人民币升值的“美国因素”(下)

人民币升值的“美国因素”(下)

The US diplomacy behind China’s revaluation

For more than a month, John Snow, the US Treasury secretary, carried with him a closely guarded secret: that China would soon scrap the renminbi’s decade-old peg to the dollar. Last week, when he was quietly informed by Chinese authorities of their plans and precise timing for a revaluation and new rate regime, it came after a nearly two-year long campaign during which Mr Snow had faced intense criticism from Congress and US manufacturers over an approach that was seen as too slow in yielding results.


The unusual early warning from a generally secretive Chinese government helped ensure that the revaluation, finally announced last Thursday, would be a high point of what has sometimes been a rocky tenure for Mr Snow. By insisting that currency flexibility was in China’s own economic interests, and by stressing global concerns rather than narrow US ones, Mr Snow appears to have helped Beijing move in a direction the administration of President George W.?Bush sorely needed to defuse rising frustration in Washington over what is seen as China’s unfair trade advantages.

Mr Snow’s decision to take a softer approach than some wanted and to downplay threats made it easier for sovereignty-conscious Beijing leaders to make a move widely seen as a bow to foreign pressure. Treasury officials say the approach was a deliberate departure from the tactics used against Japan in the 1990s, when the US tried to embarrass and threaten Tokyo into opening the Japanese market. “We were not going to be able to bludgeon them into moving,” says Tim Adams, now awaiting confirmation as Treasury under-secretary for international affairs. “We decided after seeing efforts in the past with Japan that we wanted to try a different approach

The US diplomacy behind China’s revaluation

For more than a month, John Snow, the US Treasury secretary, carried with him a closely guarded secret: that China would soon scrap the renminbi’s decade-old peg to the dollar. Last week, when he was quietly informed by Chinese authorities of their plans and precise timing for a revaluation and new rate regime, it came after a nearly two-year long campaign during which Mr Snow had faced intense criticism from Congress and US manufacturers over an approach that was seen as too slow in yielding results.

The unusual early warning from a generally secretive Chinese government helped ensure that the revaluation, finally announced last Thursday, would be a high point of what has sometimes been a rocky tenure for Mr Snow. By insisting that currency flexibility was in China’s own economic interests, and by stressing global concerns rather than narrow US ones, Mr Snow appears to have helped Beijing move in a direction the administration of President George W.?Bush sorely needed to defuse rising frustration in Washington over what is seen as China’s unfair trade advantages
人民币升值的“美国因素”

一个多月来，美国财长约翰斯诺(John Snow)一直严守一个秘密：中国即将放弃持续10年的人民币盯住美元汇率制度。上周，中国政府将升值计划、确切时机和新汇率体系等情况，预先悄悄通知了斯诺。斯诺先生在这个问题上已付出了近两年的努力，在此期间他受到美国国会和制造商们的强烈批评，称他采取的方式收效太慢。


一向守口如瓶的中国政府，就上周四最终宣布的升值行动罕见地发出预警，这在斯诺先生间或困难重重的任期内将成为一大亮点。斯诺先生反复强调，弹性汇率符合中国自身的经济利益，他还强调全球(而不单是美国)的关切。通过这些做法，斯诺先生似乎已推动中国向布什政府迫切需要的方向前进，即缓和美国日益上涨的不满，因为有人认为中国具有不公平的贸易优势。

斯诺先生决定采取的方式比一些人希望的要柔和，而且淡化了威胁，这更容易使对主权问题敏感的中国领导人采取升值行动，尽管升值被普遍认为是向外界压力屈服。美国财政部的官员们表示，这个精心准备的方法不同于90年代对付日本时所使用的策略，当时美国试图为难并威胁日本开放市场。“我们无法用大棒让他们行动，”蒂姆亚当斯(Tim Adams)说，“考虑到过去对付日本的经历，我们决定尝试一种不同的方法：耐心且私下的外交，而不是挑起国际争端。”蒂姆亚当斯正等待批准成为美国财政部负责国际事务的副部长。

中国向更具弹性的汇率政策转变，可能是这个闭塞的共产主义国家向全球经济强国转变漫长而艰难的过程中至关重要的一步。“这一声明是历史性的，非常重要，”中国社会科学院经济学家、央行货币政策委员会委员余永定说。但平衡美国的要求与中国的目标，肯定需要艰苦卓绝的努力，上周的行动只是第一步。周四人民币对美元的升值幅度仅为2.1%，大大低于美国财政部要求的10%；美国财政部通过前国务卿亨利基辛格(Henry Kissinger)等非官方特使告诉中国政府，人民币需要升值10%，才能防止美国国会提出贸易保护主义立法。美国政府希望，在新的汇率机制下，中国能继续采取行动，逐步升值人民币。中国政府表示，人民币汇率将基于市场力量，并“参考一篮子货币”。

中国人民银行行长周小川称，2.1%的升幅是“初始调整”，这刺激了外界对人民币进一步升值的预期。但中国政府的初步行动发出了截然不同的信号。在央行主导的中国中央外汇交易市场，升值的人民币对美元在第一个交易日实际上出现了小幅下跌。余教授指出，实际汇率的上升自然伴随强劲的经济增长，但这一过程不一定很突然。“我们正进入一个逐步调整的长期过程，”他说，“我认为中国不会让人民币大幅变动，因为稳定及弹性是原则。”中国还有一个很好的理由不立即让人民币稳步升值：这么做将进一步鼓励“热钱”或“游资”流入，这些资金近年令经济规划者头痛。

近期为国际清算银行(BIS)准备的一份报告发现，2003年以来，除外国直接投资之外的资本流入，在中国的巨额外汇储备中占到了近一半。无数个人和企业，利用各种策略逃避严格的资本控制，从简单的现金走私到伪造企业账目等手段都有。这些加速通胀的资金大部分都流入了房地产等领域，而这些领域可能已经出现投机性泡沫。然而，中国可以选择对热钱不屑一顾。今年的资本流入下降，中国人民银行有丰富的经验将其影响最小化：它可以发行票据，从金融体系中抽出流动性。同时，中国政府模棱两可的新汇率制度，无疑给了决策者们充分的操作自由。一些分析师表示，不管是谁在外汇市场上跟央行对着干，央行都能从他那里赚到钱。“原先投机资本占得先机，但现在先机掌握在央行手中，”中国国务院发展研究中心的巴曙松表示。该机构是国务院属下的一家智囊机构。“这种改变非常重要。”中国政府没有打算对资本控制大幅松绑(至少在陷入困境的金融领域完成改革前，这些资本控制被认为是必需的)，这样就能控制汇率改革的速度。“政府的力量很大，”一位驻京经济学家说，“它们有7000亿美元外汇储备，可以做任何想做的事情。”

中国拒绝美国对人民币升值要求

China rejects US demand for revaluation

China rejected yesterday a detailed prescription from Washington for a quick move to a more flexible exchange rate system, beginning with a 10 per cent revaluation of the renminbi.


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The US proposal also generated scepticism from China-based analysts, who said a large one-off revaluation would run against the gradualist traditions of Chinese policymaking and undermine the government's mantra of exchange rate “stability”.

A foreign ministry spokesman, in response to questions about a Financial Times report that the US Treasury had made a revaluation demand via unofficial envoys, said many US visitors had come to China recently carrying “such messages” about revaluation.

But he repeated Beijing's view that it would not bow to foreign pressure on the issue.

“China will not do this when internal conditions are not ripe, no matter how great the external pressure is,” said the spokesman, Kong Quan.

China has long said it will dump the decade-old peg to the US dollar in favour of a more flexible exchange rate system, but it has not commented on the timing of such a move.

Ha Jiming, chief economist at China International Capital Corporation, the country's largest investment bank, said that, although the timing was rizght for a change in currency policy, 10 per cent was too large a move at the beginning.

“It remains too risky to relax the peg too much, so China may well start from a 5 per cent revaluation then repeg the renminbi to a basket of currency,” said Mr Ha.

Zuo Xiaolei, chief economist with Galaxy Securities, said the currency had now become a political rather than economic issue, militating against a large move. “The making of decisions in China is mostly consensus-based . . . so that might lead to a compromise of a 3 to 5 per cent rise in the renminbi's value.”

Andy Rothman, China strategist for the securities house CLSA in Shanghai, said a 10 per cent revaluation would be counter to China's incremental approach to reform over the past 25 years, “reinforced by the experience of the Soviet Union [which made rapid changes] and which the Chinese view as a disaster”.

Stephen Green, of Standard Chartered in Shanghai, said a 10 per cent jump in the value of the currency would “be quite a shock for people, particularly when you have argued domestically that basic stability in the currency is the most important thing”.
中国拒绝美国对人民币升值要求

中国昨天拒绝美国要求先将人民币升值10%的详细提议，美国还要求中国迅速采用更灵活的汇率制度。


美国这份提议也引起一些在华分析师的质疑。他们表示，一次性大幅度升值将有悖中国制定政策的渐进传统，并破坏政府维持汇率“稳定”的宗旨。

中国外交部发言人孔泉在回答有关《金融时报》一篇报道的提问时表示，最近有许多美国来访者来到中国，他们都捎来了有关人民币升值的“这类信息”。《金融时报》的这篇报道称，美国财政部已通过非官方特使要求中国将人民币升值。

孔泉重申中国政府不会在这个问题上向外部压力屈服的观点。

他表示：“内部条件不成熟，即使外界再大的压力，中国也不会这样做。”

长期以来，中国一直表示将放弃实行10年的人民币与美元挂钩汇率，同意采用更灵活的汇率体系，但没有就这一举措的具体实施时机作出评论。

中国最大的投资银行中国国际金融公司(China International Capital Corporation)首席经济学家哈继铭说，尽管改革汇率政策的时机是适当的，但10%的变动幅度一开始太大。

“人民币与美元挂钩的汇率放松得太多仍过于危险，所以中国可能从5%的升值幅度开始，然后重新让人民币同一篮子货币挂钩，”哈先生表示。

银河证券(Galaxy Securities)首席经济学家左小蕾说，汇率现已成为一个政治问题而非经济问题，这对大幅变动汇率产生了不利影响。“中国的决策基本上是以共识为基础的……所以可能导致一种妥协，即人民币升值3%到5%。”

证券公司里昂证券(CLSA)驻上海的中国策略师安迪?罗斯曼(Andy Rothman)表示，人民币升值10%将与中国过去25年的渐进式改革手段相矛盾，“苏联(进行快速改革)的经验更加强了对这种改革方法的支持，中国认为苏联的经历是一场灾难”。

渣打银行(Standard Chartered)驻上海分析师斯蒂芬?格林(Stephen Green)说，人民币币值猛升10%将“对人们造成相当大的冲击，尤其是当国内主张人民币的基本稳定最为重要之际。”



Revaluation of RMB will not solve root causes of global imbalances

The good news from China recently is that attempts to slow its investment-led boom by selectively curbing credit seem finally to be bearing fruit: in the year to April, investment grew at its lowest rate for three years. The bad news is that this spells problems for everyone else.


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If the trend continues, it should in time check overheating of the economy. However, it will also boost China's trade surplus, aggravating global financial imbalances and frictions with the US and other trade partners. The surplus is expected to treble this year to $100bn (�79.6bn), about 6 per cent of forecast gross domestic product.

In a cooling economy, the surplus would normally rise as imports fell off. That is happening but without any apparent slowdown in economic growth, which is expected to hit about 9 per cent this year. The explanation is that China's exports are continuing to race ahead, rising more than 30 per cent in the first quarter of this year, twice as fast as imports.

One reason is that Chinese textiles and clothing exporters have sharply increased shipments since global quotas on trade ended in January. More important, the recent investment boom has hugely expanded production capacity in industries such as steel and aluminium. Not only has domestic supply replaced imports, but producers have responded to the steep downturn in the car market by diverting output abroad. As a result, China has become a net steel exporter.

For the rest of the world, that is a double whammy. As well as continuing to expand its share of established markets, such as clothing, footwear, toys, appliances and consumer electronics, China is now competing increasingly in other sectors. For many poor countries, as well as for rich ones, that is a troubling development.

However, the renminbi revaluation being urged on Beijing by US politicians would do little to blunt China's competitiveness, because many of its manufactured exports involve so little local value-added. Any rise in their dollar prices would therefore be largely offset by lower prices for the mainly imported components from which they are made. In consumer electronics, where local value-added is as low as 15 per cent, even a 25 per cent revaluation would raise export prices by less than 4 per cent. Many economists think that loss could be offset by efficiency gains.

Solutions to China's ballooning trade surplus should be sought instead by attacking its root causes. The first is a dysfunctional financial system that has encouraged wasteful investment and excess capacity. Outside the family-owned private sector, companies rely for external capital on a primitive banking industry that has yet to learn how to price risk. The country's equity markets, which might subject investment to stricter disciplines,

are both stunted and currently depressed.

The second cause of the surplus is a high savings ratio, due to a large extent to limited domestic demand. Although China has ploughed investment into infrastructure, much of it is inefficient. One foreign official tells of travelling recently on an almost empty four-lane highway in a city in the backward west, which is busy building still more roads and bridges to carry non-existent traffic.

As well as improving investment quality, China needs to raise consumer spending. With interest rates already low and liquidity plentiful, monetary stimulus is inappropriate. The best hope may be to reduce households' impulse to save by eliminating the reasons for it.

One of the most common is to guard against illness and job loss. Better social safety nets could prompt consumers to spend more by inducing a form of wealth effect. This is more than theoretical: the World Bank says household savings in Vietnam fell 8 per cent after the country set up a social security system.

The snag is that both solutions will take time to work. China is trying to modernise its financial system, but progress is painfully slow. Big state-owned banks lack skilled staff, and have yet to gain management control over their branches. Equity market reforms remain a Herculean task. Meanwhile, the Chinese economic supertanker continues to steam ahead. Its course may be changing. But the rest of the world should beware of being caught in its wake.
人民币治不了全球失衡的“本”

最近来自中国方面的好消息是：通过选择性地控制信贷，减缓以投资为导向的经济增速看来终于开始收效：在截至4月份的一年里，投资增长率达到3年来的最低点。在另一方面，坏消息是：这为其它国家带来了问题。


如果这种趋势持续下去，中国应能逐步制止经济过热。然而，这也将进一步增加中国的贸易顺差，恶化全球金融失衡，加剧中国同美国和其它贸易伙伴之间的摩擦。预计今年的贸易顺差将增加三倍，达到1,000亿美元，约占预期国内生产总值(GDP)的6%。

在经济冷却期，贸易顺差通常会上升，而进口下滑。这一现象虽然出现了，但中国经济增长速度却没有明显放缓的迹象。今年，经济增长率预计会达到9%。这是由于中国的出口仍然保持了快速的增长，今年第1季度的增长率超过30%，是进口增速的两倍。

原因之一是，自今年1月份全球纺织品贸易配额取消后，中国纺织品的出口得到了快速增长。更重要的是，近年的投资热大幅扩展了某些行业的产能，如钢铁和铝业。在汽车行业，国内供应不但代替了进口产品，而且为了应对国内汽车市场的急剧降温，汽车生产商转向国外市场输出产品。其结果是，中国成了一个钢铁净出口国。

对于中国以外的其它国家而言，这意味着双重打击。除继续扩大服装、鞋类、玩具、家电和消费者电子产品等领域原有的市场份额外，中国在其它领域也展开了日益激烈的竞争。这种发展趋势令许多国家，无论贫富，都感到担忧。

然而，尽管美国政客一直敦促中国调整汇率，但人民币升值几乎不会削弱中国的竞争力，因为许多中国制造的出口产品都只有极少的当地附加值。这些产品的美元价格出现任何上涨，都将在很大程度上被进口部件的更低价格抵销，因为这些产品主要依靠进口部件制造。在消费者电子产品方面，当地的产品附加值只有15%。这样，即使人民币升值25%，出口价格的上涨也不会超过4%。许多经济学家认为，该损失可以通过生产效率的提高来抵销。

相反，要找出解决中国贸易顺差扶摇直上的方法，我们应该针对这一问题的根源。首先，不健全的金融体系鼓励了过度投资和产能过剩。除家族所有的私营部门外，企业依靠原始的银行业提供外来资金，而这些银行还没有学会如何对风险定价。而原本有可能对投资实施更严格规范的股票市场，其发展也受到阻碍，目前行情十分低迷。

贸易顺差的第二个原因是高储蓄率，这在很大程度上是由于国内需求有限。尽管中国在基础设施上投入大量资金，但相当大部分投资效率低下。一位外国官员近期到一个西部偏远城市访问时，那里的四车道高速公路上几乎没有车辆，但这个城市还在忙着建设更多的道路和桥梁，以承载并不存在的交通量。

除了提高投资质量，中国也需要提高消费支出。在存款利率已经很低，流动资金充裕的情况下，采取货币政策上的刺激措施并不合适。最好的希望可能在于：消除储蓄理由，从而减小储蓄动力。

最常见的方法之一，是针对疾病和失业提供保障。完善社会保障体系，能够引发某种“富裕感觉”，鼓励消费者更多消费。这不仅仅是理论：世界银行表示，越南建立起社保体系后，其家庭储蓄金额减少了8%。

困难在于，这两个解决方案都需要一些时间来发挥作用。中国正试图促使其金融体系实现现代化，但进展非常缓慢。大型国有银行缺乏熟练的工作人员，并且还未做到对其分行进行有效管理和控制。股市改革仍然是一项艰巨任务。同时，中国经济这艘超大型油轮仍在继续前进。它的航线有可能改变。但世界其它国家应该小心被卷入其尾流。



Renminbi revaluation means re-evaluation

Life could be about toget tougher for European companies importing from China.


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The country is expected imminently to revalue its currency, the renminbi, raising prices in euro and sterling terms in the process.

Most suppliers expect Chinese manufacturers, already operating on wafer-thin margins, to pass on the effects of a revaluation.

European companies sourcing their goods from China who have for several years capitalised on an explosion of opportunities to outsource production to the low-cost economy now face the prospect of passing on price rises rather than cuts to their customers.

But David Peschier, finance director at Peshawear, an importer of hats, gloves and scarves that sells to Debenhams, Woolworths and Mothercare, said: “It is impossible to pass price rises on. Retailers are looking for downward pressure all the time and clothing prices have dropped 37 per cent in five years.”

The knock-on effect of a renminbi revaluation could vary widely among sectors.

European companies that compete directly with Asian rivals are likely to enjoy a competitive advantage.

Credit Suisse First Boston suggests carmakers such as Volkswagen, Peugeot, Renault and Fiat could be beneficiaries, as well as capital goods companies such as Sweden's SKF and Atlas Copco, Heidelburger Cruck of Germany and Wartsila of Finland.

Companies generating a sizeable chunk of their turnover from Asia could also gain from the translation effect when these earnings are converted into euros. Winners here could include Lufthansa, Nestlé, ABB and Danone. The luxury goods sector is particularly well positioned to take advantage of this uplift, with Bulgari, LVMH and Christian Dior each generating at least 20 per cent of their revenues from Asia.

Losers could include European companies that source large volumes of goods from Asia, such as Swedish retailer Hennes & Mauritz, estimated by CSFB to source 60 per cent of its goods from Asia. Adidas and Motorola could also lose out.

One point that remains unclear is whether, in the event of a revaluation, Chinese manufacturers would honour outstanding contracts or try to negotiate higher prices.

Paul Juneja, managing director of Benross Marketing, a supplier of electrical goods, kitchenware and lighting, sources 99 per cent of the company's produce from China. He fears some Chinese suppliers could try to renegotiate contracts upwards while Benross will be forced to honour prices agreed with customers. A key question remains to what extent a revaluation would reduce the competitive advantage China has built as a low-cost supplier compared with other developing economies, particularly in Asia.

Some companies could see a Chinese revaluation as an opportunity to re-evaluate and diversify their supply chain away from China. Roger Kemp, finance director of Robert Frederick, a UK children's book publisher and importer of calendars ranging from country cottages to Britney Spears, says: “In real terms [a revaluation] might not be bad for us.”

He says other developing countries are losing out to China but a revaluation “will make other areas more competitive and gives us more countries to source from”.

Mr Kemp's view rests on whether other Asian countries, most of which manage their currencies to some degree, continue to peg their currencies at existing levels against the dollar.

Indeed, many companies are positive at the prospect of becoming less reliant on China, regardless of a revaluation threat. Though the country can mass produce most things at a competitive price, an overheating economy has a downside.

Some complain Chinese companies are increasingly poaching employees from each other to fulfil orders, meaning late deliveries, discounted margins and the potential loss of customers. “The world is beating a path to China's door with orders and the Chinese just take them all. It is frustrating and in my opinion it is getting worse,” says Mr Kemp. “Nothing is enforceable. There is no business law out there.”

Mr Kemp's company now sources 30 per cent of its stock from India, which is “almost as competitive” and cheaper and quicker to ship from, he says.

While UK and European importers may ponder their options, it seems unlikely that domestic manufacturing is set to capitalise on a shift in the terms of trade.


Universal Cycles, which imports 600,000 bikes a year into the UK, sources about 10 per cent of its bikes from Europe. But even a Chinese currency revaluation combined with a proposed hike in European Union anti-dumping tariffs on bikes and parts from China and Vietnam is unlikely to result in more local production.

“There are capacity problems in Europe manufacturers can't cope with the demand,” says Tony Brown, group finance manager. “Big investment would be needed in Europe but with the red tape that is not so easy.”
人民币升值对欧洲是把双刃剑

对于从中国进口的欧洲公司来说，日子可能会变得更加艰难。


人们预期，中国即将把人民币升值，但这样会导致中国产品的欧元和英镑价格上升。

大多数供应商预计，利润率本来就已经很微薄的中国制造商将会把人民币升值的后果转嫁出去。

多年来，从中国采购商品的欧洲企业充分利用了呈爆炸式增长的机会，将生产外包给低成本的中国，但现在它们却要面对将价格上涨而非价格下降转嫁给顾客的前景。

但Peshawear公司财务总监戴维?佩希尔(David Peschier)表示：“不可能将价格上涨转嫁出去。零售商一直在为降价不断施压，5年里服装价格已下跌了37%。”Peshawear是一家帽子、手套和围巾进口商，并将产品卖给Debenhams、Woolworths和Mothercare等英国百货商店。

人民币升值为不同产业带来的连锁反应可能会有很大的差别。

与亚洲对手直接竞争的欧洲企业可能会获得竞争优势。

瑞士信贷第一波士顿(CSFB)认为，大众(Volkswagen)、标致(Peugeot)、雷诺(Renault)和菲亚特(Fiat)等汽车制造商可能从中受益，受益的也包括瑞典的SKF和Atlas Copco、德国的海德堡公司(Heidelburger Cruck)和芬兰的Wartsila等生产资料企业。

有相当部分营业额来自亚洲的企业在将这些收入转换成欧元时，也可能从货币转换效应中得益。这一领域的赢家可能包括汉莎航空(Lufthansa)、雀巢(Nestlé)、ABB和达能(Danone)等。奢侈品产业尤其能从这次人民币升值中得益，Bulgari、路威酩轩(LVMH)和克里斯汀?迪奥(Christian Dior)都能从亚洲获得至少20%的营收。

遭受损失的企业可能包括从亚洲采购大量产品的欧洲企业，如瑞典零售商Hennes Mauritz。据瑞士信贷第一波士顿估计，该公司从亚洲采购大约60%的货物。阿迪达斯(Adidas)和摩托罗拉(Motorola)也可能遭受损失。

目前仍然不明了的一点是，一旦人民币升值，中国制造商将会履行未执行的合同，还是会试图要求商议获得更高的价格。

Benross Marketing公司董事总经理保罗?朱内贾(Paul Juneja)从中国采购公司99%的产品。该公司是电气产品、厨房用具和照明设备供应商。他担心，一些中国供应商可能会试图重新进行谈判以提高合同价格，而Benross将被迫履行与顾客达成的价格。一个关键的问题仍然有待回答，那就是人民币升值将在多大程度上降低中国作为一个低成本供应国的竞争优势。相比其它发展中经济体，尤其是亚洲的发展中经济体，中国的成本更低。

一些公司可能会将中国人民币升值看成是一次机遇，借此重新评估自己的供应链，并摆脱供应链对中国的依赖，实现多样化。Robert Frederick公司财务总监罗杰?坎普(Roger Kemp)说：“以实际价格计算，(升值)对我们来说或许不是坏事。”Robert Frederick是英国一家儿童图书出版商，也是各种日历产品进口商，这些日历种类从乡村别墅图案到小甜甜布兰妮(Britney Spears)的画像都有。

他表示，其它发展中国家正不断让中国占优势，但人民币升值“将让其它地区更具竞争力，让我们可以从更多国家采购。”

坎普先生的观点要视一种情况而定，那就是亚洲国家是否仍将把它们的汇率以现有水平与美元挂钩。目前大多数亚洲国家某种程度上在控制其汇率。

的确，尽管升值会带来威胁，但很多公司对于减少对中国的依赖这一前景持正面观点。虽然中国能以有竞争力的价格大量生产多数产品，但经济过热也有其不利的一面。

一些企业抱怨说，为了完成订单，中国公司正竞相互挖墙脚，争抢员工，这就造成了交货延误，利润率减小，甚至丧失客户。“全球各地的企业都在拿着订单抢着来到中国，中国人一概照单全收。这种情形实在令人沮丧，而且依我看，情况还在恶化，”坎普先生说，“什么章法都无法执行，在那里没有商业法律。”

坎普先生的公司现在从印度采购30%的存货，那里的东西“几乎同样有竞争力”，运输起来更便宜且更快捷，他说。

虽然英国和欧洲进口商或许会重新考虑它们的选择，但看起来它们本国的制造业不大可能从这一贸易条件的变化中得到好处。

Universal Cycles每年从国外进口60万辆自行车到英国，其中10%来自欧洲。但即使人民币升值，加上欧盟对来自中国和越南的自行车及部件反倾销关税可能大幅提升，那也不大可能导致更多的本地化生产。

“欧洲存在产能问题，制造商们不能满足需求，”该集团的财务经理托尼?布朗(Tony Brown)说，“欧洲需要大规模的投资，但由于程序繁琐，做起来并不那么简单。”

US tells China to revalue by 10%

The US Treasury has told the Chinese authorities that it must revalue its currency by at least 10 per cent against the dollar to prevent protectionist legislation in the US congress.


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Henry Kissinger, former US secretary of state, is one of a number of unofficial envoys who have impressed upon China the urgent need for action, on the 10 per cent target, and on the seriousness of the threat from Congress, people with familiar with the administration's efforts said.

As well as the minimum 10 per cent target revaluation, Dr Kissinger was briefed by the Treasury on the need for other measures, such as a shift to a currency band against the dollar or a basket against a number of currencies to replace the peg.

Bill Rhodes, senior vice chairman of Citigroup, and Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President Ford and President George H. W. Bush, have also acted as unofficial envoys on behalf of the administration. Mr Rhodes declined to comment on talks with Beijing but said: “Apart from any external pressure, I think it's in China's interests in the coming months to move towards a market interest rate regime, accelerate the opening of the capital accounts, and move to a more flexible exchange rate system.”

Tony Fratto, US Treasury spokesman, refused to comment on the 10 per cent minimum target. “We have made it clear that the interim step should be of sufficient magnitude and flexibility to quell speculative financial flows,” he said.

On the missions of Dr Kissinger and others who have spoken to Beijing, Mr Fratto said: “Without commenting on particular individuals, I would say that it is important for the Chinese authorities to hear from respected individuals who can provide an accurate analysis of the American political environment on this issue.”

There was a marked shift in the Treasury's strategy ahead of last month's meeting of the Group of Seven leading industrial countries, with talk of the need for currency flexibility replaced by the call for urgent action. The administration has been spurred by concern over a bill championed by Charles Schumer, Democratic senator, that would impose trade sanctions if China does not act within six months.

When John Snow, Treasury secretary, released the department's report on trade and exchange rates last week, he said that the Treasury had called for currency flexibility and that an interim step was needed. The message was that China needed to act within the next six months. A senior administration official said at the time that a 5 per cent revaluation would not be enough.

Alan Greenspan said on Friday in response to a question at the Economic Club of New York that a notional 20 per revaluation of the renminbi would have little impact on the US trade balance. Analysis, Page 17
美国：人民币必须至少升值10%

美国财政部告知中国政府，必须将其货币对美元升值至少10%，以防止美国国会进行保护主义立法。


了解美国政府动向的人士称，包括前国务卿亨利?基辛格(Henry Kissinger)在内的美国非官方特使已向中国强调，中国急需采取行动，而且升值目标应为10%，并说明美国国会威胁的严重性。

美国财政部向基辛格博士说明，除将人民币升值至少10%外，中国还必须采取其它措施，如将人民币兑美元汇率转向一个兑换区间，或与一篮子货币挂钩，以取代与美元挂钩汇率。

花旗集团(Citigroup)资深副董事长比尔?罗兹(Bill Rhodes)、福特(Ford)总统和乔治?H?W?布什(George H. W. Bush)总统的国家安全顾问布伦特?斯考克罗夫特(Brent Scowcroft)也代表布什政府担任非官方特使。罗兹先生拒绝就与中国政府的会谈发表评论，但表示：“且不提任何外部压力，我认为，中国在未来几个月里朝着市场化利率体制方向迈进，加速开放资本账户，并逐步采用更灵活的汇率体系，这样做符合中国的利益。”

美国财政部发言人托尼?弗拉托(Tony Fratto)拒绝就10%的最低升值目标发表评论。“我们已明确表示，临时措施应具有足够的幅度和灵活性，足以抑制投机资金流动，”他说。

有关基辛格博士和其他已对中国政府表达过意见的人所负的使命，弗拉托先生表示：“我不会点评具体个人，我想说的是，中国政府听取受尊敬人士的意见很重要，这些人能在该问题上对美国方面的政治环境提供准确分析。”

上月7大主要工业国会议之前，美国财政部的策略出现明显转变：要求采取紧急措施的呼吁，取代了中国有必要提高汇率灵活性的说法。民主党参议员查尔斯?舒默(Charles Schumer)提倡一份提案，如果中国在6个月内不采取行动，将强行对中国进行贸易制裁。对该提案的担忧迫使布什政府采取行动。

财政部长约翰?斯诺(John Snow)上周公布财政部的贸易和汇率报告时表示，财政部已呼吁提高汇率灵活性，并表示需要采取过渡措施。传达的信息就是，中国必须在6个月内采取行动。一名高级政府官员当时表示，5%的升值幅度将是不够的。

艾伦?格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)周五在纽约经济俱乐部(Economic Club of New York)回答问题时表示，人民币名义升值20%，对美国贸易平衡几乎不会产生什么影响。

Lessons from the yen-dollar talks

Amid the inexorably rising US trade deficit, Washington is crying foul about “unfair” currency practices by its major trading partners. The leading economies of east Asia are seen as the main culprits, accumulating large trade surpluses and stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves while maintaining exchange rates that appear by all economic measures to be considerably undervalued. If the US Treasury will not act to address these inequities, Congress has threatened to take the issue out of Treasury's hands.


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Such was the situation confronting the Reagan administration in 1983 as complaints about Japanese trade and currency practices rose to fever pitch. Facing a similar challenge today over China, the Bush administration would do well to consider the Reagan Treasury's innovative approach to financial diplomacy. In November 1983, Donald Regan, US Treasury secretary, and Noboru Takeshita, Japan's finance minister, issued a rare joint statement declaring that “open, liberal capital markets and the free movement of capital are important to the operation of an effectively functioning international monetary system”. They agreed to establish a working group of senior officials on yen-dollar issues. The group met six times in early 1984 and handed a report to the ministers in May that year.

The stated rationale for these so-called “yen-dollar talks” was to promote liberalisation of Japan's capital markets and internationalisation of the yen. At the time, Japan's financial system was heavily bankcentric, interest rates were strictly controlled by the finance ministry, and markets for yen instruments were limited. Most important from a US perspective, the yen was considered to be substantially undervalued, giving Japan a perceived unfair advantage in trade.

Pulling these strands together, Treasury's strategy was to promote a stronger Japanese currency by deepening the market for yen instruments and making yen assets more attractive to foreign investors. No secret was made of this objective: in its May 1984 report, the Yen-Dollar Working Group noted that steps to internationalise the yen and liberalise Japan's capital markets would “lead to a stronger yen”.

The report included far-reaching commitments by Japan, such as a timetable for liberalisation of interest rates, the introduction of funding instruments such as certificates of deposit and enhanced access for foreign financial institutions to Japanese capital markets. As intended, the yen-dollar process contributed to the yen's long-term appreciation from its postwar fixed rate of 360 yen to the dollar to roughly 105 yen today.

Financial conditions in China today in many ways parallel those in early-1980s Japan. China's currency, the renminbi, or yuan, as the local equivalent is known, is estimated to be undervalued by as much as 25-40 per cent. Moreover it is not convertible. Capital flows in and out of China are broadly government controlled. Most domestic financial transactions and prices are also heavily regulated, and the range of permitted financial instruments is limited. Domestic capital markets are embryonic, with minimal foreign participation.

Of course, China is not Japan. Apart from the specific differences in the two countries' exchange rate regimes China maintains a rigid peg, Japan a “dirty float” China is still a developing country, with per capita income at one-thirtieth the level of Japan's. China's economy is more open to foreign direct investment than Japan's was then (or is now). And, whereas Washington had considerable leverage over Tokyo via their security alliance, the Chinese are widely perceived to be less susceptible to gaiatsu (foreign pressure). But the point is not to replicate the yen-dollar talks precisely. Clearly the agenda, format and public portrayal of any financial dialogue between the US and China would have to be modified substantially to reflect current bilateral realities. Among other things, a dialogue with China today should put more emphasis on promoting sound supervision of banks and better credit risk management. Provided the objective was to open and strengthen China's financial system and facilitate the move to a more flexible, market-based exchange rate, a dialogue that looked very different from the yen-dollar talks could make a valuable contribution to global economic growth and financial stability.

If presented as a bold, new initiative with senior-level involvement, such a dialogue could also make political sense for the Bush administration, helping deflect pressure for less market-friendly remedies to perceived unfair Chinese practices. There is even reason to believe it would be welcomed by Beijing, which may not like foreign pressure but has learned it is a reality of its new engagement in the global economy. China knows it could benefit from US experience and advice in tackling its serious financial inefficiencies, which jeopardise sustained growth.

The US Treasury has come under renewed domestic fire for failing to name China a currency “manipulator” in its latest report to Congress. Overt pressure let alone the trade-restrictive remedies being contemplated on Capitol Hill is unlikely to persuade Beijing to revalue its currency or fix its banks. In its wrangle with China, launching “yuan-dollar” talks could be exactly the kind of creative financial diplomacy Treasury used so effectively with Japan.

Matthew Goodman, US Treasury attaché in Tokyo 1992-97, is vice-president of Stonebridge International in Washington, DC; Robert Fauver, a former US Treasury staff director, is president of Fauver Associates
人民币与“他山之石”

在美国贸易赤字日益扩大的背景下，华盛顿政府大声抱怨其主要贸易伙伴“不公平”的汇率制度。一些东亚最大的经济体被认为是主要的罪魁祸首，它们积聚了大量贸易盈余和外汇储备，而其自身汇率无论用哪一个经济指标来衡量，都保持在一个相当低估的水平。美国国会威胁说，假如财政部不积极解决这些不公平现象，它将剥夺财政部处理这一问题的权力。


这正是1983年里根政府所面临的局面，当时，有关对日贸易和日本汇率制度的抱怨达到白热化。如今在中国问题上面对类似挑战，布什政府不妨参考80年代时美国财政部在金融外交上的创新之举。1983年11月，美国财政部部长唐纳德?里甘(Donald Regan)与日本大藏大臣竹下登(Noboru Takeshita)联合发表了一份罕见的声明，宣称：“对于一个有效运行的国际货币体制来说，公开、自由的资本市场和资本的自由流动具有重要意义”。双方同意，就日元-美元问题建立一个高层工作组。工作组在1984年上半年进行了6次会晤，并于同年5月向两位部长提交了一份报告。

这些“日元-美元会谈”公开的理由是为了促进日本资本市场的自由化和日元的国际化。当时，日本的金融体系在很大程度上以银行为中心，利率水平由大藏省严格管制，日元金融工具的市场十分有限。从美国的角度来看，还有最重要的一点，即日元被认为严重低估。美国认为这给了日本一个不公平的贸易优势。

综合上述主线，美国财政部的策略，是加大日元金融工具市场的深度、加强日元资产对外国投资者的吸引力，从而促成一个更强劲的日本货币。这一目标不是秘密：在1984年5月的报告中，日元-美元工作组就提到，推动日元国际化和日本资本市场自由化的步骤将“导致日元的走强”。

该报告包含了日本做出的长远承诺，如放松利率管制的时间表，推出定期存单等融资工具，扩大开放外国金融机构准入日本资本市场。正如所预想的，这一日元-美元过程帮助日元从战后固定的360日元兑1美元，上升到如今大约105日元对1美元的水平。

中国当今的金融状况，在许多方面同80年代早期的日本相似。据估计，人民币被低估了25%至40%。更糟的是，它不可自由兑换。资本在中国的流进和流出基本上受到政府的控制。大多数国内金融交易和定价也都有严格的监管，得到许可的金融工具品种有限。中国的国内资本市场刚刚起步，外国参与程度极低。

当然，中国不是日本。两国的汇率体制不同：中国一直采用盯住汇率制，而日本采用“混合浮动制” (dirty float)。此外，中国依然是一个发展中国家，人均收入只有日本的30/1。在吸引外国直接投资上，不管是当时还是现在，中国都比日本更为开放。而且，华盛顿通过安全防卫联盟对东京政府有着相当大的影响力，然而中国被广泛认为不那么容易屈从于“外压”。但问题的关键不是要照搬照抄日元-美元会谈。很显然，中美之间任何金融对话，其议程、形式以及公众形象的展示都需有实质性的修改，以反映目前的双边现实。与中国的对话，应当特别注重提高对银行的有效监管和更好的信用风险管理。只要其目标是开放并加强中国的金融体制、推动建立更为灵活、以市场为导向的汇率机制，那么看上去与日元-美元会谈颇为不同的中美对话，将对全球经济增长和金融稳定作出有价值的贡献。

如果将此作为一个大胆的新提议提出，并得到高层的参与，那么对布什政府来说，这种对话还具有积极的政治意义，有助于转移压力，此类压力要求针对中国的不公平做法，采取某些不那么符合市场原则的对策。甚至有理由相信，中国政府也会欢迎这种对话，中国可能不喜欢外国压力，但同时也认识到，这是参与全球经济的一个现实。中国明白，它能得益于美国的经验和建议，解决其严重的金融效率低下问题，这些问题正危及可持续增长。

美国财政部在其向国会提交的最新报告中，未将中国指名道姓地称为货币“操纵者”，因而受到国内新一轮的炮轰。公开的压力不太可能说服北京重新评估其货币或解决其银行问题，更不用说国会山正在酝酿的贸易限制措施。在与中国的唇枪舌战中启动“人民币-美元会谈”，有望成为当年美国财政部有效解决对日贸易问题的富有创意的金融外交。

马修?古德曼1992年至1997年任美国财政部驻东京随员，现任华盛顿特区石桥国际顾问公司(Stonebridge International)副总裁；罗伯特?福沃尔曾任美国财政部办公室主任，现任福沃尔联合公司(Fauver Associates)总裁。

Why renminbi is symbolic battleground

The announcement on Friday in Beijing that China will impose export tariffs on a range of clothing items might generate a moment of polite, if muted, applause in Washington and Brussels. After all, Beijing has done exactly what the US and the European Union has demanded it do: manipulate its textile exports to restrain the surge in shipments in some clothing categories that followed the end of a global apparel quota system on January 1.

Spare a thought for Beijing's leaders, then, when they cock their ears next week to listen to the other complaint emanating from western capitals - and particularly, from Washington. This time, the calls will be for free trade, in the form of an edict that China immediately dump its currency peg to the US dollar and allow its currency, the renminbi, to appreciate, thus making its exports more expensive.
人民币升值: 中国如何出牌?

上周五，中国宣布将对一系列纺织品征收出口关税。这一声明可能会赢来美国和欧盟礼节性的掌声，尽管可能没那么热烈。毕竟中国完全按照美国和欧盟的要求采取了措施：继今年1月1日全球纺织品配额制结束之后，中国对纺织品出口进行调控，限制某些类别纺织品出口的快速增长。


中国的领导人本周将会听到来自西方国家，尤其是美国的其它抱怨。这一次，西方要求的是自由贸易，并会发表声明要求中国立即放弃人民币盯住美元的汇率制度，让人民币升值，这样一来，中国出口产品的价格将更为昂贵。

这个原则可能与纺织品关税有极大的不同，但目的却是相同的：减弱中国出口的增长，保护本国产业。

近年来，中国的出口以及贸易顺差正在迅猛增长，这一点几乎毫无疑问。去年，中国的全球贸易顺差是320亿美元，而2005年这一数额可能增长三倍，估计将达到1000亿美元左右。对于每年必须新增1000万至2000万个就业机会的中国领导们来说，这一增长趋势是他们所不愿意限制的。

自2004年4月以来，中国对银行贷款额度施加限制，以遏制过度投资，而出口的快速增长使中国经济保持了健康的增长速度。今年第一季度，中国经济的增长率达到了9.5%的年增长水平。

在纺织品行业，中国似乎愿意以短暂的伤痛来换取最终的胜利。因此，中国上周五的表态不仅意在减弱贸易保护主义者不断施加的压力，同时也希望将美国和欧盟重新施加的贸易配额限制减至最小化。中国只需再忍耐两到三年的时间，到那时美国和欧盟就无权像现在这样，根据中国加入世贸组织的条件，对中国的纺织品出口施加配额限制。

随着时间的推移，中国的强大竞争力最终会使它从美国和欧盟手中获取市场份额。同时，中国政府也乐意在必要情况下，对私营程度较高的纺织品行业的发展进行控制。

然而，人民币是另外一回事，涉及敏感的主权问题以及国内改革的微妙平衡，后者旨在改善中国并不牢靠的金融体系。

更糟糕的是，任何中国汇率的调整均不太可能对美中之间的贸易逆差产生什么大的影响，而消除美中贸易逆差正是美国国会强烈要求采取行动以解决的问题――他们认为人民币升值是解决办法。

换句话说，美国政府要求中国做出政治让步――非常怯懦的行为，但这并不能解决当前的政治问题。

作为贸易的象征性战场，美国国会将人民币选为打击目标，这似乎尤其愚蠢。事实上，中国国内有许多学者和部分政府官员也同意取消盯住美元的汇率制度，但近来他们也渐渐变得悄无声息。这些学者和官员提出，中国为了自身利益，应该放弃盯住美元的汇率制度，这可以使政府获得货币政策的控制权。但因为害怕别人公开谴责他们与美国的利益一致，因而这些人大都保持缄默。

近年来，中国政府表示出愿意与美国合作的意愿，对某些产品出口施加限制，目的是为了维护双边关系的稳定发展。但是要在如货币这类主权问题上对美国做出如此公开的让步，却是令中国领导者所反感的，更别提这是一件非常危险的事情。

外部人士眼里中国领导人采取的合理措施，在中国普通老百姓看来则是软弱行为。对中国这样一个曾经饱受外国欺凌的国家来说，这种指控是任何一位国家领导者所不愿意背负的。

许多人认为，中国对美国有其影响力，因为中国手中握有巨额并且还在不断增加的美元储备。但是，这并不是中国愿意动用的那种影响力――至少暂时不是。尽管充斥着各式各样的阴谋推论，但是中国无意于破坏美国的经济，也不愿意让自己的美元储备减值。

接下来是有关人民币升值幅度的问题。中国政府实行增量式决策过程，并将取消盯住美元的汇率制度，这是一个非常重大的举措，它是近十年中保证中国金融稳定的基石。这些事实意味着，中国在初期阶段采取的任何举动都可能是微小的，人民币升值的幅度可能被控制在3－5%内，或者更少。

一位驻华外国分析家在向一位颇具影响力的美国来访者解释这一问题时，对来访者的反应感到非常惊奇。他说，那个美国人表现得就像是自己的尊严受到了莫大蔑视一样，认为这样微小的举措是对美国的“侮辱”。

那么，中国为什么要在行使预定时间表之前做出微小的改变，而这样只能导致别人提出更高的要求呢？

想要预测中国何时行动是不可能的。一位与人民币决策过程有密切关系的高级官员说道，他最乐观的猜测是，某天中国的最高领导们醒来后，发现那天天气不错，然后就会做出决定。他开玩笑说：“我们必须相信自由意志的存在。”

情况可能如此，但似乎美国并不乐意看到这样的情形――至少在涉及到两国的经济问题时如此。

MARKET TALK: Myth, Reality And Revaluation Of The Yuan * The information is one hour delayed.

It's not as enthralling a story as the one about woman who tried to dry a poodle in microwave but reform of China FX has generated some modern myths of own: Chief among them is mistaken idea CNY's been fixed at 8.2770 to USD for 10-years; while it's convenient to speak of a peg it's not really accurate. Nor is it strictly correct to insist China should float CNY as it's been managed float since 1994. Still, for CNY to get hard currency status, it'd have to be convertible under capital account; that'd allow foreign, domestic investors to take positions in CNY. Most agree full convertibility would damage China financial system, envisage system that gives CNY much more room to fluctuate. 　市场快讯：神话、现实和人民币重新估值

-中国外汇体制改革的话题虽然没有家庭主妇试图用微波炉烘干狮子狗这样的故事引人入胜，但是已经产生了一些现代神话：这些神话中最首要的就是人民币以人民币8.2770元钉住美元已达10年的错误概念；虽然称中国的汇率机制为钉住汇率制很方便，但实际上并不确切。而坚持中国应实行浮动汇率制的说法也并不完全正确，因为人民币自1994年以来一直实行有管制的浮动汇率制。不过人民币要成为硬通货，必须首先能够在资本帐户下自由兑换；这将允许境内外投资者交易人民币。大多人数都同意，人民币完全自由兑换将损害中国的金融系统，中国应设计一个汇率系统，给人民币提供更多的浮动空间。
(back)MARKET TALK: US Tells China To Revalue Yuan By 10% -FT * The information is one hour delayed.

U.S. Treasury has told China it must revalue CNY by at least 10% to prevent protectionist legislation in U.S. congress, FT reports, citing sources; but unclear from report what timeframe would be on this - few would expect China to revalue CNY by 10% in one initial hit, given impact on economy (talk is mostly 3-5% sometime in 2H). Paper says ex-U.S. secretary of state Kissinger's one of number of unofficial envoys who've impressed upon China the urgent need for action; as well as minimum 10% revalue, Kissinger was briefed by Treasury on need for steps like shift to currency basket 　市场快讯：美国财政部已对中国表示必须让人民币至少升值10%

-《金融时报》援引消息人士的话称，美国财政部已对中国表示必须让人民币至少升值10%才能防止美国国会的贸易保护主义立法；但从报导中无法得知时间表－几乎没有人预计中国在初期一次就让人民币升值10%，因这样会对经济产生冲击（传言称中国将在下半年某个时期让人民币升值3-5%）。《金融时报》报导称，美国前国务卿基辛格是一系列非官方特使中的一个，这些特使已向中国表明中国迫切需要采取行动；美国财政部就中国有必要采取措施（如转而让人民币与一篮子货币挂钩）及至少让人民币升值10%向基辛格作了简要指示。

新加坡外汇体制引起中国关注
China Is Considering A Currency Basket As Option for Yuan

BEIJING -- Even as China has fended off demands to revamp its currency system, its central bankers have fanned out around the world to solicit advice on the matter. They are paying close attention to Singapore's unusual setup.

International pressure on China to change its exchange-rate system has accelerated in recent months, partly because of the country's surging exports and economic growth. U.S. and European critics say Chinese products are unfairly inexpensive, because the yuan has effectively been pegged to the U.S. dollar for more than a decade and now is undervalued. Last week, Treasury Secretary John Snow appointed a special envoy to China to "continue and intensify a constructive dialogue with China" on exchange-rate and other issues.

FOREX VIEW


? Dollar Makes Up Ground It Lost Late Last Year




Beijing has said little more than that it is studying a change. "So long as conditions permit, China will push reform of the exchange rate on its own initiative, even without outside pressure," Premier Wen Jiabao said at a forum in Beijing last week.

China's central bank is examining a range of options, from expanding the yuan's trading range beyond its current 8.28 to the dollar, to taking a more complex and creative approach, according to people knowledgeable about its thinking.

The People's Bank of China has sought advice from private-sector banks, consultants and a number of central banks, including the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the U.S. Federal Reserve, as well as from the International Monetary Fund.


Lately, China's central bank has given special attention to how Singapore deals with its currency, the Singaporean dollar, says a banker advising the central bank. Implemented in 1981, Singapore's currency regime is a "managed float" -- a compromise between China's effective peg, set by its government, and the U.S. approach, in which the dollar "floats," its value determined by market forces.

Singapore pegs its dollar to a basket of currencies that mirror the city-state's trading patterns. Its central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, doesn't announce what is in the basket; the authority's bankers just tweak the mix as needed, depending on how Singapore's trade flows change.

Some economists say such an approach could prove to be a neat compromise, enabling China to say it has moved to a more flexible regime without opening the floodgates to volatile capital flows.

The system has worked well for Singapore, which is about three times the size of Washington, D.C., and has a gross domestic product that is roughly half of Wal-Mart Stores Inc.'s annual revenue. From 1981 to the present, income per person in Singapore has risen sharply, inflation has remained contained and interest rates have stayed low, encouraging consumers to spend. Despite essentially open borders for goods and capital -- a chief reason Singapore needed a tool like the basket, since it can't control its own interest rates -- the Monetary Authority of Singapore has managed to keep the Singapore dollar relatively stable while it slowly trends upward.

China's exchange rate isn't whipped around by the gobs of capital pouring into its country, either, but that is because its central bank keeps the currency fixed by buying many of the dollars that flood into the country. The result has been a massive buildup of foreign-exchange reserves. Many economists agree that while China can easily afford to do this today, eventually it will become too expensive an exercise. Almost all agree that if China were to move to a basket or a type of floating regime today, like Singapore's, the yuan would steadily strengthen.

"Moving to a basket makes sense," says Nicholas Lardy , an economist at the Institute for International Economics, a Washington think tank, and a longtime advocate of such a move.

Some economists worry that a basket would increase volatility in China's exchange rate, creating new problems for the country's corporations, which have little experience managing exchange-rate risk. Singapore also can steer its economy through a variety of unofficial policy measures, a task that would be much more difficult in a country the size of China.
新加坡外汇体制引起中国关注



在中国顶住外界压力暂时不对人民币升值的同时，中国央行也在就改革人民币汇率制度问题广泛征求各方意见。

其中，新加坡独特的制度设计引起了他们的特别关注。

近几个月来，外界要求中国改革人民币汇率体制的压力进一步加大，这在一定程度上是因为中国的出口和经济增长迅猛的缘故。美国和欧盟的批评家认为，人民币汇率十多年来一直与美元挂钩且汇率明显低估，这使中国产品在国际市场享受了不公正的价格优势。上周，美国财政部长斯诺(John Snow)还派特使访问中国，“继续与中国就汇率和其他问题进行进一步的建设性对话”。

但北京方面只表示正在研究改革方案。温家宝上周在北京的一个论坛上表示，中国将从实际出发根据自己的选择推进改革，即使没有外界压力中国也会改革。

据知情人士称，中国央行正在对一系列选择方案进行评估，其中除了扩大现有兑美元浮动范围的方案之外，还有一些更复杂的和富有创造性的设计。

中国央行一直在向股份制银行、咨询机构和多家外国央行就改革方案征求意见，其中包括香港金管局(Hong Kong Monetary Authority)、新加坡金管局(Monetary Authority of Singapore)和美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)及国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)等。

过去5年来，国际货币基金组织先后对中国1,000多名央行官员和政府部门官员进行了有关货币事务的培训。知情人士称，中国央行计划每年对5,000名高级人员进行培训。

据一位向央行提供咨询意见的银行界人士说，近来中国央行对新加坡的汇率制度尤为关注。新加坡自1981年以来开始实行有管理的浮动汇率制度，这种制度介于人民币现行的与美元挂钩的制度以及美元在市场作用下自由浮动的制度之间。

新加坡元的汇率与新加坡贸易伙伴国的一篮子货币挂钩。行使央行职能的金管局并不对外宣布这“一篮子”货币的构成，金管局会根据进出口贸易的变化在必要时对其构成进行调整。

渣打银行驻新加坡经济学家Joseph Tan解释说，每个人都在努力猜测金管局是怎么安排的，因此市场总体表现平稳，且每每能做到自我调整。

一些经济学家认为，这种安排或许是个不错的折衷方案，它既能让中国宣称已实现提高汇率体制灵活性的承诺，又不至于一下子对资本流动门洞大开。

这一制度对国内生产总值约为零售巨头美国沃尔玛公司(Wal-Mart Stores)年销售收入一半的弹丸之地新加坡非常有效。从1981年至今，新加坡人均收入大幅增加，但通货膨胀仍在控制之中，且利率保持在低位，这大大刺激了国民的消费支出。

新加坡实行这种“一篮子”挂钩制度的主要原因之一是它对外国商品和资本全面开放，因此，实际上它难以控制本国利率。但尽管如此，新加坡金管局仍做到了使新元在缓慢走高的同时保持相对稳定。

中国的汇率也没有因大量资本流入而动摇，但做到这一点的代价是，中国央行买进了流入国内的大量美元。这样的后果是中国积聚了巨额外汇储备。

多数经济学家都认为，尽管中国目前能轻松做到这一点，但这样做的代价最终会变得非常昂贵。如果中国以前也像新加坡这样转向与一篮子货币挂钩或实行某种形式的浮动汇率制，那么人民币将实现稳步升值，这基本上是所有人的共识。

像新加坡金管局这样在汇率调整上保持一定的“神秘感”将使中国央行在选择货币升值或贬值时有充分余地，不必担心受投机交易的困扰和牵制，而投机活动猖獗是中国目前面临的一个重大问题。据国际货币基金组织的估计，中国每年增加的外汇储备大约有一半是投机资金。随著经济的增长，中国可以以自己的步伐在相当长一段时间里让人民币逐渐升值。

华盛顿智囊机构国际经济研究所(Institute for International Economics)的经济学家拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)说，转向与一篮子货币挂钩对中国应该有效。该所长期以来一直主张中国采取这类措施。

但也有人认为“一篮子”挂钩可能并不适合中国。一些经济学家担心，采用一篮子挂钩将增加人民币汇率的波动性，给缺乏汇率风险管理经验的中国企业带来新的问题。对新加坡来说，它还可以通过各种非正式的政策措施来引导经济发展，但这一点在中国这样一个大国恐怕难以行得通。市场观察家指出，新加坡政府和企业界存在著密切联系。

曾在美国财政部供职的盖保德(Albert Keidel)说，这种制度是否适合中国将取决于中国引入该制度时的具体环境以及中国金融系统的发展。盖保德现在在另一家华盛顿智囊机构卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)从事研究工作。

无论中国最终是否会实行与新加坡类似的汇率制度，有一个事实不容忽视，那就是尽管大多数亚洲国家都实行浮动汇率制度，但许多国家的央行为将本币汇率保持在一定（且可能是未对外公布过的）范围内，都会进行大规模干预行动，日本和韩国就是两个典型的例子。从这个意义上来说，它们的汇率并不属于真正的浮动。

中国官员还在继续进行研究。中国央行有时甚至还要求各种外部机构就相同话题作讲座或开设课程。

为中国央行提供咨询意见的、香港Emerging Alpha Advisors Ltd.咨询师梅斯(Marshall Mays)说，他们想看看大家是否意见一致。他们希望避免被迫接受某种方案。

灵活汇率符合中国利益

A healthy global economy begins at home

The US Treasury tried to walk a legal tightrope this week. In its biannual foreign exchange report to Congress, it declared that while China is not yet guilty of exchange rate manipulation, it will soon become guilty unless it changes its policy. What exactly does this mean? Too many lawyers must have worked on this phrasing, which rivals Bill Clinton's famously evasive line (in response to a question under oath about whether he was having an affair) “It depends on what the meaning of ‘is' is.”


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To be fair, the Treasury report is very thoughtful overall, aimed at mollifying trade protectionists in Congress who are proposing punitive tariffs on Chinese imports unless Beijing stops intervening to hold the renmimbi down against the dollar. The report rightly aims to deflect attention from US-Chinese trade by focusing on the way that China's current dollar peg blocks an important price mechanism from helping to unwind today's massive global trade and current account imbalances.

Of course, what the Treasury report does not say is that “global imbalances” is a euphemism for “US borrowing binge”. After all, America is now absorbing 75 per cent of the current account surpluses of the world's surplus countries, not just China. Nor does the report mention how extraordinarily lax US monetary and fiscal policies of the past few years have probably played a far bigger role than China's peg in exacerbating the problem. Now that the US recession has passed, the starting point for reducing global imbalances has to be faster macroeconomic policy normalisation in America. The report spews the official line that the government is already reducing its own fiscal deficit. But the official target of a 50 per cent deficit reduction by 2009 is hardly ambitious enough, even if it were fully credible. Monetary policy, too, needs to compensate for years of low interest rates that have fuelled an increasingly speculative housing price boom, which has in turn contributed to low personal savings and a bigger current account deficit.

But China's exchange rate policy also matters. Indeed, it is hard to see any scenario for unwinding the global imbalances in which Asian currencies do not appreciate sharply against the dollar. According to my latest paper* with Maurice Obstfeld, a halving of the US current account from 6 to 3 per cent of gross domestic product over two years would lead to an 18 per cent trade-weighted average appreciation in the Asian currencies, with China being on the high side. Eliminating the global imbalances would entail a proportionately larger appreciation (35 per cent) of Asian currencies, and a 10-20 per cent appreciation of major non-Asia currencies including the pound and the euro. If, however, Asia sticks to its dollar peg, Europe gets slammed by massive currency appreciation and a massive current account deficit. For good measure, Europe suffers the double whammy of huge (15 per cent of European GDP) capital losses on its dollar and Asian currency assets. Asia's surpluses actually grow in this scenario, as they must to maintain Asia's dollar pegs in the face of an improving US current account.

We have talked about China's contribution to smooth global adjustment in the face of massive US borrowing, but what policy is best for China? It is a very tough question, not least because China is really two economies rolled into one. Wealthy coastal China has 450m people living in a vibrant emerging market. But the rest of China, particularly the agricultural sector, has 750m still living in a poor developing country. Many outside observers estimate China's rural unemployment at over 150m people. Poor developing countries typically do well with relatively fixed exchange rates, whereas emerging markets typically need more flexible ones. On balance, given that China's future lies with greater globalisation not less, authorities should probably move very soon to a more flexible exchange rate, while the pressures are towards appreciation and relatively easy to handle. An initial step appreciation accompanied by a move to a managed float would seem to be the ticket. But the urgency of the situation really comes from the need for China to take a lead role in dealing with a global problem. In the meantime, the US Treasury ought to focus its next report on getting the country's own fiscal house in order.


*Global Current Account Imbalances and Exchange Rate Adjustments; www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/papers/BPEA2005.pdf


The writer, a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is professor of economics at Harvard University
灵活汇率符合中国利益

美国财政部本周试图走法律“钢丝”。在每年两次向国会递交的外汇报告中，财政部宣称，虽然目前中国尚未操纵人民币汇率，但除非中国改变汇率政策，否则它很快会符合这一罪名的定义。这究竟是什么意思呢？斟酌这句措辞的律师一定不少。这一句话，可同前总统克林顿在被问到是否有外遇时讲出的那句绝妙遁词相媲美：“这取决于‘是’这个字的含义。”


公平地说，财政部的这份报告总体上考虑得非常周到，旨在安抚国会中的贸易保护主义者。这些人提议对中国进口商品施加惩罚性关税，除非北京方面不再有意压低人民币兑美元的汇率。该报告用意很得当，它超越人们对中美贸易问题的注意力，而把焦点对准中国盯住美元的汇率制度对一个重要的价格机制形成阻碍，使其无助于解决当今庞大的全球贸易和经常帐户失衡。

当然，报告中并未提到“全球失衡”是“美国过度借款”的一个委婉说法。毕竟，在全球所有盈余国家中(不仅是中国)，美国吸收了75%的经常帐户盈余。该报告也未提及：在过去几年里，美国的货币和财政政策极度宽松，这在加剧问题恶化过程中所产生的影响，很可能远远大于人民币盯住美元的汇率制度。鉴于美国的经济不景气阶段已经过去，缓解全球失衡问题的起点，应是美国加快宏观经济政策正常化的步伐。报告重申了美国的官方立场，即政府已经在削减其自身的财政赤字。但是，官方计划到2009年将赤字削减50%，这一目标即便完全可信，也很难说足够。同样，货币政策也需要为多年来执行的低利率做出补偿。低利率导致房价的上涨愈来愈带有投机色彩，这同时也造成个人储蓄水平低下和经常帐户赤字扩大。

但中国的汇率政策也很关键。的确，只要亚洲货币兑美元不大幅升值，就很难看到全球失衡得到解决的前景。根据我同莫里斯?奥布斯特菲尔德(Maurice Obstfeld)最近撰写的论文*，要使美国经常帐户赤字在两年内减半，即从占国内生产总值(GDP)的6%降至3%，亚洲货币的贸易加权平均汇率需升值18%，人民币将首当其冲。要消除全球失衡，亚洲货币需有更大幅度的升值(35%)，包括英镑和欧元在内的非亚洲主要货币也需升值10%至20%。不过，如果亚洲坚持采取盯住美元的政策，欧洲将受到货币大幅升值和巨额经常帐户赤字的冲击。此外，欧洲所持的美元和亚洲货币资产还将双双遭受巨额资本损失(占欧洲GDP的15%)。在这种情况下，亚洲的盈余实际上会有所增加，因为亚洲国家在美国经常帐户好转的情况下维持与美元挂钩的汇率制度。

我们已经提到了在美国大规模借款的形势下，中国对全球顺利做出调整可作出的贡献。但什么样的政策最符合中国利益呢？这是一个非常难以回答的问题。重要原因之一是，中国实际上有两种经济并存发展。在富裕的沿海地区，有4.5亿人口生活在生机勃勃的新兴市场中。而其它地区，特别是农村地区的7.5亿人口，仍生活在贫穷的发展中经济。许多外界观察家估计，中国农村的失业人口超过1.5亿。通常，贫穷的发展中经济适于维持相对固定的汇率，而新兴市场经济需要更为灵活的汇率制度。总体上看，鉴于中国的未来在于更高程度(而不是更低)的全球化，中国政府很可能应该很快采用更为灵活的汇率制度。在中国目前承受货币升值压力的情况下，此举相对容易成功。在初步升值举措的同时，伴之以“有管理的汇率浮动”(managed float)，将会是个不错的方案。但关键在于，目前形势的紧迫性，要求中国在应对全球问题上发挥领导作用。与此同时，美国财政部应把其下一次报告的重点，放在处理美国本身的财政问题上。

*全球经常帐户失衡和汇率调整；www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/papers/BPEA2005.pdf

本文作者是国际货币基金组织前首席经济学家，现为哈佛大学经济学教授

美国政府努力平衡对华政策
For U.S., Engaging China Is Delicate Dance

Mindful of Congress, yet Needing
Beijing on North Korea Problem,
White House Picks Fights Carefully

As anti-China sentiment rises in Washington, the Bush administration is caught in a complex balancing act: bashing Beijing enough to appease critics in Congress and stir action -- without provoking a trans-Pacific backlash.

The U.S. is exerting pressure on economic issues and criticizing China's human-rights policy and belligerence toward Taiwan, just as it is begging Chinese leaders for more help in curbing nuclear weapons in North Korea and hoping China won't cozy up to anti-American governments in places such as Venezuela.

"If we push too hard, this could cool China's ardor for helping us" on a number of issues, says David M. Lampton, director of China studies at the Nixon Center in Washington. Mr. Lampton says China also could potentially retaliate, for example, by shifting investments from U.S. dollar-denominated assets.

Complicating the White House calculus is soaring hostility on Capitol Hill, which some administration officials call "off the charts." Congress has largely deferred to President Bush's foreign-policy priorities, especially since Sept. 11, 2001, but China policy is one area where legislators are demanding a change of course, particularly on trade.

Nobody has felt that more than Treasury Secretary John Snow, who recently went to the Senate to testify about his department's budget and found himself in a hearing rife with anti-China anger. "China wants us to be a sponge for all their trinkets and trousers and shirts and shoes and all the things they produce, including high-tech, and yet, they don't want to open their market to us," Democratic North Dakota Sen. Byron Dorgan lectured the cabinet member, adding: "We sit around without the will, the nerve or the backbone to say this is nonsense; we're not going to put up with this anymore."

"Well, senator, I'm not at all happy with the situation," Mr. Snow responded. "There's a lot to be fixed there."

He stopped short of issuing a specific threat. And his report yesterday on Chinese currency practices continued that dance -- urging the Chinese to change their fixed exchange rate, yet not launching the process that could lead to direct retaliation.


The currency report came less than a week after the administration slapped new curbs on Chinese textile imports. The moves mark China's return to center stage of the American diplomacy debate -- a role Beijing assumed in the early days of Mr. Bush's presidency, before the spotlight shifted to terrorism and Iraq.

Officials across the administration are reviewing China policy. Rob Portman , the new U.S. Trade Representative, is making "market access" the focus of a fresh examination of economic policy toward the mainland. Among the issues under scrutiny: whether the U.S. should make more aggressive use of sanctions, such as antidumping laws, to control trade practices. His office's experts have begun what Mr. Portman describes as a "top to bottom" review of the agency's China policy. Within the White House, officials are discussing broadening the China policy review launched by Mr. Portman to encompass the Treasury and Commerce Departments, which share in policy making on trade and international economics. A decision could come in a few weeks.

That study comes as the State Department is preparing separately to open talks with China that will focus on what one U.S. official called the "nexus between economics and national security." Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick will lead the talks, expected to begin this summer in Beijing. The dialogue was requested in the fall by Chinese President Hu Jintao, and the White House has embraced the forum in hopes of developing a mechanism through which to engage Beijing on issues such as energy prices and human rights.

It has been a long time since President Bush or his chief diplomatic aides provided a comprehensive, public articulation of the administration's China policy. Privately, officials list certain principles and say they see China falling in the netherworld of neither adversary nor ally.

To explain policy coordination across multiple issues, some officials invoke the image of a highway with separate "lanes" and say U.S. action in each lane is largely taken on its own merits, without talks crossing into other lanes.

Officials see five separate lanes: economic, including issues such as trade, currency and intellectual property; China's human-rights record; Beijing's help in containing North Korea's nuclear program; the situation in Taiwan; and China's growing international influence.

As the recent actions on currency and trade show, the economic lane is the most contentious. Last year, the U.S. ran a bilateral trade deficit of $161.97 billion with China and is on pace to smash that record in 2005. Beyond trade, Mr. Bush made a point yesterday of saying upon swearing in Mr. Portman that his new aide "will work to ensure that China stops the piracy of U.S. intellectual property." The concern isn't just about counterfeiting of movies and music; it extends to a range of U.S products, such as pharmaceuticals, autos, entertainment, software and branded apparel. The administration recently moved closer to imposing sanctions over the issue, placing China on a "priority watch list" of offenders.

While the U.S. talks of more cooperation with China in noneconomic issues, there is concern inside the Pentagon and White House that Beijing's global ambitions could bump up against U.S. interests. Many American officials are unnerved by trips made last year by Chinese leaders to Venezuela, a country whose leadership is often at odds with Washington.

Beijing's influence has grown with free-trade agreements it has signed with a number of East Asian and commodity-exporting countries. China also has been able to gather support by engaging some foreign governments that were facing international isolation because of alleged human-rights abuses.

Chinese officials periodically try to cross lanes -- telling U.S. officials they may curb American imports, for example, if the U.S. continues to sell certain arms to Taiwan. American officials respond that if China crosses lanes, then Congress will force the same -- tying trade sanctions, for example, to human rights. So far, the threat of invoking Congress has worked for the administration.
美国政府努力平衡对华政策

华盛顿反华情绪的日渐滋长，让布什政府在平衡政策时陷入了一种非常复杂而微妙的境地：在向中国施压的问题上，如何才能既让国会满意，又不至于激起太平洋彼岸的怒火？

如今，美国在经济问题上对中国施压、抨击中国大陆人权政策和不承诺对台湾放弃武力的同时，也要求中国政府在敦促朝鲜放弃核武器研发计划问题上提供更多帮助，还希望中国不要过于亲近委内瑞拉等反美政府。

“如果我们太咄咄逼人，中国可能就不太愿意在一些问题上提供帮助，”华盛顿Nixon Center的中国问题研究主管戴维?兰普顿(David M. Lampton)表示。兰普顿称，中国也可能会采取报复性措施，比如将投资转移出美元面值的资产等。

令白宫更为头疼的是美国国会反华情绪的急剧升温，一些政府官员称之为“莫名其妙”。美国国会对布什的对外政策优先级别基本没有异议，特别是在2001年9月11日之后，但中国政策是议员们要求进行调整的一个领域，尤其是对华贸易政策。

没人能比美国财政部长斯诺(John Snow)的感受更深切了。最近斯诺前往美国参议院就财政预算作证时，就遭到了议员们激烈反华言辞的一阵炮轰。“中国希望我们像海绵一样吸纳他们生产的所有的饰品、裤子、衬衫和鞋子等等，甚至也包括高科技产品，却不愿向我们开放市场，”北达科他州民主党参议员拜伦?多根(Byron Dorgan)教训斯诺道，“而我们只是坐视这一切发生，说我们对这一切熟视无睹、甚至敢怒不敢言这是胡扯；我们再也不能忍受这一切了。”

“参议员先生，我对这种状况并不感到满意，”斯诺回答称，“有很多事情都需要解决。”

但斯诺的讲话从头至尾都是泛泛之谈，没有提及任何对中国的具体威胁。周二，美国财政部的中国外汇政策报告也延续了这种立场，敦促中国改变固定汇率制度，但并未启动可能导致直接报复的进程。

这份外汇报告是在美国政府决定对中国纺织品进口实施配额后不到一周发布的。这标志著中国已重新成为美国外交争议的中心，在布什上任的初期中国问题也曾成为热点，后来才转向恐怖主义和伊拉克。

美国政府各部门官员正在重新审定中国政策。美国新任贸易代表罗伯?波特曼(Rob Portman)正在将市场准入作为重新审定对华经济政策的焦点。正在接受重新审定的问题包括：美国是否应采取更激进的制裁措施（如反倾销法等）来控制中国的贸易行为。美国贸易代表办公室的专家们已对中国政策展开了波特曼称为“从上到下”的重新审定。在白宫内部，官员们正在讨论是否将波特曼重新审定中国政策的做法推广到美国财政部和美国商务部，这两个部门分享贸易和国际经济政策制定的权力；决定将在几周内做出。

此外，美国国务院正在准备与中国开始谈判。一位美国官员称，谈判的核心议题将是经济和国家安全问题。美国谈判代表团将由副国务卿佐立克(Robert Zoellick)带队，预计今夏在北京启动谈判。此轮谈判是应去年秋季中国主席胡锦涛的要求，白宫希望藉此能建立一个机制，与北京在能源价格、人权等问题上进行磋商。

布什总统或其首席外交助理们花了很长时间才公布了政府对华政策的详细方案。私下里，官员们列出了某些原则，并称，他们认为中国既不是敌人，也不是同盟。

有些官员将各项政策间的协调类比于多车道高速公路。他们说，美国在每个车道上采取的行动很大程度上取决于车道自身的因素，没有和其他车道进行协商谈判。

官员们认为有5个独立的车道：经济，包括贸易、汇率和知识产权；中国的人权纪录；北京在遏制朝鲜核计划方面提供的帮助；台湾局势；以及中国迅速提升的国际影响。

美国政府最近在外汇和贸易方面显示的行动显示，经济车道已成为最具争议的问题。去年，美国与中国的双边贸易逆差为1,619.7亿美元，2005年看来还会打破这个纪录。除了贸易，布什周二在波特曼宣誓就职之时特别指出，这位新的助理将“努力确保中国停止侵犯美国的知识产权”。知识产权担忧并不局限于电影和音乐的版权，而是涉及到医药、汽车、娱乐、软件和名牌服装等众多美国商品。布什政府最近将中国列入侵犯知识产权的优先观察名单，使得美国在这个问题上采取制裁措施的可能性大大上升。

虽然美国谈到在非经济事务上要加强与中国的合作，但五角大楼和白宫内部依然担心中国的国际野心突然上升可能损害美国的利益。中国领导人去年访问了与华盛顿关系紧张的委内瑞拉，令许多美国官员感到不安。

随著与众多东亚国家以及大宗商品出口国签订自由贸易协定，北京的影响与日俱增。而且，中国也能与取得一些因人权状况遭指责而被孤立的外国政府的支持。

中国官员经常试图跨越各个车道，比如声称如果美国继续向台湾出售某些武器，就可能限制美国商品的进口等。对此，美国官员回应称，如果中国跨越车道，美国国会将如法炮制，例如将贸易制裁与人权联系起来，迄今为止这种威胁还是奏效的。