Japan is casting off the burden of excess saving
Japan is in the early stages of a demographic transformation that will ultimately reinvigorate its economy. Most of its structural imbalances over the past 20 years stemmed from the fact that a disproportionately large number of its population was middle-aged and high-saving, and those people are now retiring. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this change.
The usual pattern for developing nations is that, as they approach industrial maturity, the range of profitable investment opportunities diminishes, rates of return fall and households react by saving less and spending more. Consumption thus replaces capital expenditures as the primary source of new aggregate demand. Yet, although Japan achieved maturity in the late 1970s or early 1980s, its private-sector savings rate remained as high as that of a frugal developing country until quite recently.
There were two reasons for this. First, the institutions of corporate governance were weak and did not compel companies to disgorge their earnings to shareholders. Instead, many companies hoarded so much cash that the net effect was that the corporate sector had little need to borrow from the household sector. Second, during the 1980s a very large number of Japanese entered the high-saving 40-64 age bracket.
Japan's gross national savings rate therefore stayed well above 30 per cent of gross domestic product through the late 1990s, as opposed to 20-22 per cent for the European Union and even less for the admittedly improvident US. Textbook theory suggests that this surplus capital should have flowed overseas so that foreigners could procure more of Japan's output, thereby maintaining full employment in Japan while also lowering global interest rates. But Japan was so big that the rest of the world could absorb only about a third of the necessary exports. It was left with a surfeit of capital that threatened to depress prices, multiply bankruptcies and shrink GDP.
Japan's most conspicuous structural flaws stem from attempts to employ these superfluous funds. During the late 1980s and early 1990s low interest rates and reckless banking practices encouraged companies to use this money to acquire vast expanses of productive capacity, causing GDP to surge in the short term. In the longer term, however, such enormous investment produced severe industrial distortions.
When companies started to reduce their investment spending towards profitable levels in 1992, the government compensated by increasing its budget deficit in order to forestall prolonged recession. This extra stimulus ensured that GDP continued to grow modestly, yet it also inflated the national debt to vast proportions. At the turn of the decade the first wave of Japan's previously middle-aged workers started retiring. Their income decreased relative to their spending and they simultaneously began transferring more wealth to relatively profligate children and grandchildren. Hence the household savings rate plummeted. On a flow-of-funds basis this had ranged between 6 and 9 per cent of GDP until 1998, but then declined to 1.7 per cent in 2002 and turned negative last year. The macroeconomic effect of this change has so far been muted by parsimonious corporations that are saving more in order to reduce their leverage, but sooner or later the swelling ranks of the retired people will drag down the overall private sector savings rate.
The implications are immense. If consumption increases while investment and government expenditures remain stable, aggregate demand will strengthen, which means the pace of economic growth over the next decade should pick up considerably. Moreover, once this expansion has closed the output gap and the pace of real GDP growth slowed to the sustainable rate of perhaps 1.5 per cent a year, greater demand will bring persistent price inflation. That will improve the health of the banking system and lighten the load for indebted companies.
A decline in the savings rate relative to investment will also translate into fewer net exports. Japan's chronic current account surplus could thus turn into an equally enduring deficit by the mid-2010s. Western protectionists may applaud this development, but the fall in Japanese capital exports will push up global interest rates and may even eventually compel the US to curtail its current account and budget deficits.
Regardless, the Japan of 2014 will scarcely resemble that of today. That country will have a very low savings rate, significant inflation and either a small current account surplus or an outright deficit. Its reputation for frugality will be but a quaint memory.
日本人将不再节俭
当前，日本正处在人口结构发生重大变化的初期阶段，这种变化最终将使日本重振经济。造成日本过去20年经济结构失衡的主要原因，是日本人口结构不平衡，高储蓄率的中年人数量过多，而他们现在正步入退休年龄。这种变化的重要性无论怎样都不会被高估。
对于发展中国家来说，一般的发展模式是这样的：工业化成熟以后，投资获利的机会减少，回报率降低，居民则相应减少储蓄，增加消费。这样，消费就取代资本支出成为该国新的总需求的主要来源。但尽管日本在70年代末80年代初就达到工业化成熟阶段，私营部门储蓄率依然和节俭的发展中国家一样高，直到最近才有所变化。
产生这种状况的原因有两个。首先，日本公司治理机制薄弱，无法迫使公司将收益转移给股东。相反，很多公司积蓄大量现金，直接导致企业界基本没有必要向住户部门筹借资金。第二，为数众多的日本人在80年代步入高储蓄率的40－64岁年龄层。
因此，在90年代后期，日本国民总储蓄占国民生产总值的比例始终高于30％，而欧盟的这一比例仅为20－22％，在举世公认大手大脚的美国，这一比例则更低。根据教科书上的理论，过剩的资本应当流向海外，让其他国家有能力购买更多的日本产品，这样就可以使日本保持完全就业，同时在全球范围降低利率。但是，由于日本经济总量极大，世界其他国家只能吸收日本必需出口总额的三分之一。这就造成资本过剩，并导致了抑制物价、加剧破产以及GDP缩水等各种威胁。
产生日本经济结构中最明显的弊端的原因在于，日本总是试图对这些过剩的资金加以利用。80年代末90年代初，低利率和草率的银行策略鼓励企业利用这笔资金获取生产能力的巨大膨胀，这使得GDP在短期内一度高涨。但是从长期来看，庞大的投资导致了产业结构的严重畸形。
1992年日本企业开始减少通过投资追求利润增长的行为，政府则通过加大预算赤字对企业进行补偿，以预防长期经济衰退。这项新的刺激因素确保了GDP持续以中速稳定增长，但同时也造成国债规模急剧膨胀。世纪之交，日本第一批原先的中年工人开始进入退休年龄。相对于其消费而言，他们的收入有所下降，他们同时开始把更多的财产转移给相对挥霍的儿孙辈。因此，家庭储蓄率骤跌。按资金流量的方式计算，1998年以前日本的家庭储蓄在GPD中一直占6-9％，到了2002年这一比例降至1.7％，去年则已经成为负数。由于企业厉行节约以求增加积累，降低负债经营的比重，这抵消了家庭储蓄降低对宏观经济所产生的作用。但是由于退休人口的不断增多，这迟早会使私营部门储蓄利率降低。
这些变化具有非常重要的意义。如果在投资和政府支出保持稳定的情况下消费能够获得增长，总需求就会增加，这意味着在未来10年内，日本经济增长的步伐将大大加快。而且，一旦经济增长能够抵消产能过剩，而且GDP的实际增长率降低到1.5％左右的可持续水平，需求的增加就会带来物价的持续上涨。这将会改善银行体系的经营状况，同时减轻负债企业的负担。
存款利率相对于投资的下降也将使净出口额减少。在2015年前后，日本在经常项目上的长期顺差将转变为均衡的长期赤字。西方贸易保护主义者或许会为这一发展变化而欢呼，但日本输出资本的减少将会促使全球利率攀升，甚至可能迫使美国压缩其经常项目和预算赤字。
不管怎样，日本在2014年的情况将和今天完全不同。那时该国将是低利率高通膨，经常项目顺差规模很小或者完全处于赤字地位。日本节俭的名声将彻底成为奇特的历史现象。
