The Asian giants compete for energy
China National Offshore Oil Corporation is considering a nearly $14bn (￡7bn, �10.6bn) takeover of Unocal of the US. Sinopec, another Chinese state-controlled oil group, has struck a $70bn deal to buy Iranian crude oil and liquefied natural gas over three decades. China has sent $6bn to Rosneft, the Russian company that bought the main production unit of the embattled Yukos oil group, as advance payment for oil supplies.
India has just reached a $40bn agreement to import LNG from Iran and develop Iranian oilfields, and is promoting pipeline projects to bring oil and gas across neighbouring countries to supply its energy-hungry economy.
These deals are among the largest of their kind, but scarcely a week goes by without Indian or Chinese companies announcing similar, if smaller, energy transactions from Ecuador to Gabon. The race by the two emerging economic giants of Asia to secure fuel has begun in earnest.
With world energy supplies already tight, the question is not whether the rising demand from India and China will bring them into commercial competition with each other and with other big importers such as the US and Japan: that is already happening. The question is whether it will lead to diplomatic tension and ultimately increase the risk of military conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
For the moment, the competition for resources is fierce but not hostile. The main evidence of concern is that Beijing, nervous about the possible use of US and Indian naval power to control oil supplies from the Middle East in the event of conflict, is rapidly strengthening its own navy. “The Chinese are building up a capability to defend those sea lanes,” says Gary Samore, director of studies at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “There is a naval rivalry building up in south-east Asia and the Indian Ocean.”
There is no doubt that India and China, which together account for more than a third of the world's population, must greatly increase their imports of oil and gas if their economies are to continue growing at annual rates of 6-10 per cent. China was once an oil exporter but is now the world's biggest oil consumer after the US and is increasingly dependent on imports: already, a third of its oil is imported.
India, although its economy and its energy needs are smaller than China's, is even more dependent on imports than its dynamic neighbour. Mani Shankar Aiyar, petroleum minister, reckons India's import dependency will increase from 70 per cent of consumption this year to 85 per cent in 15 years.
In Mapping the Global Future, an assessment of the world's prospects in 2020, the US government's National Intelligence Council says China is expected to boost its energy consumption by 150 per cent and India by nearly 100 per cent if they maintain steady growth. “The single most important factor affecting the demand for energy will be global economic growth, particularly that of China and India,” says the report, released in December. Both countries lack domestic resources and need to ensure access to imports. “The need for energy will be a major factor in shaping their foreign and defence policies, including expanding naval power,” says the intelligence report, adding that this is likely to prompt China to be more “activist” in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Eurasia.
This, too, is already happening. In recent years, Beijing has courted nations rich in natural resources. Trips by Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, to countries such as Kazakhstan and Gabon are at least partly inspired by China's thirst for energy.
Rivalry between China and India would be a concern even if it occurred in a world where other demands for energy were unchanged. But that is not the case. With oil and gas remaining the essential fuels for industrial societies, the importance of Middle East suppliers will increase as reserves elsewhere are depleted.
“ Last year the UK for the first time became a net gas importer, as a result of which there is a lot of interest in pipeline and LNG deals in the UK and Europe,” says Anna Howell, a Hong Kong-based consultant for Herbert Smith, the international law firm. “That is exactly what we're already seeing here in India and China.”
Japan, the world's second largest economy, and South Korea, which recently sealed an agreement to buy $20bn of LNG from the Russian far east and Yemen, also remain highly dependent on energy imports. The continuing confrontation between China and Japan over a gas field in a disputed part of the East China sea and the fierce diplomatic battle (apparently won by Japan) over the route of a proposed Russian pipeline carrying Siberian oil show that the dangers of energy competition are real.
Not everyone, however, is pessimistic. Claude Mandil, executive director of the International Energy Agency, the club of industrialised oil consumers, says the difficulty of meeting China's and India's need for fuel imports can and should be eased by international and regional co-operation.
India's Mr Aiyar takes the same view. He dismisses the idea that the tussle may become a new version of the “Great Game” for influence between rival 19th century imperial powers, saying he plans to visit Beijing later this year for consultations. One of his aims is to avoid damaging competition between Indian and Chinese oil companies for the overseas energy assets coveted by both countries. “India and China don't have to go through fratricide in order to arrive at the conclusion that it is better to co-operate on energy security,” he says. “Of course there will be competition where the market dictates.”
The need to secure oil and gas supplies for the Indian economy may also help improve relations with other neighbours including Pakistan, its long-time enemy. Among the pipelines under consideration are one bringing gas from Burma across Bangladesh, one from Iran across Pakistan, one from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even one across India from Iran to China.
S. Chander, an energy and infrastructure expert at the Asian Development Bank, notes that reaching access agreements with neighbouring states is easier than before, at least financially. “For these countries like China and India with booming exports, to pay out a couple of hundred million dollars to Pakistan or Bangladesh is not a big deal, as it might have been five or seven years ago when foreign exchange was tight.”
The need for governments to co-operate on long-term infrastructure projects thus points at least to the possibility of improved relations between previously hostile states. “People are getting pragmatic,” says one Asia-based strategist at a big international oil company.
he energy squeeze is not so good for human rights or environmental protection, in central Asia or countries such as Burma. Governments in oil importing countries typically care more about energy security than the politics of the exporter. Democratic India has forged close relations with Burma's military junta and all but abandoned support for the pro-democracy opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Like China, India is prepared to sacrifice other goals in the search for energy security.
In this search, both countries are implementing an array of policies designed to keep their power stations, factories and vehicle fleets running in the years ahead. The first and most obvious step is to boost domestic output of oil and gas, but the two governments accept that domestic production, even if it can be increased, cannot be enough to meet fast-growing demand.
The next step is to ensure good relations with suppliers, which is why India hosted a meeting of Gulf oil exporters and big Asian oil consumers (including China) last month. It also explains why India, China and Japan are all prepared to risk the wrath of the US by striking deals with Iran.
Another priority is to guard against disruptions to supply. Both India and China have decided to create oil stockpiles for this purpose and India has signed a memorandum of understanding with the IEA on the co-ordinated release of stored oil. China is expected to begin its stockpile this year.
The fourth strategy is to diversify sources of supply, both geographically and in terms of fuel types. In short, no one wants to depend on oil from the Gulf. China and India are enthusiastic new customers for LNG from various sources, with India's first terminal operating and several more being constructed and planned in each country.
“ The objective of LNG imports is to substitute for liquid petroleum imports from the Middle East,” says Mr Chander. “It will, if not reduce the dependency, then at least hold it to a manageable level.” Both Beijing and New Delhi are also eager to exploit more nuclear power. China wants to quadruple its output of nuclear-generated electricity in the next decade.
A fifth policy, favoured by environmentalists and finance ministries, is to allocate imported energy to the most suitable users and increase the efficiency with which the energy is used. Much fuel would be saved if India's cars and China's power stations and factories were as efficient as vehicles and plants in Japan and the west.
Yet analysts doubt that improved efficiency can make a noticeable difference to energy consumption. Joe Zhang, head of China research at UBS, argues that for the policy to work it must be universally adopted, or else the few plants that do invest in better equipment would simply be at a financial disadvantage. “If one factory does it, it's no use,” he says. “You need 200,000 other factories to do the same.”
Mr Zhang believes it is unfair to compare China's high energy use per unit of gross domestic product with the lower figures recorded in western countries because the whole point about China's economic growth is that the nation has attracted heavy, high-energy industries from richer countries. China, furthermore, is importing particularly large amounts of energy at the moment because it is building so much physical infrastructure roads, ports, buildings and power stations.
The last and most controversial strategy, pioneered with spectacular lack of success and large financial losses by Japan in the 1970s, is to try to achieve energy security by purchasing overseas exploration and production assets, or even whole oil companies. China has pursued what it calls a “go out” strategy for a decade and its oil companies have secured footholds in countries such as Venezuela and Sudan. The mooted Unocal bid is another example.
It is an idea that attracts only scorn from financial analysts. “It's actually a silly thing to do,” says Mr Zhang. “Whether the energy is produced by you yourself or by somebody else in Canada or Australia, you still have to pay for it. It makes sense to buy the reserve, the resource, only if you are a better producer. It doesn't change your energy dependency at all.”
David Hurd, energy analyst at Deutsche Bank, adds that it is odd for CNOOC to think about buying Unocal, whose share price has recently been valuing its reserves at about $8 per barrel of oil equivalent, when it is buying gas assets in Australia for a quarter of the cost. “The argument about oil security is in my opinion irrelevant until you control the sea-lanes of the world,” he says. Pipelines are even more insecure, as shown by repeated sabotage of pipes in Iraq and in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.
Indian companies are starting to play the same game, and Indian and Chinese groups are now partners in one project in Sudan. “We are a late starter,” says Ravi Mohan, chief executive of Crisil, the Indian credit rating agency. “In the early round of this, I think China is perhaps ahead of India, but India has woken up, so we can expect to see more action on this front.” Yet even the best of the strategies India and China are adopting to improve their energy security will make a difference only at the margins. The two countries will inevitably compete to buy oil and gas, just as they will compete with other energy importers in developed and developing countries. The challenge is not to stop the competition but to keep it amicable.
For the previous two articles go to 北京新德里互争能源
中国海洋石油总公司 (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) 正考虑以近 140 亿美元价格收购美国的优尼科 (Unocal) 公司。中国另一个国家控股的石油集团中石化 (Sinopec) 敲定了一笔 700 亿美元的交易，将在未来 30 年内购买伊朗的原油和液化天然气。中国已向俄罗斯石油公司 (Rosneft) 预付 60 亿美元，作为购买该公司的石油预付款。这家俄罗斯石油公司买下陷入困境的尤科斯 (Yukos) 石油集团主要的石油生产部分。
印度刚刚达成一项价值 400 亿美元的协议，将从伊朗进口液化天然气，并开发伊朗的油田。同时，印度正在积极筹划穿越几个邻国的管道工程，以便向其能源饥渴的经济供应石油和天然气。
上述交易是此类交易中最大的几宗。但几乎每周都有印度或中国公司宣布类似的能源交易，只不过有时规模较小，包括与厄瓜多尔和加蓬等国达成的交易。这两个亚洲新兴经济大国为保证燃料供给的竞赛确实已经展开。
由于世界能源供应已很紧张，因此问题不是印度和中国日益高涨的需求是否会使它们彼此之间、以及与美国和日本等能源进口大国之间展开商业竞争：这些竞争已经在发生。问题在于，两国日益高涨的能源需求会不会导致外交紧张，并最终加大亚太地区发生军事冲突的危险。
眼下资源竞争非常激烈，但没有敌对气氛。引起担忧的主要证据是，中国政府担心，一旦发生冲突，美国和印度可能会利用海军力量控制中东的石油供应，因此中国正迅速加强它的海军。“中国正在增强海上运输线的保卫能力，”伦敦国际战略研究所 (International Institute for Strategic Studies) 研究部主任加里?萨莫尔 (Gary Samore) 表示，“在东南亚和印度洋，海军竞争态势正逐渐上升。”
印度和中国共占世界人口的三分之一以上。无疑，如果两国经济要继续以每年 6% 至 10% 的速度增长，那它们必须大幅增加石油天然气进口。中国一度是石油出口国，但现在是仅次于美国的世界第二大石油消费国，而且正越来越多地依赖进口：目前中国已有三分之一的石油来自进口。
尽管印度的经济规模和能源需求比中国小，但它甚至比发展迅速的中国这个邻国更加依赖进口。印度石油部长马尼?桑卡尔?艾亚尔 (Mani Shankar Aiyar) 估计，印度的石油进口依赖程度将会提高，今年印度的石油进口占全部消费的 70% ， 15 年后将升至 85% 。
《世界未来格局展望》 (Mapping the Global Future) 是一份有关 2020 年世界格局的评估报告，美国政府的国家情报委员会 (National Intelligence Council) 该在该报告中声称，如果中国和印度保持稳定增长，那么预计中国能源消耗将增加 150% ，而印度将增加近 100% 。这份去年 12 月公布的报告指出，“影响能源需求的最重要因素将是全球的经济增长，尤其是中国和印度的经济增长。”中印两国国内资源不足，因而需要确保获得进口资源。该报告预测，“能源需求将是决定两国外交和国防政策（包括扩张海军力量 ) 的主要因素。”报告还补充说，这可能促使中国在中东、非洲、拉美和欧亚更为“活跃”。
这种情况已经发生。近年来，中国政府一直在向自然资源丰富的国家示好。中国国家主席胡锦涛出访哈萨克斯坦和加蓬等国，至少部分原因来自中国对能源的渴求所激发的。
即使其它地区的能源需求不变，中国和印度之间的竞争也会成为一个令人担忧问题。但其它地区的能源需求并不会停滞不变。石油天然气依然是工业社会的基本燃料，由于其它地区的储量正在耗竭，所以中东的能源供应将越来越重要。
“英国去年首次成为天然气净进口国，使得英国和欧洲的管道及液化天然气交易引起人们极大的兴趣，”安娜?豪维尔 (Anna Howell) 表示，“那正是我们目前看到在印度和中国发生的事情。”她是国际律师事务所史密夫律师事务所 (Herbert Smith) 驻香港的顾问。
世界第二大经济体日本以及韩国也高度依赖进口能源。韩国最近达成协议，将从俄罗斯远东地区和也门购买 200 亿美元液化天然气。围绕中国东海有争议地区的一个天然气田，中国和日本在继续对抗。在一条输送西伯利亚石油的拟建俄罗斯管道的路线问题上中国和日本展开的激烈外交战（显然是日本取得了胜利 ) 都表明，能源竞争的危险是实实在在的。
