone.
Imagine, as a first possibility, that this continues, to give the US the overall depreciation suggested by Mr Cliffe. Then the dollar would be more than $1.60 to the euro and the yen possibly back at 80 to the dollar. This would be a recipe for deflation in the eurozone and even deeper deflation in Japan.
The second possibility is for members of the capital-account zone to join the Asian mercantilists in supporting the US currency. The monetary consequences would be expansionary. But though such an expansion would be welcome, it would be insufficient to reduce the US current account deficit. The result would be a faster global economic expansion, probably ending in worldwide overheating and a dollar collapse.
The third, and most benign, possibility would be for the Asians to decide not to play this game much longer: the reserve accumulation is too large and the US political backlash against rising deficits too powerful. These countries would then let their currencies rise, not dramatically but by a good margin against the US dollar.
That leaves a final possibility: the Nixon shock repeated. As the election comes closer, President George W. Bush announces an across-the-board import surcharge, to be lifted when all significant currencies appreciate against the dollar. The arrest of Saddam Hussein must make this less likely. But it is not inconceivable. At some point, the new Bretton Woods game will end. The question is when. In the meantime, those in the capital account zone must realise that a currency tidal wave is being deflected in their direction
不要低估美元有序下滑危险
美元在下滑。这用不着感到惊奇。令人惊奇的只是美元怎样下跌。经常帐户赤字和通货紧缩风险正在由美国转向其他高收入国家。这些国家中危险最大的是本来已经脆弱的欧元区国家。
自从2002年开始以来，联邦储备委员会贸易加权指数已经下降12％（见图表）。在美国财长约翰?斯诺（John Snow）看来，美元下滑是“有序的”。但是，对美国有序的事情对其他国家可能便不见得如此。
从2002年1月份到现在，美元兑澳大利亚元已经失去价值的31％，兑欧元损失30％，兑日元和英镑减少19％，兑加拿大元下跌18％。但是，对于最重要的新型市场经济货币即人民币来说，美元价值保持不变。香港港币和马来西亚林吉特也与美元挂钩。但是，甚至印度的卢比、南韩韩元、台湾新台币和新加坡元及俄罗斯卢布兑美元的价格都几乎未变。
这究竟是怎么回事呢？“干预”是问题的答案。世界又已经回到1971年终结的布雷顿森林体系时代，走向一种联合浮动。但是，只是部分实现的联合浮动。德意志银行的彼得?嘉伯（Peter Garber）在国际货币基金组织主办的论坛上，提出了关于新全球货币体系的精彩解释。
在原来的布雷顿森林体系时代，存在两组国家：一组是美国，另一组是美国以外的国家。美国作为核心国家，根据世界其他国家的政策作出调整。这种情况到1971年突然终止。但是，现在世界经济分为三个部分：美国是第一部分；用嘉伯先生的术语，“资本帐户区”是第二部分；第三部分是“贸易帐户区”。属于资本帐户区的国家以国内货币稳定为目标，同时允许通过私人资本流动确定汇率。在贸易帐户区的国家实行固定汇率，同时力图消除汇率政策的国内影响。
贸易帐户区国家的目标是增长。用嘉伯先生的话说：“全球的基本不平衡不是在于汇率。全球基本不平衡是亚洲庞大的过剩劳动力等待进入现代全球经济。汇率只是控制准入的唯一阀门。”未来最大限度增长，亚洲重商主义者将钱借给美国，让美国用钱购买别国提供的大量出口产品。当它们需要付款时，美国对货币进行贬值，这实际是部分违约。亚洲的战略是通过馈赠实现增长。
让我们来看一下世界经济这种三角分工的含义。美国经常帐户赤字增长，现在达到了国内生产总值的5％。随着赤字累积，美国成为巨大的债务国。去年年底，美国净负债为GDP的25％（见图表）。推动债务增长的是对外经济结构和实现充分就业的政治要求，或经济学家称为的“内部平衡”。按照目前美元的汇率，只能靠巨大的外部不平衡才能实现这种内部平衡。
对外赤字增长似乎是结构性的：自从1990年以来，用不变价来衡量，美国产品和劳务出口每年增长5.7％，而进口增长8.8％。为了避免继续恶化，一种选择是，相对于世界其他国家而言，美国放慢经济增长。但是，ING的马克?科立夫（Mark Cliffe）认为，与趋势增长率相比，这需要美国GDP下降11％，才能使美国经常帐户赤字降低到GDP的2％。毫无疑问，美国无法允忍这样的衰退。有两个摆脱衰退陷阱的可能出路：汇率贬值和美国以外的世界经济更快增长。但是，按照科立夫先生的观点，这需要美国以外世界各国GDP增长36％，或贸易加权美元汇率下降34％，或者两者兼而有之，才能使美国经常帐户赤字降低到GDP的2％。
世界各国相对GDP如此大幅度增长是不现实的。但是，贬值又至少部分地被亚洲重商主义者阻碍。2002年和2003年上半年，外国官方购买为美国筹集了经常帐户赤字的四分之一。从2002年初到2003年9月，亚洲外汇储备增加5460亿美元。但是，美国货币依然受到贬值压力。这种压力从亚洲重商主义者那里转移到了资本帐户区。
想象一下第一种可能性，即美元继续贬值到科立夫先生建议的总体水平。那么欧元将升值到1欧元兑1.6美元，日元可能重回到1美元兑80日元。这将可能使欧元区发生通货紧缩，日本通货紧缩的程度甚至更为严重。
第二种可能性是资本帐户区一些成员加入亚洲重商主义阵营，支持美国货币。这样做的结果将是货币扩张。虽然这种扩张可能受到欢迎，但是将不足以降低美国经常帐户赤字。结果是全球经济扩张更快，可能导致世界经济过热，以及美元崩溃。
第三也是最温和的可能性是，亚洲国家决定不再继续玩目前的游戏：外汇储备过大，美国针对不断上升赤字的政治反应过于强烈。这些国家将允许它们的货币升值，虽不是剧烈变动但对美元升值幅度可观。
剩下的是最后一种可能性：尼克松式的冲击重演。美国大选正在逼进，乔治?W?布什总统宣布对所有进口提高关税，当所有重要货币对美元升值后再解除。抓获萨达姆?侯赛因减少了这样的可能性。但是也并非不可思议。在某个时点，新的布雷顿森林式的游戏将会结束。问题是什么时候结束。同时，资本帐户区的国家必须意识到，货币大潮正被转移，向它们汹涌袭来。
