China's banking system has made only patchy progress
In the early 1990s the Bank of China, one of the country's “big four” banks, made an error in my favour amounting to hundreds of US dollars. When I pointed out the mistake, the bank declined to take the money back.
Instead, I was sent from one slow-moving queue to another at the bank's main Beijing branch, by tellers anxious to avoid the task of sorting out the fouled-up transfer. When I told the third cashier that I had had enough and was going home, she said that she appreciated my good intentions but there was nothing she could do.
The experience left me with a deep impression of just how dysfunctional China's biggest financial institutions could be. A decade of reform efforts later, and with Bank of China (BoC) and its “big four” peer, China Construction Bank (CCB), preparing for multibillion dollar international initial public offerings, the banking system today remains deeply confused.
At least that is the lesson from recent events. Since January, Chinese authorities have been trying to find a manager of a BoC sub-branch in the north-eastern city of Harbin accused of involvement in embezzling up to Rmb1bn ($120m). This month Zhang Enzhao, chairman of CCB, resigned amid corruption allegations. Since September 2004, more than 50 CCB staff have been accused of financial offences.
These are not isolated incidents and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Agricultural Bank of China are considered to be in even worse shape. Just this week, for example, regulators accused dozens of staff at two Agricultural Bank sub-branches in Inner Mongolia of making illegal loans and other abuses involving nearly Rmb115m.
To cite such cases is not to deny that China's banks have made huge progress. The BoC branch where I had to queue a decade ago was dingy, badly organised and full of surly and conspicuously under-employed staff. These days such flagship branches boast bright decor, ticket-queuing and comfortable chairs that show the new importance attached to service. ATMs are common and internet services increasingly popular. Balance sheets also look better. BoC's non-performing loan ratio fell to about 5.1 per cent at the end of last year from more than 16 per cent just a year before. CCB's non-performing loans are even lower at 3.7 per cent, and both have capital adequacy ratios above the benchmark 8 per cent.
However, much of the improvement is cosmetic, the result of debt transfers to state-owned asset management corporations and infusions of public funds such as the $45bn pumped into BoC and CCB in 2003. Stronger balance sheets make it easier to attract foreign strategic investors and IPO subscribers but do not fix banks' corporate culture, governance or leadership.
Beijing knows that, of course. Indeed, officials see international listings as a way to improve oversight and attract expertise. Even Wen Jiabao, the premier, stresses the need for better bank accounting and more transparency. The energetic China Banking Regulatory Commission issues reams of guidelines laying out what lenders must do to improve internal controls and risk management. And the big banks have officially been liberated from state interference in lending and given greater freedom to vary interest rates.
Such reforms should allow the banks to shed their role as tools of economic central planning and operate as true commercial entities. But they also bring risks: a rush into consumer lending, for example, brings new scope for misjudgment and abuse, with reports of people successfully applying for dozens of mortgages or car loans.
Executives at BoC talk with great self-satisfaction about the progress they are making in reorganising staff and strengthening controls. But the scandal in Harbin suggests progress is patchy.
The government's instinct to control the banks may also conflict with their need for commercial independence. CCB's Mr Zhang was quickly replaced by Guo Shuqing, a central bank vice-governor.
All of which strongly suggests that foreign investors should think twice before putting their money in BoC or CCB. While strategic investors in China's smaller state-owned banks can at least hope to play a transformative role, the scale of the “big four” creates both a management minefield and an intrinsic moral hazard.
The recent scandals also have policy implications. Fixing China's banks, which account for more than 60 per cent of financial system assets, is vital to continued development. Nobody doubts that injections of public funds are needed. But policymakers should make bail-outs contingent on reform: giving a badly run bank more capital makes it more dangerous, not less.
The scale of the challenge was brought home to me on a personal level last year, when I tried to withdraw Rmb2,000 from an ATM at a branch of ICBC, China's biggest bank. ICBC is next in line for an infusion of state funds, and most of the time serves me reasonably well. But I became concerned when the ATM appeared to count my cash but then refused to deliver it.
Staff at first insisted the transaction had been cancelled, but eventually confirmed the money had been taken from my account and promised to pay it back. Indeed, it became clear that I was only the latest of a series of customers to complain about the malfunctioning machine. But when I asked why the ATM had not been shut down, the manager on duty waved the suggestion aside. “It works some of the time,” she said.
中国给银行注资的风险
上世纪90年代初，中国银行出现一次工作失误，多付给我几百美元。当我指出这一错误时，这家身列“四大”的银行不肯收回多付给我的钱。
当时，在中国银行北京的一家主要营业厅内，柜台出纳都不想惹上麻烦，处理这次转账错误。他们让我不断排队，每个队都移动地非常缓慢。后来，我告诉第三位出纳员，我已无法忍受并准备回家，她表示感谢我的好意，但对此无能为力。
这次经历给我留下了深刻的印象，让我体会到中国最大的金融机构功能是多么不完善。中国的银行业改革已经持续了十年，而且，与中国银行同属“四大”的中国建设银行，正在准备价值上百亿美元的海外首次公开上市。如今，中国的银行系统仍然十分混乱。
至少，这可以作为近期一系列事件中得出的教训。在中国东北部城市哈尔滨任职的中国银行某支行经理被指控挪用10亿人民币(1.2亿美元)。今年1月以来，中国当局一直在努力寻找这位经理。本月，中国建设银行董事长张恩照因涉嫌贪污而辞职。2004年9月以来，超过50名中国建设银行员工被指控金融违规。
这些并非孤立事件。中国工商银行和中国农业银行的管理状况被认为更糟。就在本周，监管机构指控中国农业银行内蒙古两家支行数十名员工涉嫌非法贷款及其他滥用职权问题，涉案金额近1.15亿人民币。
我引用这些案例，并非否认中国银行业已取得的巨大进步。十年前，我不得不排队等候服务的那家中国银行营业厅肮脏灰暗，组织混乱，员工人手不足，态度粗鲁。如今，这类主要营业厅装修亮丽，顾客拿号排队，有舒适的座椅，体现出银行对服务新的重视。自动柜员机得到广泛应用，互联网服务也日益普及。资产负债表看起来也好得多。中国银行的不良贷款率从仅仅是1年前的超过16%，去年年底降到约5.1%。中国建设银行的不良贷款率甚至更低，仅为3.7%。两家银行的资本充足率都超过8%的基准水平。
但在很大程度上，这种改善是表面的，是将债务转移给国有资产管理公司和财政资金注入的结果。比如，2003年财政部为中国银行和建设银行注入了450亿美元资本金。良好的资产负债表更容易吸引外国战略投资者和首次公开上市的股票认购人，但无法纠正银行在公司文化、治理和领导方面存在的问题。
中央政府当然清楚这一点。实际上，政府官员将海外上市视作提高银行监管和银行吸引专长的手段。甚至总理温家宝也强调，需要更好的进行银行核算，并增强透明度。中国银监会积极发布一系列指导方针，提出银行提高内部控制和风险管理所必须采取的步骤。目前，从行政上讲，几大银行已经摆脱国家对贷款决策的干涉，几大银行拥有了更大的利率浮动自由。
这些改革应该使得银行摆脱中央计划经济工具的角色，作为真正的商业实体运作。然而风险随之而来：银行争相进入消费贷款领域，扩大了贷款决策失误和滥用职权的范围的扩大；比如，报告显示有的人成功申请到数十笔住房按揭贷款和车贷。
中国银行高管在谈及员工重组和加强控制等领域取得的进展时，表现得非常自满。然而，哈尔滨事件却暴露出改革进程不平衡。
政府控制银行的这一本能，还可能与银行商业独立的需求发生冲突。建设银行的张恩照先生很快就被中国人民银行副行长郭树清取代。
所有这些都有力表明，外国投资者在考虑将资金投入中国银行或中国建设银行之前，应该三思而行。中国小型国有银行中的战略投资者至少可以希望扮演转型的角色，但“四大”国有银行的规模会导致出现管理层雷区或本质上的道德危险(moral hazard)。
最近的丑闻事件对决策也有影响。中国银行拥有全国金融系统60%以上的资产，因此，解决中国银行存在的问题，对中国金融系统的持续发展至关重要。无人置疑财政资金的注入确有必要。但决策者应该在改革的基础上再帮助银行解决问题：给经营不善的银行更多资金，只会增加而不是减少危险。
去年的一次亲身经历，使我感受到挑战之巨大。当时，我想要通过中国工商银行的自动柜员机取出2000元人民币。工商银行是下一个财政资金注入对象，通常，我认为其服务质量还不错。但当发现自动柜员机清点完我的现金却拒绝支付时，我开始担心了。
起初，银行员工坚持认为交易被取消了，但最终确认钱已从我账面划出，于是承诺返还给我。实际上，我只是最近一系列投诉自动柜员机出现故障的客户之一。当我问为何不关闭那台自动柜员机时，值班经理拒绝了这一提议。“有时还能用。”她说道。
