Doha Aground
Surprise, surprise, the WTO talks in Geneva are "suspended." But in truth, hardly a surprise, since in May France's agricultural minister said, "I would prefer that the negotiations fail rather than . . . raise questions about . . . agriculture." At the G-8 summit this month President Jacques Chirac backed him up: "Only Europe has moved [and] gone to the extreme limits."
Both were responding to America's insistence that Europe do more to match its offer to cut farm subsidies -- in order to break the logjam at the heart of the now-collapsed Doha Round. But Europe had a partner in its "my way or the highway" approach. India's Commerce Minister Kamal Nath, presumably speaking for the developing nations, said more "flexibility" was needed, and then gave his definition of the word: "We can't negotiate subsistence and livelihood . . . we should not even be asked to do that."
Mr. Nath had walked out of earlier trade talks, arguing "there was no point" in continuing, which prompted the press at home to fault him for throwing a "temper tantrum." Not a bad label in this case, since India in 2004 accounted for less than 1% of world trade. And speaking after the collapse, which Mr. Nath characterized as "between intensive care and the crematorium," he sharply singled out the U.S. as the sole culprit: the "mind-set" of the Americans was "inverted . . . they're thinking only of market access."
What was surprising was the far more relaxed tone of Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorin, who until now has acted with India as co-spokesman for the developing nations. Yet not once in his press conference did he mention the U.S. by name, though several times he singled out the EU -- from whom "I didn't hear all I wanted to hear." And, he added, the breakdown of talks was "especially sad" for Brazil because the Doha talks can't be compensated by bilateral or regional deals.
That's quite a shift for a Brazilian foreign minister, since Rio has put so much effort into Mercosur, its home-grown idea for an integrated South American economy. Yet now, with Venezuela's Hugo Chávez's sudden emergence as a Mercosur "partner" -- and one who proposes to take Mercosur in a very different direction -- the failed WTO talks must look even more important than before. Their breakdown, Mr. Amorin concluded, now meant trade would revert to "the law of the jungle."
That is the issue, and if the jungle is once again to characterize world trade, then who is in a better position to operate in that realm than the U.S.? That's why it is so initially remarkable that the U.S. has stood, essentially alone, for the rules-based system the WTO represents. Last October, when President Bush announced his plan to cut domestic farm subsidies by 60% over five years, it was at first not taken seriously -- least of all by Peter Mandelson, the EU trade commissioner. Yet it was Alexander Downer, Australia's foreign minister, who represents one of America's principal competitors as an exporter of agricultural products, who said of the Bush proposal: "It's a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity that ought to be grasped."
Susan Schwab, the U.S. trade representative, had only weeks before been relegated as a lightweight who could not fill the shoes of Robert Zoellick or Rob Portman. Yet she made it clear once again that the U.S. would not accept a watered-down version of the Doha Round -- what she and others referred to as "Doha Lite." Before going to Geneva this past weekend, she returned to Washington to touch base with leaders in Congress, and especially with the über-powerful and knowledgeable Sen. Charles Grassley.
Along with Sen. Max Baucus, Mr. Grassley stressed that anything less than major world trade reforms, especially market access for America's farm goods, would be unacceptable to Congress: It would represent only another effort to "kick the can down the road." Their support in independent quarters was substantial: The World Bank recently concluded that "within agriculture, market access barriers are the key. Deep reductions in agricultural tariffs would deliver 12 times the gains that would be achieved by abolishing export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support to agriculture."
There are three conclusions from all this. The first is that the world's "small farmers" in several wealthy nations, whether in Japan, South Korea, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland or France, are the short-term winners. A Japanese farm trade negotiator put it frankly: "I regret the rupture of the WTO talks, but it enabled us to avoid the worst scenario, in which a food importer like Japan is forced to widely open its market."
The second is that the more dominant industrial sectors in those countries, especially in Japan and South Korea, are the long-term losers. Nihon Keizai, Japan's business newspaper, along with its Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, recognized that Doha's collapse "will deal a serious blow to Japan." Why? Because unlike the 2% to 4% tariff level on industrial goods in the U.S. and Europe, "influential developing countries, including Brazil and India, are at the 30% level."
The final conclusion, as many recognize, is that the way is now clear for a wholesale rush to more so-called regional and bilateral "Free Trade Areas." Washington has already pocketed several, including small ones such as with Oman, which was concluded just last week. It represents an early step towards a wider Middle East FTA, and the U.S. has more on its agenda, including imminent talks with much larger groups, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
But nations in the developing world should be forewarned. If they seek open access to the U.S. market of 300 million free-spending and import-prone Americans, their negotiators will be tested. As in Central America, Singapore, Chile and Australia, they may have to accept some distasteful conditions to close the deal. In the end, that may show it was not the U.S. that lost last weekend when the Doha Round was "suspended." It was everyone else.
Mr. Gordon, professor emeritus of political science at the University of New Hampshire, is the author, most recently, of "America's Trade Follies" (Routledge, 2001).
回到“丛林”时代
意外，意外，世界贸易组织(WTO)在日内瓦的会谈“暂停”了。但说实话，这根本算不上什么意外，因为法国农业部长5月份时就曾说过：“我宁愿(WTO)谈判失败也不愿......引起农业方面的问题。” 而法国总统希拉克则在八大工业国(G-8)峰会上声援他说：“只有欧洲采取了行动(并且)走到了极限。”
这两人都是在回应美国一贯坚持的立场──为了破解多哈回合谈判核心环节上的僵局，欧洲应该做更多事情以不负它削减农业补贴的承诺。但欧洲这种自以为是的态度并非独此一家。以发展中国家代言人自居的印度商业部长卡迈勒?纳特(Kamal Nath)表示，“灵活性”是需要的，然后他就给这个词下了定义：我们不能在关乎生存和生计的问题上讨价还价......我们甚至不应该被要求去谈这个。
以前曾在贸易谈判中拂袖而去的纳特声称，(谈判)“简直不能”再继续下去了，这句话导致印度媒体怪罪他“意气用事”。这顶帽子扣得不错，因为印度2004年在全球贸易额中所占的比例不足1%。纳特在被他称作“命悬一线”的全球贸易谈判失败后发表了谈话，独独将美国挑出来当作罪魁祸首：美国人“脑筋搭错了”......“他们只想著市场准入。”
令人意外的是巴西外交部长塞尔索?阿莫兰(Celso Amorin)那份轻描淡写的论调，他直到目前仍与印度代表一起充当著发展中国家的共同代言人。他在新闻发布会上确实一次也没提到美国，但却数次专门提到了欧盟──“我没有从(欧盟)那里听到任何我想听到的东西。”他还说，谈判破裂对巴西“尤其可悲”，因为多哈回合谈判不能被双边贸易协定和区域性贸易协议所替代。
这一态度对巴西外长来说确实是个不小的转变，因为巴西已经向它为实现南美经济一体化所提出的南方共同市场(Mercosur)计划倾注了极大努力。而现在，由于委内瑞拉总统查韦斯(Hugo Chavez)突然以该市场的“共同倡导者”的形像冒了出来，而且他还为该市场指出了一条完全不同的发展道路，所以失败了的WTO谈判有必要看上去比以往还要重要。阿莫兰总结说，谈判破裂意味著国际贸易又要受“丛林法则”的支配了。
确实是这么回事，如果国际贸易重新回到茫茫丛林之中，那么这个地界上还有谁能比美国更占优势呢？正因如此，美国单枪匹马站出来支持WTO所代表的规范化国际贸易体系初看起来就十分不同凡响了。去年10月，当布什总统宣布他计划在5年内将美国国内的农业补贴削减60%时， 人们都没认真看待他的这一表态，欧盟贸易委员曼德尔森(Peter Mandelson)尤其如此。但澳大利亚外交部长亚历山大?多纳(Alexander Downer)却独具慧眼地指出，布什的建议“是一个千载难逢的机会，应该抓住它。”澳大利亚是美国在农产品出口方面的主要竞争者之一。
美国贸易谈判代表苏珊?施瓦布(Susan Schwab)要想避免被归入不称职的贸易谈判代表之列只剩下几周的回旋时间了，但她再次明确表示，美国不会接受一个打了折扣的被她和其他人称为“缩水的多哈”(Doha-Lite)的谈判结果。在上周末前往日内瓦之前，施瓦布返回华盛顿向国会领袖们交了底，她特别征询了重量级参议员查尔斯?格拉斯利(Charles Grassley)的意见。
格拉斯利和参议员马克斯?鲍克斯(Max Baucus)都强调，如果不涉及对国际贸易进行重大改革的内容，特别是如果不解决美国农产品的市场准入问题，多哈回合的任何谈判结果都是国会所不能接受的，而这不过是又一个推卸责任的做法。他们得到了一些独立机构的强有力呼应。世界银行(World Bank)最近就得出结论，“在农业领域，市场准入壁垒是关键。与废除出口补贴以及取消其他可对贸易产生扭曲作用的国内农业扶持政策相比，大幅降低农产品关税所产生的效益要高11倍。”
从以上论述中可以得出三点结论。首先，多哈回合谈判失败将使日本、韩国、挪威、爱尔兰、瑞士和法国等少数几个富国的“小农”成为短期内的赢家。日本一位农业贸易谈判人员直言不讳地说：“我对WTO谈判破裂感到遗憾，但它却使我们避免了最坏的局面，即让日本这样的食品进口国被迫敞开本国市场的大门。”
其次，长期而言，在这些国家地位更重要的工业部门将成为输家，日本和韩国尤其如此。《日本经济新闻》(Nihon Keizai)和日本经济产业省(METI)都承认，多哈回合谈判失败“将给日本造成沉重打击。”为什么呢？因为美国和欧洲只对进口工业品征收2%至4%的关税，“而印度和巴西等有影响力的发展中国家关税水平高达30%。”
最后一点，像许多人承认的那样，各国一骨脑地去打造更多所谓的地区和双边“自由贸易区”已成为大势所趋。华盛顿在这方面已有些许斩获，例如美国上周就刚刚与阿曼签署了自由贸易协定。这是朝建立范围更广泛的中东自由贸易区迈出了第一步，这类自由贸易谈判在美国的日程表上还有更多，比如它与东南亚国家联盟(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)等规模大得多的贸易集团就即将展开双边谈判。
但各个发展中国家要惊醒了。如果它们想让3亿出手大方、喜爱进口产品的美国人购买自己的东西，它们的贸易谈判代表就要经受考验。就像中美洲、智利、新加坡和澳大利亚一样，为达成自由贸易协议它们可能不得不接受一些不那么令人愉快的条件。说到底，当多哈回合谈判上周末宣告“暂停”之时，失败的似乎不是美国，而是所有其他国家。
（编者按：本文作者伯纳德?戈登(Bernard K. Gordon)是新罕布什尔大学(University of New Hampshire)的荣誉退休政治学教授，最新著有America's Trade Follies一书。）
