A deal can still be salvaged from the ashes of Doha
Now that the smoke and fire have cleared from the suspension of the Doha talks, we should ask what phoenix can be summoned from the ashes. The current stalemate is due more to politics than personalities. All parties are exporting domestic political constraints into the negotiations.
Europe will go as far as its 2003 agricultural reform programme will allow. Some in Europe would like to go further. But there is no political consensus for this - certainly not when people see what is being offered in return. The US, which has not yet embarked on reform of its farm subsidies, does not want its changes to be prescribed by the World Trade Organisation. Some advanced developing countries are demanding more access to others' farm markets. The rest insist on maintaining tariffs so as to protect farm markets. Both demand an end to trade distorting subsidies in the rich world.
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It is a complex political picture - even before we get to the equally important questions of industrialtariffs and liberalisation of services, where the bulk of the economic gains exist.
Yet the positions in agriculture are not irreconcilable. They require that the European Union lift its average tariff cut close to that requested by the developing countries and ensure that we offer real new market access on our most sensitive import products. This is difficult but doable.
In farm subsidies, where the EU's reforms are already cutting historically high payments, the US has to cut no more than a few billion dollars worth of trade-distorting support from what it presently spends. Again, politically hard with mid-term elections in November, but not impossible.
The talks broke down on the US belief that it was being short-changed by the flexibility in agricultural market access indicated by the EU and developing countries. This led it to decline to offer an effective cut to its subsidies.
Commitment to farm reform in the US is fragile. American negotiators believe that their ability to persuade Congress to cut subsidies depends on others' markets being opened extensively to US crop producers. But developing countries say they are prepared to import more US farm goods but not US farm subsidies. As Kamal Nath, the Indian commerce minister, has said: "We don't mind competing withAmerican farmers but we cannottake on the US Treasury." The US needs to show what it is willing to do if it wants clearer answers on market access.
The EU in turn has an obligation to say exactly how its offer will benefit US and other exporters, but the effect of a 100 per cent elimination of export subsidies, a 75 per cent reduction in trade-distorting farm support and a 50 per cent tariff cut cannot be dismissed. All three numbers count, because subsidy cuts will see EU producers withdraw dramatically from global export markets. It is wrong to claim that this offer will be emptied of content by recourse to "sensitive products". The EU can reduce the number of sensitive products and offer improved market access even in this category.
Doha is now losing the race against time. It cannot now be concluded by the end of 2006. This means that the fast-track negotiating authority granted to the US president by Congress will probably expire before a final deal can be approved. As things stand, unless George W. Bush persuades Congress to renew his negotiators' mandate, the talks have little prospect of concluding for some years.
There are reasons - partly economic and partly political - why Mr Bush may choose to put this to Congress. He is a free trader. He believes in expanding trade and opening markets as the best way to generate and distribute wealth in the global economy. He is not ideologically committed to subsidies, nor is Mike Johanns, his pro-reform agriculture secretary.
Politically, Mr Bush will know that the death of the round would be cheered by the wrong people. A failure of Doha would strengthen those who want to turn their backs on globalisation and retreat into protectionism. It would undermine the WTO system, which has brought stability and predictability to the global economy. It would make it much harder to anchor China, India and other growing economies into an open, fair and multilateral trade system. What is at stake if we fail greatly outweighs the relatively small gaps that divide us.
We must avoid burning our bridges. We should try to find a way back to the table. None of us will get all we desire and, indeed, Europe has already dropped many of its aspirations for the round. But the costs of no agreement are far greater than the inconveniences of a less than perfect one.
The writer is EU trade commissioner
多哈谈判应该“浴火重生”
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着多哈回合贸易谈判的中止，谈判中的硝烟和战火都已经消散。既然如此，我们应该问问：从灰烬之中会再生出怎样的一只凤凰。目前的僵局，更多是出于政治因素，而非由于个性的差异。谈判各方都把本国的政治约束带到了谈判中来。
欧洲的局限是其2003年农业改革计划所允许的范围。部分欧洲国家愿意走得更远一些，但在这一点上没有达成政治共识――当人们看到自己现在得到的回报时，肯定不会达成共识。尚未开始改革农业补贴的美国，不希望由世界贸易组织(WTO)为自己的改革设定条条框框。一些较发达的发展中国家要求进一步进入其它国家的农产品市场。其它发展中国家则坚持征收关税，以保护自己的农产品市场。二者都要求结束富国扭曲贸易的补贴政策。
这是一个复杂的政治景象――而我们甚至还没有触及同样重要的工业品关税和开放服务业的问题，经济增长的很大一块都来自这两个方面。
然而各国在农业问题上的立场并非不可调和，这要求欧盟(EU)将平均关税削减幅度提高到接近发展中国家要求的水平，并确保我们在最敏感的进口产品方面实现真正的新市场准入。这有难度，但是可以做到。
在农业补贴方面，欧盟已通过改革削减处于历史高位的农业补贴，美国则须将目前导致贸易扭曲的补贴削减区区几十亿美元。同样，由于美国今年11月将举行中期选举，因此这在政治上有难度，但也并非不可能。
本轮谈判之所以破裂，是因为美国认为，欧盟和发展中国家在农业市场准入方面表示出的灵活程度，未能给予美国公平的回报。这促使美国拒绝大幅削减农业补贴。
美国在农业改革方面所作的承诺是脆弱的。美国谈判代表认为，他们能否说服美国国会削减农业补贴，取决于其它国家是否向美国农作物生产商广泛开放市场。但发展中国家表示，他们准备进口更多美国的农产品，而不是美国的农业补贴。正如印度商业和工业部长卡迈勒?纳特(Kamal Nath)所说：“我们不介意与美国的农民竞争，但我们无法迎战美国财政部(US Treasury)。”如果美国希望在市场准入方面得到更明确的回答，它需要表明，自己愿意为此做些什么。
反过来，欧盟有义务说出自己的提议到底将如何惠及美国和其它出口国，但100%取消出口补贴、将扭曲贸易的农业补贴削减75%，以及将农产品关税削减50%所造成的影响，不可能被忽视。这三个数字都颇为重要，因为削减补贴将导致欧盟生产商大规模地撤出全球出口市场。有人声称求助于“敏感产品”条款将使该让步内容空洞，这种说法是错误的。欧盟可以减少敏感产品的数量，甚至在这类产品方面也能提供有所改善的市场准入条件。
如今，多哈回合谈判正在输掉这场与时间的赛跑。目前看来，多哈回合谈判无法在2006年年底前圆满结束。这意味着，美国国会授予总统的“快速审批”谈判授权可能在最终协议得到批准前就到期了。在目前的情况下，除非乔治?W.?布什(George W.Bush)说服国会延长其谈判授权期限，否则，在未来若干年，贸易谈判圆满结束的前景都十分渺茫。
布什也许会选择将问题提交国会，这是有理由的――部分是经济上的，部分是政治上的。他是一位自由贸易者。他相信，扩大贸易、开放市场，是全球经济创造和分配财富的最佳方式。就思想层面而言，他并非一定要对农业实行补贴，支持改革的美国农业部长麦克?约翰斯(Mike Johanns)同样也不会。
从政治角度讲，布什知道，多哈回合谈判被断送，只会使“亲者痛，仇者快”。多哈回合谈判的失败，可能会让那些希望背弃全球化进程、退回到贸易保护主义的人实力增强。这会削弱为全球经济带来稳定性和可预测性的世贸组织体系，要引领中国、印度和其它发展中经济体进入一个公平开放的多边贸易体系，会更加困难。如果我们失败，带来的风险将远远超过我们之间相对较小的意见分歧。
我们必须避免不留后路的做法。我们应该努力找到办法，回到谈判桌前。没有人会得到自己想要的一切，的确，欧洲已经放弃了对这轮贸易谈判的许多渴望。但是，与一份不够完美的协议所带来的不便相比，无法达成共识的代价要大得多。
本文作者为欧盟贸易专员。
