Revolutionary China, Complacent America
Are Americans missing a revolution? Across the Pacific, China's emergence is reshaping not only trade, but also world finances, global manufacturing and the entire East Asian economy. This should naturally give rise to searching debate. But the debate we are actually having is limited to a series of complaints about currency rates, intellectual property piracy and Chinese investment intentions in the U.S. It is more a to-do list than an assessment of structural global change and what it means for America. Some of the complaints are valid. But to focus on complaints alone -- even serious ones -- is to risk mistaking the foothills for the Himalayas behind.
China is opening to the world, merging its low costs and vast manpower reserves with the financial and technological strengths of its wealthier neighbors. In the process, it is rapidly creating an informal "Asian Union" -- a deeply integrated Asian economy with a GDP equal to America's, a population six times as large, the technological and financial strengths of an advanced economy and the cost advantages of a developing one. This powerful competitive challenge cannot be met by protectionist legislation, penalty tariffs or bans on Chinese investment. Instead, America needs a strategic response that rethinks our own consumption and debt-led growth, addresses our competitive weaknesses and reshapes our approach to Asian trade and global financial institutions.
No country leads the world by divine right. China itself provides a sobering lesson. According to the economic historian Angus Maddison, the emperors of the Qing dynasty ruled almost a third of the world's population and oversaw a third of world GDP. They looked back on a history of innovation, spanning the inventions of paper money, explosives, the printed book and the professional civil service. They considered their status natural and eternal. When Europe's diplomats and merchants began to arrive in the 1790s, the emperors thought them insignificant. It was a devastating mistake. Employing superior technology and military tactics, Europe came to rule Asia in just a few decades. China's leaders were discredited and its vassal states fell away. The ensuing period of demoralization and upheaval lasted almost two centuries.
America faces no such grim future: What we do face, however, is a substantial challenge. We have been the leading economy for a century. But other countries of similar size and potential can catch up -- if they try, and we remain content with past glories. China's economy has tripled in size since 1980 and continues to grow at 9% per year: it could equal ours by 2020. China is also climbing the tech ladder, investing in ports, coastal-road systems, telecom networks, research centers and universities. It draws $50 billion a year in foreign direct investment, and topped $60 billion in 2004. It is already getting results, first shifting from exports of light, labor-intensive manufactured goods to heavy industry and technology, and now to a new role as financier and outward investor. This is happening because China is getting some big things right; its neighbors are contributing to and benefiting from its success; and we are not keeping up. Consider three trends.
Asia is pooling its strengths. Despite America's outsourcing debate, investment in China is predominantly an Asian phenomenon. Three-quarters of China's $60 billion in FDI last year came from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia. In 2003, China's Commerce Ministry calculated that Asian investment puts up about 20,000 "manufacturing facilities" a year. These facilities mesh China's low costs and skilled workers with the technology and capital of its wealthier neighbors, strengthening all of Asia. China now intends to extend these relationships through formal preferential trade agreements with Asean, India, Pakistan, Australia and perhaps Japan. America's response to date is limited to a free trade agreement with Singapore and perhaps a later accord with Thailand. Our role in the Pacific risks erosion.
Asia's human capital is improving. The Chinese government builds about 200 new research centers a year. Since the '80s, Chinese college enrollment has quadrupled to 20 million. And students are taking the hard subjects. The Computer Systems Policy Project notes that Chinese universities now produce 200,000 engineers a year. Japanese schools produce 100,000, and smaller economies like Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore are much the same. America, meanwhile, has fewer native-born technology graduates than we did 20 years ago. Only 60,000 new American engineers graduate each spring. Concurrently, new visa restrictions have impaired our ability to compensate by discouraging skilled workers, scientists and aspiring students to emigrate to the U.S. Since Sept. 11, our pool of foreign graduate-study applicants has shrunk by 30%.
Asia is saving money. Chinese families save as much as 40% of GDP. Savings rates in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan are also exceptionally high. Meanwhile, we are borrowing. Our savings have fallen to between 1% and 2% of GDP since 2001, a level last seen in 1934. Our economic growth rests on a consumption and shopping boom, financed by China, Korea and Japan, which has pushed up current account deficits and overseas liabilities. Public opinion polls show Americans anxious despite two years of strong growth -- and rightly so.
Asia has weaknesses too, of course. Great-power relationships among China, Russia, Japan and India are uneasy. Asia's population is aging faster than ours. China in particular faces weak finances, environmental stress, severe income inequality, widespread poverty and an uncertain rule of law. And the U.S. maintains many strengths, from a robust political system to superior universities, from sophisticated environmental and intellectual property policies to special advantages in medicine and the life sciences. But if we do not recognize our weaknesses, our strengths may not be enough.
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How should we respond? The U.S. must develop an integrated policy to address this emerging challenge in all its aspects. Perhaps we can identify four priorities.
? First, we must reduce the risk of global trade and financial imbalances. America saves and exports too little and consumes too much on credit; Asia saves too much and overinvests in real estate and export industries. This pattern poses risks for both sides. Because our current-account deficit is above 6% of GDP and we are dependent on foreign capital to finance growth, we risk financial shock and face rising long-term liabilities. Asia, for its part, is building up stocks of dollars whose value is likely to fall and relies on the mood of U.S. consumers for growth. Since responsibility for the imbalances is shared, we must together reduce them. This necessitates further currency appreciation in China, deficit reduction and personal savings incentives in the U.S., and sustained liberalization in Japan and Korea.
? Second, America needs to raise its game at home to remain the world's technological leader. To this end, our tax policy needs sharpened focus on encouraging innovation. Public investment must be reshaped to improve high-tech and traditional infrastructure. Both the government and the private sector should increase investment in research, particularly in the physical and information sciences. Federal spending on basic science (excluding life sciences) has been stagnant in real terms for three decades, and since the '70s has dropped by 37% relative to GDP. The government must also contribute to a renewal of human talent by rethinking visa policy. Waiting periods for foreign students applying to graduate schools should be cut and work-visa constraints for scientists and engineers should be eased. America also needs to create a larger network of elementary and secondary schools focused on science and technology.
? Third, America's central place in the Pacific economy must be maintained. The FTA with Singapore and the partially negotiated one with Thailand are a start, but scale matters. Regardless of the outcome of the WTO's Doha Round, ambitious agreements should be negotiated with the major Asean countries, South Korea and Japan. In addition, strengthened economic ties with India should further ensure a robust U.S. economic presence in Asia.
? Finally, American needs to restructure its economic relationship with China, and China needs to reshape its own engagement with the world. For the U.S., episodic attention to the specific issues highlighted by Congressional debates is not enough. Complaints about specific Chinese trade policies should be met through bilateral negotiations, the WTO and U.S. trade laws. Together with this must come a broad and intensified engagement with China and Asia more generally, predicated on China's own growth, its central role in Asian integration and Asia's larger role in the world economy. This requires not only rethinking American policy, but fundamental reform of global economic institutions, in particular the G-8, the IMF and APEC. As the world's second-largest economy, third-largest exporter, largest destination for FDI and second-largest holder of foreign currency reserves, China should be a G-8 member, not an occasionally invited guest. Korea has an economy easily comparable to Canada or Italy, and should also be a member. The IMF quota allocation is similarly undersized. China's share of contribution to IMF resources is 3%, a rate equal to Canada's and not far above Belgium's. This is far below the level of responsibility China should accept in the global financial system. APEC, too, needs a new mission, one that reignites its early vision of "free and open" trade in the Pacific and addresses four major long-term issues of common concern: energy, climate change, aging and Pacific finance.
Before all this, however, comes a first step. That is recognition by the administration, Congress, businesses and the public that we face a powerful competitive challenge, one that cannot be attributed to undervalued currencies or unfair trade. The plain fact is that our competition has gotten tougher, and we need to match it. Two hundred years ago the Chinese emperors failed. America must act now to succeed.
Ms. Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative from 1997 to 2001, is a lawyer in Washington. Mr. Gresser, director of trade and global markets at the Progressive Policy Institute, was policy advisor at the Office of the USTR from 1998 to 2001.
如何应对中国的挑战
美国人正在错过一场革命吗？环顾整个太平洋地区，中国的崛起不仅在重塑全球的贸易格局，还在改变著世界的金融、制造业格局以及整个东亚地区的经济形势。这种局面自然应该引发探索性的争论。但目前的实际情况却是，争论仅限于一系列有关中国的汇率问题、知识产权保护和在美投资意图的抱怨。这更像是在开列一份“麻烦”清单，而不是在对一场结构性变革及其对美国的影响进行评估。有些抱怨是正当的。但如果把注意力只集中在抱怨上，即使确有抱怨的理由，也有可能犯下一叶障目不见森林的错误。
中国正在向世界打开大门，将自己廉价而丰富的劳动力资源与较富裕邻国的金融和科技实力结合起来。在这个过程中，一个非正式的“亚盟”正在快速形成，这一深度整合的亚洲经济在GDP总量方面已不输美国，而人口却是美国的6倍，它既有发达经济体的科技和金融优势，也具备发展中经济体的成本优势。这一强有力的竞争性挑战是无法依靠贸易保护主义立法、惩罚性关税和禁止中国在美投资来应对的。相反，美国需要做出战略性回应，即对美国依赖消费和负债推动经济增长的方式进行反思，解决我们自身在竞争力方面的不足，重塑我们对待与亚洲的贸易及全球性金融机构的态度。
没有哪个国家是天生有权领导世界的。中国就是一个生动的例子。据经济史专家安格斯?麦迪森(Angus Maddison)说，中国清朝的皇帝们曾统治著世界近三分之一的人口并掌握著全球三分之一的GDP。中国在历史上不乏创新精神，这里曾经诞生了世界上最早的纸币、火药、印刷品以及文官制度。但清朝的皇帝们却一味沉迷于中国在历史上的辉煌，他们认为中国领先于世界的地位是自然而然和永恒不变的。当十八世纪九十年代欧洲的外交官和商人们来到中国时，他们在中国皇帝眼里根本无足轻重。这是一个严重错误。仅仅几十年后，欧洲人就凭借他们先进的科学技术和军事策略统治了亚洲。清王朝因此颜面扫地，其众多附庸国自然也是树倒猢狲散。此后中国在衰败和巨变中苦苦挣扎了近两个世纪。
美国未来的前景当然不会这样黯淡，但我们也确实面临著实质性挑战。美国成为世界最大的经济体已有一个世纪。但那些在幅员和经济发展潜力上与美国不相上下的国家如果有决心是可以赶上美国的，而我们却依然沉缅于过往的辉煌。中国经济的规模自1980年以来已经增长了两倍，现在仍然以每年9%的速度增长，到2020年时有可能赶上美国。中国也在科技的阶梯上向上攀登，它不断投资兴建港口、沿海道路体系、电信网络、研发中心和大学。中国每年吸引的外商直接投资超过500亿美元。这些努力已经有了回报，中国先是实现了从出口劳动密集型轻工业产品向出口重工业和高科技产品的转变，现在它又开始扮演起金融家和对外投资者的角色。之所以能做到这些是因为中国在大方向上走对了；它的邻国既为中国的发展做出了贡献又在从中国的成功中受益；而我们却未能与中国一道前进。请考虑以下三种趋势：
──亚洲经济正在形成合力。虽然美国国内围绕外包问题正在争论不休，但投资中国的实际上主要是亚洲国家和地区。中国去年吸引的600亿美元外商直接投资中有四分之三来自香港、台湾、日本、韩国和东南亚。中国商务部(Commerce Ministry)2003年的统计显示，亚洲国家和地区每年在中国大陆投资建设了大约2万家“生产型工厂”。这些汇聚了中国的高素质、低成本劳动力和亚洲较发达国家和地区的技术和资金，从而使亚洲的整体实力得到了加强。中国现在的打算是，通过与东盟国家、印度、巴基斯坦、澳大利亚或许还有日本签署特惠性质的贸易协议，进一步推广这种合作共荣的关系。而美国迄今为止对此的回应仅仅是与新加坡签署了自由贸易协议，或许一年后还会与泰国签订类似协议。而美国在太平洋地区的地位有被削弱的危险。
──亚洲的人力资本状况正在改善。中国政府每年新创办约200个研究中心，从上世纪八十年代起，中国在校大学生人数已增长三倍，达到2,000万人。学生们纷纷选择艰深的学科。电脑系统政策设计委员会(Computer Systems Policy Project)指出，中国的大学现在每年培养20万名工程师，日本的大学每年培养10万名工程师，台湾、韩国、香港和新加坡等规模较小经济体每年培养的工程师加起来也差不多有10万。而美国现在本土出生的工科毕业生却比20年前要少。美国每年毕业的工科学生只有6万人。目前美国在发放签证方面新实施的限制性规定损害了美国从海外引进人才以弥补国内工程师不足的能力，这些规定增加了熟练工人、科学家和优秀学生移民美国的难度。自911事件发生以来，外国人来美就读研究生的申请量下降了30%。
──亚洲人正在积攒财力。中国的家庭储蓄率高达40%。韩国、台湾、香港和日本的储蓄率也都无一例外地处于高水平。而美国人却在借钱过日子。2001年以后，美国的储蓄率已下降到1934年以来的最低水平，仅相当于GDP的1%至2%。美国的经济增长依赖的是消费和购物热潮，而为我们提供资金支持的则是中国、韩国和日本，美国人在花钱上的大手大脚推高了我们的经常项目赤字，加大了美国的外债负担。民意调查显示，尽管美国经济连续两年强劲增长，但美国人仍普遍感到紧张不安。他们有理由如此。
当然，亚洲也有其自身的弱点。中国、俄罗斯、日本和印度间的大国关系不好处理。亚洲人口在以比美国更快的速度老化。中国尤其面临著金融体系不健全、环境压力大、收入分配严重不均、贫困面广以及法治基础不牢固等问题。而美国仍然有很多优势，从充满活力的政治制度到质量优良的大学，从完备的环保和知识产权政策到在医药和生命科学方面所独具的优势，不一而足。但如果我们认识不到自身的弱点，我们的长处可能也无法充分发挥出来。
我们应该如何应对？美国必须拿出一套完整的政策来应对来自各方面的挑战。下面试著列出几个应优先解决的问题：
──首先，我们必须降低全球金融和贸易出现失衡的危险。美国储蓄和出口太少，而靠借贷进行的消费却太多。亚洲的储蓄率则太高，这导致了在房地产和出口行业上的过度投资。这种模式对美国和亚洲均蕴含著危险。由于美国的经常项目赤字已经超过了GDP的6%，并且依赖外国资金来推动经济增长，因此美国面临爆发金融危机和长期债务不断增加的危险。而亚洲方面，其不断增加的美元储备则面临著贬值的危险，这一地区的经济增长也太过依赖美国人的消费意愿。由于美国和亚洲对造成这种失衡局面均负有责任，因此在降低这些风险方面双方也应合作才是。中国需要使人民币进一步升值，美国需要减少贸易赤字并增加个人储蓄，而日本和韩国则需要在市场自由化方面进行持续的努力。
──其次，美国要保持自己在科技方面的世界领先地位就需苦练内功。为此，美国的税收政策需要将重点转到鼓励创新上来。公共投资的重点必须转到促进高科技发展和基础设施建设上来。政府和民间都应该增加研发支出，特别是在物理学和信息科学方面的支出。30年来，联邦政府在基础科学(生命科学除外)方面的实际支出一直停滞不前， 自上世纪七十年代以来，这一支出占GDP的比重已经下降了37%。为了使国内的专业人才得到补充，美国政府还必须反思其签证政策。外国学生申请来美读研究生的待批期应该缩短，在签发工作签证方面对科学家和工程师应放宽限制。美国的小学和初中还应更注重科学技术教育。
──第三，必须保持美国在太平洋经济圈所处的中心地位。美国与新加坡已经签署且与泰国正在谈判的自由贸易协定虽然只是个开始，但却具有重要意义。不管世界贸易组织(WTO)发起的多哈回合全球贸易谈判取得何种结果，美国都应该继续致力于与东盟主要国家、日本和韩国达成自由贸易协定。此外，强化与印度的经济关系可以进一步确保美国在亚洲经济中扮演重要角色。
──最后，美国需要重新构建与中国的经济关系，中国也应该改变自己对世界事务的参与方式。就美国而言，通过国会在一些具体问题上挑起争论的方式而定期关注一下中国是不够的。对中国具体贸易政策的不满应通过双边谈判、诉诸WTO和援引美国的贸易法律加以解决。除此之外，鉴于中国的经济增长速度、该国在亚洲整合中所扮演的核心角色以及亚洲在世界经济格局中日益重要的地位，美国还必须与中国和亚洲进行更广泛而密切的接触。这就不仅需要对美国的现行政策进行反思，还要对全球性经济机构进行改革，特别是要改革八国集团(G-8)、国际货币基金组织(IMF)和亚太经济合作组织(APEC)。作为世界第二大经济体、第三大出口国、最大的外商直接投资目的地和外汇储备全球排名第二的国家，中国应该成为G-8成员国，而不仅是该集团偶尔邀请的访客。韩国的经济规模足以与加拿大和意大利媲美，它也应该成为G-8成员国。IMF在向成员国分配缴费额度方面也存在问题。该机构的资金只有3%来自中国，这一出资比例仅与加拿大相当，较比利时也高不了多少。这与中国应对全球金融体系所负的责任是远远不相适应的。APEC也应肩负起新的使命，即重新举起在太平洋地区实现“自由和开放”贸易的大旗，并解决各方共同关心的四个长期性问题──能源、气候变化、老龄化和财政问题。
不过在这之前还需要先迈出重要的一步。那就是美国政府、国会、商界和公众都要认识到，美国正面临著强有力的竞争性挑战，而我们不能将这一挑战归咎于其他国家被低估的货币以及不公平的贸易政策。现实情况是美国面临的竞争更激烈了，而我们必须适应这一局面。两百年前中国的皇帝们失败了，美国要想成功现在就必须采取行动。
（编者按：本文作者沙琳?巴尔舍夫斯基(Charlene Barshefsky)曾在1997至2001年期间任美国贸易谈判代表，目前在华盛顿担任律师。本文另一位作者艾德华?格雷瑟尔(Edward Gresser)现任进步政策研究所(Progressive Policy Institute)贸易和全球市场部门的负责人，他在1998至2001年期间曾担任美国贸易代表办公室的政策顾问。）
