East Asian renaissance talk is premature
Well before next year’s 10th anniversary of east Asia’s economic crisis, celebrations of the region’s return to health are in full swing. A new World Bank study has proclaimed it a “renaissance”. Investment banks declare that, after being eclipsed by China for a decade, the rest of developing Asia is poised to regain its place in the sun. Then along comes North Korea’s claimed nuclear test to spoil the party. But even without Pyongyang’s reminder of the region’s vulnerability to geopolitical risk, some scepticism would be in order. It is wise to be wary when those caught napping once before sound the all-clear. Just four years before the 1997 crisis, a Bank study lauded east Asia’s “miracle” (to be fair, its latest one does identify some flaws and challenges ahead). International investment managers kept the faith until much too late.
So is today’s optimism any better founded? At first glance, the region’s recovery seems impressive. Annual growth averaging 7 per cent since 2000 has restored nominal US dollar incomes at least to pre-crisis levels. Inward investment has picked up. Shattered banking systems have been rebuilt, balance sheets repaired and excess capacity trimmed, while bulging currency reserves have replaced ruinous reliance on short-term foreign borrowing. Financially, east Asia is in far sounder shape than 10 years ago.
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The big questions are about growth. Take away China and the picture looks less rosy. The Asian Development Bank estimates that the rest of developing east Asia grew by an average 4.9 per cent annually from 2000 to 2006, compared with 7.4 per cent from 1990 to 1996. Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan, all once vibrant tiger economies, could not manage even that. Some of the torrid growth just before the crisis was caused by overheating. But given the hoop-la about “Asia rising”, the recent performance looks almost anaemic. The relevant issue is not how east Asia has fought its way back, but why it is not doing better.
The main culprit is under-investment almost everywhere except in China, which has the opposite problem. Jonathan Anderson of UBS says that even when China and India are included, investment’s share of gross domestic product in Asia is at a 40-year low, with increases limited to export-oriented activities. Domestic investment, above all in construction, remains depressed. That, coupled with artificially low exchange rates, means the region continues to send much of its large savings abroad. The ADB reckons developing Asia must spend $3,000bn in the next 10 years on basic infrastructure in order to keep growing. Yet apart from China, few countries are making the necessary effort. For a region often hailed as the global growth engine of the future, most of Asia seems reluctant to bet on itself.
An important reason is that governments have drawn the wrong lessons from the crisis. Bitter memories of being left to sink or swim, or of being man-handled by the International Monetary Fund, have created a desperate determination to avoid a similar fate in the future. The result is risk-averse policies and a fiscal orthodoxy stricter even than the IMF now preaches.
Fears that growing budget deficits would be punished by the markets have limited increases in public infrastructure spending. Those anxieties look misplaced. Markets are worried less by the risk of a surge in official borrowing than by a lack of confidence that the money will be spent productively.
Early enthusiasm for schemes involving private capital has waned, as projects have gone sour. Failure to develop sound regulatory frameworks or local bond markets sufficiently deep to defray long-term risk have damped investor interest. Governments are hog-tied by rigid and obstructive bureaucracies and corruption in much of the region continues unchecked.
Many of those deficiencies will take years to correct, demanding robust institutions, solidly grounded in political culture. But Asia’s efforts are still patchy and halting. Not only has the pace of market reforms flagged as memories of the crisis have receded; but in many countries, reforms aimed at improving public sector governance and efficiency have yet to begin in earnest. Until they do, economies will continue to perform below potential.
Continued inertia is not a recipe for another 1997-style crisis. It is, rather, a missed opportunity. East Asia’s recovery has benefited from a benign international environment. The world economy has weathered repeated setbacks, thanks to expansionary US policies and abundant global liquidity. These were near-ideal conditions in which to pursue difficult reforms. The moment, however, has not been fully seized.
A US downturn triggered by a sagging housing market could spell tougher times ahead. Despite rapid expansion of intra-regional trade, east Asia still depends heavily on final export markets in the west. Until the region builds firmer and broader foundations for its growth, talk of an economic renaissance or of uncaged tigers roaring again sounds premature.
东亚经济虎啸尚早
明
年是东亚经济危机10周年纪念，而各种庆祝该地区经济恢复健康状况的活动已早早展开。世界银行(World Bank)的一项最新研究将其称之为一次“复兴”。各投资银行宣称，过去10年来，亚洲其它地区的光芒一直被中国所掩盖，而现在，它们将重新在发展中的亚洲占据一席之地。而就在这个时候，北朝鲜宣称进行了核试验，搅乱了这场盛宴。
然而，即使没有平壤来提醒我们，该地区在面临地缘政治风险时存在的弱点，也会有人怀疑这种“亚洲复兴”的说法。当灾难初发引起的慌乱宣告解除之后，保持警惕是一种明智的做法。就在1997年危机的4年前，一份银行研究报告还称赞亚洲的“奇迹”。大多数国际投资经理都坚信这一点，直到一切已为时太晚。
那么，今天的乐观态度是否有着更充分的依据呢？乍看上去，该地区的复苏给人留下了深刻的印象。从2000年起，年平均增长速度达到了7.6%，使得该地区以美元计算的名义收入至少已恢复到危机之前的水平。内部投资增长提速。在危机中遭到严重破坏的银行体系已得到重建，资产负债状况得到改善，过剩产能被削减。同时，外汇储备急剧上升的局面，取代了对短期外国借款的依赖――这种依赖是毁灭性的。从财务角度来说，东亚的状况远胜于10年之前。
有关增长的问题十分重要。如果将中国排除在外，情况就远没有那么乐观。亚洲开发银行(ADB)估计，发展中的东亚其它地区2000年到2006年的平均增长率为4.9%，低于1990年至1996年间的7.4%。而印尼、泰国这些前“小虎”经济体――甚至连这个速度都无法达到。当然，就在那次危机前出现的疾速增长是源于经济过热。但按照除欧元区以外其它任何地方的标准衡量，东亚地区近来的表现仍显乏力。相关的问题不是该地区增长如何恢复到先前的水平，而是它为什么没有比现在好得多。
主要的原因是：除中国以外，几乎所有地区都存在投资不足的情况，而中国面临的情况恰恰相反。瑞银集团(UBS)的乔纳森?安德逊(Jonathan Anderson)表示，即使将中国和印度包括在内，投资在亚洲国内生产总值(GDP)中所占的比例也处于40年来的低点。唯一的增长出现在出口驱动型活动。国内投资――其中最重要的建筑领域投资――仍然较为疲弱。加上人为造成的低汇率，这一切意味着，该地区仍在将巨额储蓄中的大部分送到海外。
认为该地区仍在逐步消除以往过度投资的观点正在逐渐消逝。实际上，对新的大规模国内投资的需求，从未像现在这样急迫。亚行估计，为继续保持增长，发展中的亚洲地区未来10年必须在基础设施领域投入3万亿美元。然而，除中国之外，很少有国家在这方面付出必要的努力。对于一个常常被称为未来全球增长引擎的地区而言，亚洲大部分地区似乎不愿意凭借自己的努力，这令人感到奇怪。
一个重要的原因是，各政府从金融危机中总结出了错误的教训。要么生死听天由命，要么受国际货币基金组织(IMF)的左右，这种痛苦的记忆，使得各国政府不顾一切地避免类似情况再次出现。其结果是采取了规避风险的政策和正统的财政措施，甚至比国际货币基金组织现在鼓吹的还要严格。
由于担心财政赤字的日益扩大会立即受到市场的惩罚，各国政府不考虑大幅增加公共基础设施方面的投资。但是，这种忧虑看起来是不对的。市场担心政府借款出现不可控制的增长，但更担心缺乏有效使用资金的信心。
由于项目已然失宠，对于那些涉及私人资本的方案而言，初期的热情已逐渐消退。由于未能建立健全的监管框架，或足以应对长期风险的本地债券市场，投资者的兴趣有所减退。在印度尼西亚和其它一些地方，政府受到了僵硬和碍事的官僚体制的束缚。世行最新的一份研究有力地指出，该地区普遍存在的腐败仍未得到控制。
许多缺陷需要数年时间才能弥补，这需要有深深植根于政治文化之中的强有力的机构。但亚洲的努力仍然不够一致，存在一些不足。随着金融危机的记忆渐渐淡去，不仅市场改革的步伐放缓；而且在许多国家，旨在提高公共部门治理和效率的改革尚未真正启动。在此之前，各经济体将始终无法发挥出它们的潜力。
对于又一次与1997年类似的危机而言，持续的惯性并非对策。相反，它相当于丧失一次机会。东亚的复苏得益于一个好得非同寻常的国际背景。世界经济已经受了一次又一次的挫折，这要感谢美国的扩张政策，以及充沛的全球流动性。在寻求艰难的改革时，这是近乎理想的条件。然而，这一时机并未被完全抓住。
住宅市场疲软引发的美国经济低迷所带来的威胁，意味着好时候可能已经快到头了。这将考验东亚地区的恢复能力。尽管其对出口西方的依赖程度正逐渐下降，但这仍是一个至关重要的需求来源。在该地区打下更为牢固的增长基础之前，谈论亚洲经济“复兴”或“猛虎”再度出笼咆哮，都还为时尚早。
