The pact should be replaced and not mourned
The stability and growth pact is dead. This is bad for those who believe that pacts and treaties should be respected. But its death also shows that agreements should be intelligent and perceived to be in the national interest. This was not the case with the stability and growth pact.
Why did this happen? The pact identified an important problem: unsustainable government debt levels can lead to debt crises, which are especially damaging in a monetary union. Three countries - Belgium, Italy and Greece, with debt ratios exceeding 100 per cent of gross domestic product - came close to unsustainable debt levels. For these countries it made sense to use drastic medicine aimed at reducing the debt levels. For them, the pact's medicine of maintaining a balanced budget over the business cycle and of punishing the trespassers of the magical 3 per cent deficit rule was appropriate. It was not, however, for the others, including France and Germany.
These countries have reasonable debt levels and it did not make sense to subject them to a rule that pushes their debt ratios towards zero, and threaten them with heavy fines when the deficits exceed 3 per cent. This medicine was intended for the critically ill, not for the healthy.
The pact was unintelligent for another reason. Modern nations have a lot of responsibilities to their citizens. These responsibilities are stretched during a recession, when citizens expect the social insurance mechanisms to function. The rigidity of the pact was blind to this.
If nothing is done and the pact remains unchanged, it will be very bad for Europe. The pact will inevitably be invoked again in the future, leading to new fights and recriminations. We have to do better.
What should such a new pact look like? First, since countries have very different debt levels, they should all be treated differently. This means that countries whose debt exceeds more than 100 per cent of GDP should follow different budgetary policy rules from countries with sustainable debt levels. The approach of the old stability pact - applying the same medicine to all, sick or healthy - should be abandoned.
Second, the pact should have more flexibility. A rule that requires countries to lower their social security responsibilities during recessions will not last because, in a monetary union, governments have lost an instrument of policy.
How should we implement these principles? In the new pact, countries would define the debt levels that they found appropriate; and that will not lead them into a debt crisis. This should be a national decision but the new pact would define a maximum, which might or might not be 60 per cent, as in the treaty of Maastricht. Individual countries would then target this debt level over the business cycle, allowing for some flexibility on both sides.
Let us take an example. Suppose that in a new pact a country targets a 50 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio, which is very different from the present 0 per cent target imposed by the stability pact. The arithmetic of this example then implies that this country can maintain a budget deficit of 2 per cent a year on average (assuming that the nominal growth of GDP is 4 per cent a year), without endangering the 50 per cent debt target.
In such a pact the 3 per cent maximum deficit rule cannot apply. It is far too inflexible. With each recession, countries would hit the ceiling and a crisis would arise. In general, numerical rules for the budget deficits should be avoided. They have no credibility in a world where democratically elected governments face the many claims and aspirations of their citizens.
In a new pact, there would be no place for heavy fines and penalties. Like the numerical rules, fines and penalties have no credibility. Instead, mutual control should be exerted by peer pressure. Some economists have proposed the creation of an official and independent watchdog that would evaluate the budget policies in the light of the announced debt targets. This seems like a good idea.
This is the time to abandon the old pact and build a new one that reconciles the need for debt sustainability and the desire of modern nations to react flexibly to economic disturbances. We have an opportunity to create such a pact. We cannot afford to live with the old pact, which, if resuscitated, will be a constant source of conflict in the future.
别为稳定与增长公约惋惜
稳定与增长公约已经死亡。对于那些认为公约和条约应当得到尊重的人们来说，这是坏消息。但是，该公约走向死亡也说明，协议应当是合理的，并且让人们觉得是符合各国利益的。但稳定与增长公约并非如此。
为什么会出现这种情况呢？稳定与增长公约有一个严重的问题：不可维持的政府债务水平会导致债务危机，特别是这种危机会破坏货币联盟。有三个国家的债务比例超过了国内生产总值的100％，接近于无法持续的水平。这三个国家是比利时、意大利和希腊。对于这些国家来说，为了降低债务水平，使用猛药是有道理的。公约所开的药方是，在商业循环周期维持平衡预算，如超过重要的3％赤字规则便会受到惩罚，该规则对这些国家来说合适的。但是，同样的方法对其他国家如法国和德国却是不恰当的。
这些国家的债务水平适中，用公约的规则对它们进行约束并将强迫它们的债务比例趋于零，而且当赤字超过3％时，威胁对它们予以重罚，这是没有道理的。该药是给重病人而不是健康人吃的。
公约不合理还有另一个原因。现代国家对自己的公民承担有许多责任。在经济衰退期间，市民期望社会保障机制发挥作用，但国家的财力则比较紧张。不灵活的公约对此却没有考虑。
如果不采取行动，让该公约原封不动存在，这对于欧洲相当不利。该公约将来还会无可避免地遇到问题，导致新的对抗和相互指责。我们不能不寻求好的出路。
新的公约应当是什么样的呢？首先，由于各国的债务水平悬殊很大，因此各国应当区别对待。这意味着，那些债务水平超过国内生产总值100％的国家和那些债务水平可持续的国家，应当遵循不同的预算政策规则。不管有病或是健康，原来的稳定公约对所有国家用同样的药，这样的方法应当摒弃。
第二，公约应当更为灵活。要求各国在经济衰退期间降低社会保障支出责任的规则是难以维持的，即因为加入货币联盟，各国政府已经失去了一种政策工具。
我们应当怎样来贯彻这些原则呢？在新公约中，各国将界定它们认为是合理的债务水平。这种水平将不会使它们陷入债务危机。虽然这应当留给成员国自己决定，但是，新公约将设定一个上限，像在《马约》(Treaty of Maastrich)中规定的那样，也许可以定为国内生产总值的60％。在商业周期循环中，每个国家将以这个债务水平为目标，上下允许一些灵活性。
让我们举例来说明。假定参加新公约的一个国家把债务与GDP比例定为50％。这与稳定公约当前设定的零目标完全不同。本例子的计算表明，该国可以每年平均维持2％的预算赤字（假设GDP名义年增长率为4％），将不会危险地接近50％的目标。
在这个公约中，3％的赤字上限规则是不适用的。这个规定过于灵活。每次经济衰退，各国都可能触及上限，导致危机。一般说来，应当避免使用预算赤字的数字规定。一个民主选举产生的政府面临来自其市民的许多申请和要求，在这种情况下，数字规则缺乏可信度。
在新公约中，不会发生严重罚款和惩罚。如同数字规定一样，罚款和惩罚没有可信度。相反，应当通过权威机构的压力来实行相互控制。有的经济学家建议，建立一个独立的官方监督机构，按照宣布的预算目标，对各国的预算政策进行评估。这看来是个好主意。
现在是放弃旧公约的时候了，我们需要制定一个新的公约，该公约兼顾债务可持续性和现代国家灵活地对经济波动作出反应的需要。我们有机会创造一个新的公约。我们再也不能继续让旧公约主导我们的生活，如果不对它进行更新，它将会屡屡成为我们未来冲突的根源。
