America's deficits are more than just China's problem
“If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem. But if you owe a million, it has.” John Maynard Keynes
If Keynes was right, the world's creditor countries have a huge problem and the US none at all. Yet the assumption that the creditors should be more terrified than the debtor is wrong if the latter needs to continue borrowing. If creditors face an endless stream of additional borrowing and a good chance of default at the end of it, they should refuse to throw good money after bad. They will then impose huge costs on the debtor.
This balance of financial terror, as it has been called, characterises the current huge flows of finance to the US. Carefully thought through economic policy is needed if the world is to extricate itself from this predicament. Alas, we can rely upon the administration of George W. Bush not to provide it.
So it proved at this weekend's meeting of the Group of Seven “leading industrial countries”. The communiqué remarked that “we emphasise that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major countries and areas that lack such flexibility”. If anyone was in doubt about what that meant, John Snow, the US treasury secretary, insisted that China should embrace a looser exchange rate immediately. Mr Snow is not the organ-grinder of US economic policy, but the monkey. But he accurately reflected the “China-bashing” now sweeping across US politics, so painfully reminiscent of the Japan-bashing of past decades.
As Nouriel Roubini of New York University promptly responded, the US attack on one of its principal creditors is playing with fire. In the past two years, he argues, three quarters of the US fiscal deficit has been financed by foreign central banks, 100 per cent of the fiscal deficit has been financed from abroad and about 80 per cent of the current account deficit has been financed by foreign central banks.* Biting the hand that feeds one is folly.
According to the International Monetary Fund, the US general government fiscal deficit this year will be 4.4 per cent of gross domestic product, while the current account deficit is forecast to be 5.8 per cent of GDP. At present, therefore, the American people are able to consume and invest as if the fiscal deficits did not exist. The treasury secretary of what is arguably the most fiscally irresponsible US administration since the second world war should fall down on his knees in thanks rather than indulge in complaints.
Prof Roubini is also right to note the economic disruption that would ensue if the flow of official international credit were cut off. The consequences would almost certainly include a dollar collapse, higher domestic prices, a jump in interest rates, a fall in prices of housing, a steep rise in household bankruptcies and, not least, a sharp US recession. The bigger and swifter the adjustment in the external accounts, the more drastic those impacts would be. The landing would be hard.
Nevertheless, it is in US long-run interests to avoid an explosive build-up of net external liabilities. However big the crisis if a sudden correction were to occur now, it would be nothing compared to what would happen after another decade of rising net liabilities. Better still, instead of choosing between a sudden correction now and a still more brutal sudden correction later, why not go for a smoother correction that starts now?
The requirements for such a correction are clear. There needs to be a reduction of spending, in relation to potential output, in the US and an increase in spending in its creditors. A reduction in the US structural fiscal deficit will be required. Exchange rate movement will be needed as well, to facilitate adjustment.
Where then does China fit into this? The answer is suggested by the charts, which show the current and capital accounts of all emerging market economies, of Asian emerging economies and of China itself since 1996, the year before the devastating Asian financial crisis. From these, one can draw four important conclusions.
First, in 2004, the emerging market economies ran an aggregate current account surplus of $336bn, just over half of the counterpart of the US deficit of $666bn. Asian emerging market economies ran a surplus of $193bn.
Second, these current surpluses emerged after the financial crises. This is particularly visible for Asian emerging countries, which ran a current account deficit of $40bn in 1996 and a surplus of $114bn in 1998.
Third, the private sector has been trying to push emerging market economies into current account deficit. In 2004, the combination of current account surpluses and net capital inflows forced emerging market economies to accumulate $519bn in reserves. The corresponding figure for Asian emerging economies was $344bn.
Fourth, China is a significant player. Its current account surplus was 18 per cent of the emerging market total in 2004, its net inward direct investment was 28 per cent and its reserve accumulation was 40 per cent.
In short, it will be impossible to achieve a significant adjustment of the US current account deficit without a big adjustment by emerging market economies. These are the world's natural deficit countries. Moreover, given present levels of reserves, running current account deficits at least equal to the inflow of FDI is both perfectly safe and obviously sensible.
If the emerging market economies had run such current account deficits last year, the total would have been $186bn. The difference between the actual surplus and this deficit would have been $523bn, sufficient to eliminate most of the US deficit. Even China on its own is significant. Last year, the sum of its current account surplus and net inflow of FDI was 7 per cent of GDP. If it had run a current account deficit equal to inward FDI, instead, it would have run a deficit of $52bn. This would have made a difference of $111bn.
The huge reserve accumulations of emerging market economies are by now senseless. These are not only wasteful investments, but they prevent the global adjustment that the private sector rightly wishes to make. Emerging market economies should run current account deficits equal to inward FDI. Hectoring China on the exchange rate alone is folly. But a serious discussion of policies to deliver a better global balance is not. That discussion must begin now. 美国赤字不只是中国问题
“如果你欠银行 100 英镑，你有一个问题。但如果你欠银行 100 万英镑，这个问题就是银行的。”约翰?梅纳德?凯恩斯 (John Maynard Keynes) 说。
如果凯恩斯是正确的，那么全世界的债权国就都面临一个重大问题，而美国反而一身轻松。然而，如果债务人需要继续借钱，那么认为债权人应比债务人更恐慌的看法就是错误的。如果债务人不断向债权人借钱，最终又极有可能拖欠不还，那么债权人就应拒绝此类赔了夫人又折兵的事情。这样，债权人将使债务人付出巨大的代价。
这种所谓的金融“恐怖平衡”，就是目前涌向美国的巨额资金流所具有的特征。如果世界要摆脱这一困境，就需要有认真拟定的经济政策。但是，我们可以肯定布什政府不会这么做。
这一点在上周末举行的七国集团（由“发达工业国”组成 ）会议上得到了证实。会议公报说，“我们强调，对于缺乏灵活汇率机制的主要国家和地区而言，提高汇率灵活性是可取的”。如果有人对其中的意思还不能完全领会，美国财政部长约翰?斯诺 (John Snow) 替大家做了进一步说明。他坚持要求中国立即采取更为宽松的汇率机制。在美国经济政策的制定上，斯诺并非可以操控局面的街头手风琴卖艺者，他不过是表演的猴子。然而，他准确反映了目前在美国政坛甚嚣尘上的“敲打中国”论，这不禁使人痛苦地回忆起过去几十年的“敲打日本”论。
纽约大学的努里尔?鲁比尼 (Nouriel Roubini) 教授立即对此做了回应，认为美国攻击其主要的债权国之一是在玩火。他争辩说，在过去两年中， 3/4 的美国财政赤字由外国的中央银行负担， 100% 的财政赤字由海外资金负担， 80% 的经常账户赤字由外国央行负担。以怨报德的做法是愚蠢的。
根据国际货币基金组织 (International Monetary Fund) 提供的数据，今年美国一般性政府财政赤字将占到国内生产总值的 4.4% ，而经常账户赤字预计将占 GDP 的 5.8% 。因此，美国人现在若无其事地消费、投资，仿佛财政赤字根本不存在。二战以来，本届美国政府可以说是在财政上最不负责任的；身为财政部长，斯诺应该对美国的债权国跪地叩谢，而不应该以怨报德，牢骚不断。
鲁比尼教授还正确指出，如果切断官方的国际信贷流，随之而来的将是经济混乱。后果几乎可以肯定包括美元崩溃、国内物价上涨、利率飙升、房价缩水、私人破产急剧增加、以及美国经济的严重衰退。美国外部账户的调整幅度越大、速度越快，这些影响也就越剧烈。经济将会硬着陆。
然而，避免外债激增是符合美国长远利益的。现在立即纠正，无论产生多么大的危机，与任凭净负债继续增长十年后的危机相比，也是微不足道的。是现在立即纠正，还是以后更猛烈地纠正？与其在这两者之间进行选择，不如从现在开始采取一种更为温和的纠正方式。
需要对哪些方面进行纠正是很明确的。相对于潜在的产出来说，需要缩紧美国国内的消费，同时增加债权国的消费。还需要降低美国的结构性财政赤字。此外，为了便于进行这种调整，还需要变动汇率。
那么，中国从中起到了什么作用呢？相关图表给出了答案。该图表显示的是所有新兴的市场经济国家、亚洲新兴经济体和中国本身自 1996 年（破坏力强大的亚洲金融危机爆发的前一年）以来的经常账户和资本账户。我们从中可以得出四点重要的结论。
首先，在 2004 年，新兴市场经济体经常账户盈余总计 3360 亿美元，刚刚超过美国高达 6660 亿美元经常账户赤字的一半。其中，亚洲新兴市场经济体的经常账户盈余为 1930 亿美元。
其次，这些经常账户盈余出现在金融危机之后。这一点在亚洲新兴国家中体现得尤为明显。这些国家在 1996 年尚有 400 亿美元的经常账户赤字，而到了 1998 年则盈余 1140 亿美元。
第三，私营部门一直在试图将新兴市场经济体推向经常账户赤字。 2004 年，经常账户盈余和净资本流入共同迫使新兴市场经济体积累了 5190 亿美元的外汇储备，其中亚洲新兴市场经济体占 3440 亿美元。
第四，中国扮演着重要角色。 2004 年中国的经常账户盈余已占到新兴市场总盈余的 18% ，外商直接投资净流入占到 28% ，外汇储备增加额占到 40% 。
简而言之，如果新兴市场经济体不进行大规模调整，美国的经常账户赤字就不可能取得重大调整。这些新兴市场经济体理应是赤字国家。鉴于现有的外汇储备水平，经常账户赤字至少应与外商直接投资流入相等，这既很安全，也明显很合理。
如果去年新兴市场经济体的经常账户赤字保持在这一水平，那么总额本应达到 1860 亿美元。实际盈余与赤字之间的差距也应为 5230 亿美元，足以抵销美国的大部分赤字。即便中国一国的盈余金额也很可观。去年，中国经常账户盈余加外商直接投资流入占国内生产总值的 7% 。如果中国有与外商直接投资持平的经常账户赤字，它应该有 520 亿美元的赤字。这将和实际盈余相差 1110 亿美元。
到了现在，新兴市场经济体增加巨额外汇储备是没有意义的。它们不仅是糟糕的投资，也妨碍了私营部门进行全球调整的合理意愿。新兴市场国家应维持与外商直接投资流入相等的经常账户赤字。威吓中国调整汇率是愚蠢之举。但是，围绕如何取得更好的全球平衡进行认真讨论，则是非常明智的。这种讨论必须从现在开始。
