How the elephant can start to run
Can elephants run? Purists say no, as they are at no point ever entirely airborne and maintain a pendulum-style walking gait even at full speed. For Sanjaya Baru, who has selected a temple carving of a charging elephant for the cover of his new book, the main thing is that his lumbering pachyderm - a metaphor for an India on the move - reaches its rightful destination as soon as possible.
That destination is a seat at the top table of world affairs consistent with India's self-image as a major power. A country under colonial rule just 60 years ago, India has a deep psychological need for international recognition of its history, its contribution toreligion, maths and philosophy, its demographic and geographic size, its military might and its new economic vitality.
Between 1700 and 1995, according to figures Baru cites, India's share of world income fell from 22.6 per cent to 4.6 per cent. Since the start of the reform era in 1991, this decline has begun to reverse. India is set for an unprecedented fourth straight year of 8 per cent growth in 2006/7. If it continues at this pace (admittedly a big if), it could, Brics (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economists at Goldman Sachs say, become the world's third largest economy by 2050.
A key aide to Manmohan Singh, India's prime minister, Baru could have chronicled the elephant's journey to big power status from the mahout's saddle. He should be encouraged to do so as soon as possible as this book feels a little like a missed opportunity. Except for the introduction, its essays and articles were all written before the economist-cum-news???-paper editor became Singh's spokesman in 2004. This is essentially a collection of Baru's journalistic greatest hits: 52 of the 63 chapters are reprints of yellowing newspaper columns, some more than a decade old.
Yet you will forgive his publishers everything once you have read the four brilliant scene-setting essays analysing the strategic choices that have faced India since it started to open its economy 15 years ago. Although covering barely one-quarter of the book's 500-odd pages, they make it required reading for anyone interested in the interplay between domestic economic strategy and global power politics.
An admirer of the way China has created interdependencies through trade and foreign investment, Baru argues that India will be able to exercise influence beyond its borders only if it engages with the global economy and sustains its rapid growth. Only then will it generate resources needed not just for its defence and security but also for overdue investment in its infrastructure and human capital.
Stressing the centrality of economic performance in the shaping of a country's strategic power and relevance, Baru, like his new boss, argues that India's principal challenges are internal. The world, he says, wants India to do well and he urges it to capitalise on an unprecedentedly benign global environment, in which only Pakistan and China, "its two major adversaries", view its rise as a strategic concern.
Four factors have helped shift western perceptions of India, leader of the awkward squad during the cold war, since the early 1990s. First, India's economic performance and the shift in policy towards greater liberalisation; second, its declared nuclear weapons status; third, New Delhi's shared commitment to eradicating jihadi terrorism; and, last, Washington's desire for a counterbalance to China in Asia.
Taken together, Baru argues, these have laid the groundwork for India's potential re-emergence as a great power. Yet he insists that nothing must be taken for granted and is critical of the "hubris" of the Indian policymaking community in believing a return to glory is predestined. There remains a "credibility gap" to be bridged before India can truly be viewed as a major power beyond her immediate neighbourhood.
Above all, Baru believes India must jettison the knee-jerk defensiveness that characterises its relations with trading partners and foreign investors, a manifestation of what he calls its East India Company syndrome. Late among developing countries in opening up its economy and still on the margins of globalisation, accounting for less than 1 per cent of global foreign investment, India must run to catch up.
Decades of inward-orientated industrial development and protectionist policies have taken a toll on India's strategic profile in Asia. Even if India's information technology industry is creating new economic ties and interdependencies with the English-speaking world, China's use of economic diplomacy is in a different league of sophistication. Beijing is a more significant trade partner for every country in Asia, except for Nepal and Sri Lanka.
At the peak of the cold war, backed by the USSR, India could adopt foreign policy postures scarcely warranted by the strength of its economy. Washington is today offering New Delhi a free ride on its coat-tails. For Baru, strategic autonomy starts at home. Fix weak public finances that leave India unable to pay for essential development expenditure, let alone nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers: then the elephant will really be able to run.
“印度象”如何起跑
《印度经济表现的战略后果》(The Strategic Consequences of India’s Economic Performance)
作者：散嘉亚?巴鲁(Sanjaya Baru)
Academic Foundation, $59.95
大象能跑吗？纯粹主义者的回答是“不”，因为它们永远不会完全脱离地面，即使全速前行也是步履蹒跚的。散嘉亚?巴鲁(Sanjaya Baru)选择了一座雕刻着一头“奔腾之象”的寺庙作为自己新书的封面。在他看来，关键是他那动作迟缓的庞然大物（暗喻前进中的印度）尽快到达自己应有的目的地。
这个目的地就是全球事务中的一个上座，与印度自视为大国的形象相一致。作为一个60年前还处于殖民统治之下的国家，印度有一种强烈的心理需求，希望国际社会认可它的历史、对宗教、数学和哲学的贡献、它的人口和地理规模、它的军事实力及新的经济活力。
巴鲁援引的数字显示，1700年至1995年间，印度在全球收入中所占比例从22.6%降至4.6%。1991年开始改革以来，这种下降趋势已经开始扭转。在2006/7年度，印度有望连续第四年实现8%的经济增长，这是前所未有的成绩。高盛(Goldman Sachs)研究“金砖四国”（BRIC：巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）的经济学家们指出，如果印度继续照此速度发展（我们得承认这是个很大的“如果”），那么到2050年，它有望成为全球第三大经济体。
作为印度总理曼莫汉?辛格(Manmohan Singh)的重要助手，巴鲁本可以从看象人的角度，详细记录下这头大象奔向大国地位的征程。应该鼓励他尽快这样做，因为这本书让人有一点错失良机之感。除了导言之外，书中的文章都写于这位经济学家兼报社编辑2004年成为辛格发言人之前。从本质上说，这本书是巴鲁记者生涯中辉煌篇章的集锦：63个篇章中的52章都是泛黄报纸专栏的再版，其中一些发表已有10多年。
然而，一旦你阅读了四篇才华横溢的大格局论文，你就会彻底原谅他的出版商。文章分析了印度自15年前开始开放经济以来面临的战略选择。尽管这些论文只占这本书500余页的四分之一，对于所有对国内经济战略与全球大国政治相互作用感兴趣的人士来说，它们是必读文章。
中国通过贸易和外商投资，与世界其它国家形成了相互依赖的关系。作为这一方式的推崇者，巴鲁认为，印度只要参与全球经济并保持快速增长，就能将影响力扩展至境外。只有到那个时候，它才能提供足够的资源，不仅满足自己国防和安全需要，而且能进行早该进行的基础设施和人力资本投资。
正如他的新上司一样，巴鲁强调经济表现在形成国家战略实力及影响力方面的核心作用，认为印度面临的主要挑战来自内部。他表示，全球都希望印度表现出色。同时，他敦促印度利用全球前所未有的良好环境。在这个环境中，只有印度的“两大劲敌”――巴基斯坦和中国，将印度的崛起视为战略隐忧。
印度曾被西方视为冷战期间“捣乱集团”的带头人。自20世纪90年代以来，四个因素促使西方改变了对印度的看法。首先是印度的经济表现和朝向自由化的政策转变；其次，印度宣布拥有核武器；第三，印度政府承诺参与根除伊斯兰恐怖主义；最后，美国政府希望在亚洲找到一个能抗衡中国的国家。
巴鲁指出，上述因素共同构成了印度可能再度崛起为大国的根基。不过他坚持认为，万事都不该想当然；而印度决策团体认为印度再现辉煌是注定的，他对这种“自以为是”的观点持批评态度。在印度能够真正在本地区之外被视为大国之前，仍有一条“可信度鸿沟”有待填补。
首先，巴鲁相信，印度必须抛弃与贸易伙伴和外国投资者关系中特有的下意识防御心态。巴鲁将这种表现称为“东印度公司综合症”。由于在发展中国家里开放经济的时间较晚，而且仍处于全球化边缘（占全球外国投资不到1%），印度必须快步赶上。
数十年的内向型工业发展和保护主义政策，影响了印度在亚洲的战略形象。即便印度的信息科技产业使印度与英语世界形成了新的经济纽带与相互依赖关系，中国对经济外交的运用之老到，与印度不可同日而语。除尼泊尔和斯里兰卡外，中国是亚洲每一个国家更重要的贸易伙伴。
在冷战高潮时期，在苏联的支持下，印度可采取与其经济实力不相称的对外政策姿态。如今，美国也为印度提供了“免费沾光”的机会。在巴鲁看来，战略自主的关键在国内。薄弱的公共财政，令印度无力支付必要的发展支出，更不用说发展核潜艇和航空母舰。先解决好这个问题，那么大象就真的能跑了。
